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Abstract
Under the new agreement signed by member nations of the World Trade 
Organisation, the protection of intellectual property rights now forms a vital 
part of world trade rules. The aim of this thesis is to identify the economic 
implications of these new rules in the Philippine economy. For a country like 
the Philippines, the implications of stronger rules on intellectual property 
rights warrant consideration not only because of the current international 
pressure from industrial countries to enforce these rights, but as a means of 
enhancing the technological capability of the country to generate appropriate 
technology for its development.
A theoretical model has been constructed to analyse the likely impact of 
increased patent protection on output and reverse engineering efforts of 
developing countries. Comparative static analysis shows that a regime of 
stronger patent protection could have two opposing effects in developing 
countries. While the new rules will increase the supply of foreign technology 
available to Philippine firms, they will also raise the cost of acquiring these 
technologies, thus, the end result depends on which effect dominates.
Any benefit from stronger patent protection in developing countries 
however, would depend on other policy settings in these countries particularly 
those policies that affect the ability of a country to absorb and exploit existing 
and new technologies. A review of the technological capability of the 
Philippines suggests that the current state of the country's technological 
development decreases the potential benefits that could be derived from a 
regime of stronger patent protection. While the country has a considerable 
number of educated and trained engineers, very few are engaged in research 
and development activities. Moreover inappropriate trade, industrial and
macroeconomic policies have distorted technological choice and undermined 
the allocation of resources in the country. The challenge then for the 
government is to use the five year transitional period prescribed in the TRIPs 
agreement to correct its past mistakes in order to ensure that the benefits from 
strengthening patent protection would outweigh its cost implications.
Are there possible gains associated with patenting in the Philippines? An 
econometric analysis shows that an increase in industry specific innovations 
(both foreign and domestic) has a positive impact on the technical efficiency of 
various manufacturing industries in the Philippines. In this regard, a patent 
policy that stimulates inventive activity would have some positive 
repercussions on the country's technological development. Moreover, the 
nature of inventive activity in Philippine industry suggests that the recognition 
and enforcement of utility or petty patents would be beneficial from the point 
of view of developing countries where innovation is generally adaptive.
The positive implications of patent protection in Philippine industry is 
also reinforced in the analysis of the determinants of domestic innovation from 
which the relationship between domestic and international patenting could be 
deduced. Empirical estimates suggest that foreign patenting on balance 
increases derivative inventions in the chemical and engineering industries; 
however, in the case of light industries, the result indicates that foreign patents 
tend to inhibit derivative innovations. This implies that a regime of stronger 
patent protection would be more beneficial to the development of non- 
traditional, technology-intensive industries in the Philippines.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The rapidly changing patterns of world production and trade coupled with the 
increasing role of technological innovation in enhancing productivity and 
growth in industry have recently enhanced the economic value of knowledge 
and new ideas in the world economy. There is increased political pressure for 
the protection of the so called advanced technologies which, in the current 
state of increasing globalisation of world production are readily copied, thus, 
diminishing the incentive to undertake research and development. Most 
industrial countries are in broad agreement that the international trading 
system provides inadequate protection to intellectual property rights (Beath 
1990). This inadequate protection is particularly evident in markets of 
developing countries where patent and copyright infringements are a common 
practice which then effectively reduce the incentive to innovate.
As a result of the intense efforts of the industrial countries led by the 
United States, the legal protection of intellectual property rights through 
patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets has become a part of world 
trade rules. The Final Act of the Uruguay Round (UR) contains an agreement 
on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs) which will be 
administered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The agreement 
obliges member nations to provide a minimum standard of protection that 
grants patent rights for at least 20 years. Industrial countries are expected to 
comply within a year, while developing countries have been given an 
additional four year grace period, and least developing countries ten (GATT
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1994; Baldwin 1995).1 Despite the agreement, the economic implications of 
stronger patent protection in developing countries are still controversial. 
TRIPs represents a significant and unusual change in the GATT approach. It 
is unusual because it requires ‘positive’ integration by WTO members. This 
is in contrast to other GATT/WTO liberalisation which is regarded as 
‘negative’ integration like the removal of tariff barriers. Thus, in the case of 
TRIPs ‘harmonisation’ is unique, and although it is enforceable under the 
WTO dispute settlement procedures, it will not be easy.
Some doubts are expressed whether developing countries should 
strengthen their intellectual property right protection. Critics of a unified 
system of intellectual property rights say that developing countries would face 
potential costs from a regime of stronger patent protection. Earnings from 
patent protection accrue to knowledge producers who are mostly found in 
industrial countries. The social cost of patent protection is similar to losses 
incurred by society in the presence of a monopolist. A contrary view suggests 
that developing countries will benefit from greater access to new technologies 
which a regime of stronger patent protection would bring. Developing 
countries seeking to foster new industries depend on access to patented 
technology to compete on the international market. Many of these 
technologies cannot be pilfered and in the case of high-technology products, 
foreign companies must be attracted to build local plants or share their 
expertise with local producers. In a regime of lax patent protection this would 
rarely occur. From these two opposing views, it may be deduced that a shift 
towards stronger patent protection could have both negative and positive 
repercussions in developing economies. The major challenge facing
1 An additional five years is also given in areas where patent protection is not available (eg. 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals).
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developing countries therefore, is to transform such a policy regime from a 
rent transfer mechanism into an effective instrument for their own 
technological needs (Primo Braga 1995).
1.1 Objectives of the Study
This thesis analyses the impact of strengthening intellectual property 
protection in developing countries, particularly the Philippines, by focusing on 
patents, the major form of protection. Patent protection warrants consideration 
not only because of current international pressure to enforce intellectual 
property rights in the WTO, but as a means of enhancing the technological 
capability to generate appropriate technology for economic development. 
Studies on the economic implications of patent protection in developing 
countries have been confined largely to theoretical analyses which rely on very 
restrictive assumptions. This study presents some empirical findings using 
econometric techniques to examine two related hypotheses: (i) does patenting 
make a positive contribution to Philippine manufacturing? and (ii) does 
patenting stimulate domestic innovation? Specifically, this thesis aims to 
address the following issues:
(i) What are the perceived benefits and costs associated with intellectual 
property right protection in developing countries?
(ii) What does economic theory suggest about the repercussions of 
intellectual property right protection in developing countries?
(iii) Given that there are benefits and costs associated with a regime of 
stronger patent protection, does the current technological capability of the 
Philippines lead to the conclusion that benefits would outweigh the costs 
involved?
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(iv) One perceived gain from strengthening protection of intellectual 
property rights is that it will encourage inventive activity at the global level. 
Will an increase in industry specific innovation or knowhow be beneficial in 
Philippine manufacturing?
(v) Empirical studies suggest that inventive activity in developing 
countries like the Philippines generally involves adaptation to meet local needs 
(Deolalikar and Evenson 1989; 1990; Dahab 1986; Mikklesen 1885). Will 
stronger patent protection aid or hinder this type of innovative activity?
3.2 Organisation of the Study
This thesis is organised as follows:
Chapters 2 presents an overview of the nature of intellectual property 
rights and reviews the inclusion of intellectual property right protection in 
international trade negotiations.
Chapter 3 examines the divergence in the interests between industrial and 
developing countries when it comes to patent protection. It presents the 
economic implications of patent protection in developing countries like the 
Philippines. While costs are involved, what benefits might a country expect 
from strengthening intellectual property right protection?
Chapter 4 considers existing theoretical studies of patent protection in 
developing countries. Most of these studies suggest that on balance 
developing countries would lose from a regime of stronger patent protection. 
However, a model is proposed showing that patent protection may have two 
opposing effects in developing countries: a production effect which is positive 
and a rent effect which is negative. The final result depends on which effect 
dominates. In developing countries with substantial technological capability 
the production effect is likely to dominate.
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Chapter 5 assesses the technological capability of the Philippines and 
draws some insights into the implications of stronger patent protection in that 
country.
Chapter 6 examines the relationship between industry specific 
technological innovation and technical efficiency in Philippine manufacturing.
Chapter 7 is a pooled regression analysis of the determinants of domestic 
innovation in Philippine manufacturing industry. The emphasis is on the 
relationship between domestic and international patenting in light, chemical 
and drug, and engineering industries in the Philippines.
Finally, chapter 8 summarises and offers general conclusions.
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Chapter 2
The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: An Overview
The protection of intellectual property rights has long been regarded as a 
territorial issue, despite a number of international agreements among different 
countries. Many industrial economies set up institutions and enforcement 
mechanisms necessary for its protection. Developing countries however, 
showed little interest for its protection until recently when the legal protection 
of intellectual property rights was made a vital part of world trade rules.
2.1 Nature of Intellectual Rights
Intellectual property rights are defined as control over information or 
equipment that has commercial value. If the right can be defined, then it could 
be bought and sold in a market. The creation of new ideas has repercussions 
on society's welfare as measured by: consumer surplus, producer surplus and 
the rents that accrue to the owner of the idea. However, the interests diverge 
when it comes to intellectual property. The inventor will prefer the highest 
price possible as a reward for the novel idea generated. The producer wants 
easy access to ideas to facilitate production at minimum costs. The consumer's 
interest is to purchase the best products at the lowest possible prices. This 
latter concern is achieved through competition and implies that from a 
consumer's point of view the interest lies in the greatest possible dissemination 
of ideas. The more firms with access to an idea, the lower the product price. 
But this is not in the interest of either the inventor or the producer (Beath 
1990).
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Research and development and intellectual property rights pose problems 
in resource allocation. Because ideas are intangible, the benefits can not be 
completely appropriated. This raises questions related to spillover and 
infringements as well as concern over private and social returns when 
externality effects are considered (Beath 1990). Moreover, economic 
efficiency requires that ideas should be made available at marginal cost to all 
users, but marginal cost is zero if the nature of knowledge is a public good.
Since the benefits from knowledge are hard to appropriate once produced 
and that other users can not be perfectly excluded, the private returns to 
investments in new ideas are lower than social returns (Beath 1990). This 
notion forms the main rationale for providing protection to intellectual 
property which represents society's attempt to balance the interest of 
knowledge producers and users. In doing so, the aim is to promote inventive 
effort and dissemination of information by transferring some portion of the 
consumer surplus to the inventor. In principle both parties gain from 
intellectual property protection.
This view has been accepted in most industrial countries. Developing 
countries, however, believe the bulk of the gains from strengthening 
intellectual property protection accrue to the industrial countries where most 
technology is developed. Despite the lack of consensus among industrial 
countries about the standard to set for intellectual property protection, it 
became a contentious issue between the industrial and the developing 
countries in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
2.2 Intellectual Property Rights and the GATT
The Uruguay Round agenda went beyond the scope of the GATT negotiations 
and the traditional concern with reducing tariffs. The new issues introduced
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onto the agenda at Punte del Este (September 1986) included trade in services 
and trade aspects of investment policies and intellectual property rights. The 
industrial countries particularly the United States, insisted that intellectual 
property rights should be included. Technologies, brand names, copyrights are 
being copied and counterfeit products manufactured mostly in developing 
countries. The US position on the issue of intellectual property rights was 
summarised in a message from Washington to the US Trade Representative 
(USTR),
...requiring the USTR to identify those foreign countries 
that deny adequate and effective protection o f intellectual 
property or deny fair and equitable access for US 
persons relying on intellectual property protection and to 
determine which o f those countries are priority foreign 
countries...
I f  a country is identified as a priority foreign country, the 
USTR must within 30 days o f identification, decide 
whether to initiate an investigation. I f  the investigation is 
initiated, the USTR has up to 6 to 9 months to decide 
whether the measures under investigation are actionable, 
and if so, decide what response is appropriate, including 
possible retaliation (United States Information Service 
1992).
Early in the 1970s a call was made for strengthening the protection 
intellectual property rights. Some commentators questioned whether the 
GATT was an appropriate forum for discussions on intellectual property 
rights. These issues were regarded as under the jurisdiction of the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), established in 1967 by a
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Convention and brought into force in 1970 (Deardorff 1990). Many 
developing countries opposed the idea of bringing intellectual property rights 
within the GATT framework, because they feared that the industrial countries 
would have an advantage in the conduct of negotiations. Moreover, 
intellectual property rights are not necessarily related to trade or trade barriers; 
hence, the negotiating group in the Uruguay Round was given the task of just 
dealing with issues relating to trade and as a result, the trade related 
intellectual property rights including counterfeit goods or TRIPs group was 
created and included in the international trade policy issues.
By the mid 1980s, the limitations of intellectual property protection under 
the WIPO system became apparent. Although developed countries had their 
share of violations, it was more rampant in developing economies where legal 
protection is generally weaker (Lesser 1990a). In 1989 for example Finland, 
Norway and Spain were pressured by the United States to protect 
pharmaceutical products and processes or face retaliatory trade actions under 
Section 1988 of the Trade and Competitiveness Act. Later the EU also 
adopted similar policies against these three countries for failing to provide 
protection on pharmaceutical products (Lesser 1990a). The chemical and 
pharmaceutical industry is one area where patent protection is important. 
Innovation in this industry is costly and imitation is generally easy thus, strong 
patent protection is necessary to reward firms for their inventive effort 
(Frischtak 1990). Mansfield (1986) reports that based on a random sample of 
100 firms from 12 industries in the United States, 65 per cent of the 
innovations by pharmaceuticals firms would not have been marketed without 
protection. This is because the investment needed to develop new chemical 
products are also substantial. Virts and Weston (1981) estimate the cost to be 
approximately US$54 million based on 1976 prices while the Pharmaceutical
9
Association estimated this cost to be in the range of US$50 million to US$125 
million in 1990 (Nogues 1990b).
The US International Trade Commission estimated that in 1986, US 
companies worldwide registered losses between US$43 billion and US$61 
billion dollars due to inadequate protection in developing countries. This 
forced the United States to put pressure on a number of developing countries 
in Asia to reform their intellectual property laws and to increase enforcement 
efforts by threatening to remove their Generalized System of Preference 
benefits.
Brazil and India were put in the priority watch list by the United States in 
the late 1980s for failing to provide protection on foodstuff and 
pharmaceuticals. In 1995, major multinational firms have taken the battle 
against copyright pirates in Asian countries that distribute products ranging 
from Mickey Mouse souvenirs to Microsoft computer programs. In 1994, 
Microsoft claims that software piracy in Asia cost the company around 
US$2.22 billion while Walt Disney estimates its loses from Asian 
counterfeiters to be US$1 billion (Philippine Daily Inquirer 1995).
In China, it is believed that the pirating of compact disks is costing US 
companies around US$1.35 billion a year (The Australian 1994). Sega 
Enterprises of Japan also reported substantial losses due to video game piracy 
done by an electronic company in China.
In South Korea, there has been a growing concern about its enforcement 
and protection of copyrights, trade secrets and integrated circuits. Piracy of 
computer programs is also a serious problem with many large firms allegedly 
engaged in internal unauthorized copying of computer programs (United States 
Information Services 1992 ). The International Intellectual Property Alliance 
(IIPA) estimates loses from copyright violations in South Korea to be around
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US$356 million in 1994. Moreover, in the area of sound recordings and video 
manufacturing, many licenses have been issued to reproduce and distribute 
these products based on false documents (United States Information Services 
1992).
The Philippines along with other Southeast Asian economies was placed 
in the priority watch list mainly because of the problems of enforcement and 
inadequate protection of trademarks and copyrights. The IIPA estimates that 
in 1994, trade losses due to piracy in the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia 
amounted to US$ 441 million (Philippine Daily Inquirer 1995).1 2 In addition 
to very little penalties to infringers, the United States believed that many 
Southeast Asian countries do not clearly protect U.S. sound recordings. Piracy 
of these products including motion pictures is extensive and estimated to be in 
excess of 60 per cent of the market (United States Information Services 1992). 
The Philippines was put in the priority watch list in 1989 and Thailand got 
added into the list two years later despite making some amendments to the 
Thai Patent Law. Thailand was put in the priority foreign country list for the 
inadequate enforcement of copyright and patent laws resulting to significant 
losses in U.S. motion picture, sound recording and computer software 
industries.
Intellectual property right protection is important in information-related 
technology industries because of the fierce competition in this field and the 
sector’s strong reliance on research and development in order to survive. In 
many developed countries, these industries not only rely on patents,
1 Losses due to piracy in the Philippines is estimated at US$119 million. For Thailand and 
Indonesia, the estimated losses are US$154 million and US$168 million respectively.
2 As defined by Mody (1989) information-related technology industries include process and 
communication services as well as electronic hardware.
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trademarks and trade secrets but also on software copyright protection and on 
the protection of semi-conductor chip design. The significance of each type of 
protection vary over time and across subsectors of the industry (Primo Braga 
1990b).
For the audio, video and publishing industries on the other hand, 
protection is important because these creative efforts usually involve costs that 
are higher than the subsequent manufacturing costs of printing a book or 
stamping out a compact disc (The Australian 1994). In recent years, with the 
growing recognition that weak intellectual property protection has negative 
repercussions on local entertainment industries, various interest groups in 
developing countries have asked their government to strengthen copyright 
protection. India, one of the top nine film-exporting nations in the world and 
Brazil having the largest TV network in the developing world are realizing that 
they also have their own intellectual property to protect (Primo Braga 1990b 
and The Australian 1994).
All the above violations demonstrate that after many conventions and 
agreements covering patents, copyright and trademarks under the jurisdiction 
of the WIPO, the level of harmonization achieved remained limited. It also 
became clear that membership alone can not guarantee the strength of patent 
protection that exist at a country level. Indeed, although the world IPR system 
under WIPO has bigger coverage than GATT membership, there are some 
drawbacks: (i) the rules themselves are not broad enough and allows 
exceptions on some products like food, drugs and chemicals; (ii) the present 
system relies on the national treatment principle to provide protection but 
weak systems in other countries make the agreement inadequate; and (iii) the 
absence of enforcement provisions or any dispute settlement mechanisms 
(Baldwin 1995). The Uruguay Round agreement on TRIPs addressed the
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above issues and made substantial progress in overcoming them by requiring 
all GATT members to provide copyright, trademarks and patent protection for 
a specified number of years on the goods and services covered under the 
agreement. Enforcement procedures are also contained in the agreement, 
requiring countries to establish civil judicial procedures whereby individuals 
and firms can seek to enforce their intellectual property rights.
The primary objective of bringing intellectual property rights into the 
GATT framework was to harmonise its treatment in different countries. In the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States pushed persistently for 
bringing national laws and enforcement mechanisms into conformity with US 
procedures on patents, copyrights and trademarks. Other industrial countries 
prefer 'convergence' rather than full harmonisation. The European Union (EU) 
was concerned with national rules that discriminate against foreign imports in 
favour of domestic activity (Beath 1990). But despite the lack of consensus 
among industrial countries on the manner of implementation of intellectual 
property right protection, the industrial countries have been successful in 
having intellectual property on the agenda of the Uruguay Round and upon its 
conclusion, an agreement on TRIPs has been drafted which would be 
administered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the successor to the 
GATT.
2.3 The TRIPs Agreement
The legal protection of intellectual property through patents, copyrights, 
trademarks and trade secrets entered into effect in January 1995 when the 
WTO holds its inaugural meeting. One of the WTO's three councils will 
supervise the Uruguay Round agreement on trade related aspects of intellectual 
property rights. The agreement is based on traditional GATT principles of 
non-discrimination and transparency. In addition, it provides for a minimum
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Standard of protection of intellectual property rights, with WTO members free 
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the agreement within 
their legal systems and practices. The TRIPs agreement has seven parts: (i) 
general provisions and basic principles; (ii) standards concerning the 
availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights, (iii) enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, (iv) acquisition and maintenance of intellectual 
property rights and related inter-parties procedures, (v) the dispute prevention 
and settlement, (vi) the transitional arrangements, and (vii) institutional 
arrangement and final provisions.
General provision and basic principles are similar to those in other 
intellectual property conventions. Article 3 contains a national treatment 
provision under which the residents of other members must be given treatment 
that is no less favourable than that accorded to its own nationals with regard to 
intellectual property protection (GATT 1994). Article 4 introduces the most­
favoured-nation provision (MFN). Under this provision and with a few 
defined exceptions, any advantage, favour or benefit, a member gives to the 
nationals of other member countries must be extended immediately and 
unconditionally to the nationals of all other members, even if the treatment is 
more favourable than that which is extended to its own nationals. Deviations 
from MFN are permitted if they represent international agreements on judicial 
assistance or law enforcement of a general nature, or rights not covered by the 
TRIPs agreement, or international agreements on aspects related to protection 
of intellectual property right that were have been put into force before the 
WTO agreement (Primo Braga 1995)
The principle of transparency is introduced in Article 63. Member 
countries have an obligation to publish their laws and regulations on 
intellectual property rights, as well as judicial decisions and administrative
14
rulings on intellectual property rights. This practice would help governments 
and holders of intellectual property right to be acquainted with measures 
affecting their interests.
Intellectual property right standards on the TRIPs agreement establishes 
minimum standards on the availability, scope and use of intellectual property 
rights, including copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, patents, integrated circuit designs, trade secrets, as well as control of 
anti-competitive practices in contractual licenses.
The Paris Convention (1883) obliges members to comply with the 
substantive provisions on patent protection. That agreement provides for a 
minimum 20 year patent term for most inventions, whether product or 
processes, in all fields of technology. This implies that many countries have to 
change their patents' laws to accommodate the new provisions.
Inventions may be excluded from patents if commercial exploitation is 
prohibited for reasons of public order and morality. Exemptions are also 
permitted for diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals, plants, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals. With regard to plant varieties, however, 
members are required to provide protection either by patents, or by a specific 
individual sui generis system (such as plant breeders' rights).
The TRIPs agreement also identifies the rights of the patentee which 
include the exclusive right of importation as provided. (Article 28). However, 
no stipulation has been provided on the conditions of exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights at the international level. This implies that after the first
3See GATT (1994 ) and Primo Braga (1995) for a more detailed discussion of the other forms 
of protection other than patent protection.
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distribution of a product covered by patent protection, a title holder will no 
longer have the right to prevent further distribution of the protected product in 
the domestic market. Furthermore, the agreement does not prevent the import 
of protected goods from third parties.
Detailed conditions regarding the use of a patent by governments without 
authorisation from patent owners are set out in Article 31. The article, 
imposes strict conditions on the use of compulsory licenses.
Process patents, arising from their protection are automatically extended 
to the product directly obtained from the process. This is designed to 
strengthen the protection granted to process patents. Enforcement of this 
provision (Article 34) stipulates that under certain circumstances the burden of 
proof is placed on alleged infringers to demonstrate that the process used to 
produce an identical product is different from the patented process.
Enforcement of intellectual property protection is required from member 
governments of the WTO who are required to provide procedures and 
remedies under their domestic laws that ensure that intellectual property rights 
are protected, regardless of the holder of the rights. For the industrial 
countries, particularly the United States, this was crucial because standards are 
only relevant if they are enforceable. Enforcement procedures should be fair 
and equitable, not complicated or costly, nor entail unreasonable time limits 
and unwarranted delays. They should not create barriers to legitimate trade 
and should be open to judicial review. There is no obligation to establish a 
judicial system for the protection of intellectual property rights that is distinct 
from the system of enforcement of general laws, nor to give priority to 
intellectual property rights.
The civil and administrative procedures and remedies outlined in the 
agreement give judicial authorities the right to order the disposal or destruction
16
of goods that infringe the provisions of the TRIPs agreement. Customs 
authorities are also given the power to prevent suspected pirated and 
counterfeit goods from being imported and exported. Members are obliged to 
provide for criminal procedures and penalties to deter wilful infringers.
Acquisition and maintenance of agreement conditions are outlined in 
Article 62. It requires that procedures like registrations, should be consistent 
with the set provisions. The granting of patent protection must be expeditious 
so that the effective period of protection is not be diminished.
Dispute prevention and settlement will take place under the integrated 
Dispute Settlement Procedures established in the WTO agreement. For 
dispute prevention, the possibility of cross-sectoral retaliation from other 
member countries is expected to play a role in strengthening protection of 
intellectual property rights on a global basis (Primo Braga 1995). However, 
there is a five year moratorium in the use of the integrated dispute settlement 
procedures to handle indirect violations such as foreign exchange restrictions 
on royalty payments which would impair the benefits of patent holders.
Transitional arrangements allow industrial countries one year to bring 
legislation and practices into conformity with the TRIPs agreement. On the 
other hand, developing countries and economies in transition have five years 
transition period. In addition, these countries are entitled to an additional five 
year transitional period in technology areas that were not protected prior to the 
agreement. All member countries have only one year for transition to national 
treatment, MFN and multilateral agreements on acquisition and maintenance 
of protection. Least developed countries are given 11 years for transition to 
comply with the provisions of the agreement. They are entitled to request 
further extensions except for its national treatment and MFN obligations.
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Institutional arrangements are set up to execute the provisions of the 
agreement. These arrangements include (i) the creation of the Council for 
TRIPs which would monitor the operation and implementation of the 
agreement, (ii) measures adopted to accommodate the protection of specific 
subject matter, (iii) conditions for review, (iv) amendments, (v) reservations, 
(vi) security exceptions and (vii) an exhortation to international cooperation 
(Primo Braga 1995).
2.4 Patent Protection in Developing Countries: Some Stylised Facts
Most nations conferring patent rights prior to the TRIPs agreement had agreed 
to accept broad guidelines that come from the Paris Convention of 1883. As 
of 1988, the Paris Convention had been adopted by 98 member countries, 
including many developing countries who are also members of the WTO 
(Appendix 2.1). Most of developing countries are former colonies of industrial 
countries which adopted the patent laws of their metropolitan powers. The 
Philippines, for example, adopted the Spanish patent law system when it was 
under Spain but when it came under United States' control, it adopted the US 
system.4 (Sapalo 1992).
The Philippine's patent system based on the US system was established on 
June 20, 1947 by the Republic Acts 165 and 166. The Office became the
4The Philippines has a long history of patent protection and records show that the country 
observed patent protection even before 1862 when the country was still a colony of Spain. 
The country adopted the Spanish patent law which grants the inventor an exclusive right to the 
exploitation o f his invention. The patent term is usually set at five, ten or twenty years 
depending on the preference of the inventor. Patent grants for five or twenty years may be 
renewed; however, the entire term of patent protection should not exceed twenty years.
During the Spanish rule, no formal organisation or institution was set up to administer patent 
applications and grants in the country; all patent applications made by domestic residents had 
to be sent to Spain for examination and grant.
The Philippines was ceded to the United States by Treaty of Paris in 1898. By the provisions 
of Article 13 o f the treaty, patents granted during the Spanish period continued to be enforced. 
But subsequently, all patent applications were filed with the United States Patent Office.
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authority to grant letters of patents for inventions, industrial designs and utility 
models. The Patent Office was originally placed under the Department of 
Justice. Several months later, it was transferred to the Department of
Commerce and Industry which became the Department of Trade and Industry’ 
(DTI).
The Philippines became a member of the Paris Convention in 1965. The 
international system of patent classification came into effect in the 1970s. 
During the transition, each patent was given both US and international patent 
classification.
Under the Philippine patent system, priority is given to the first person to 
invent. In most Western European nations however, patents are issued to the 
first person to file a claim to be the original inventor. The life of a patent in 
the Philippines is normally set at 17 years from the date of patent issue. To be 
granted a patent in the Philippines, an inventor has to meet three criteria: 
novelty, usefulness and non-obviousness.
Available statistics show that a substantial proportion of patents granted in 
developing countries go to foreign firms or non-nationals (see Table 2.1). In 
general, leading industrial countries like the United States, Japan and Germany 
dominate patents in the developing countries. Foreign patents are concentrated 
on the chemical and drug industries, as well as high technology intensive 
industries.
Despite the presence of a law protecting patents in most developing 
countries, the dominance of foreign nationals in patent grants has always 
worried the developing countries and has raised doubts about the merits of 
such a policy. In the 1970s, most developing countries made an effort to 
obtain better terms of technology transfer from the industrial countries. Some 
developing countries such as India even changed their system of intellectual
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property right protection, on the grounds that royalties and patent fees 
constituted 'unfair trade' because industrial countries had no moral or natural 
right to be awarded such protection in developing countries (Evenson 1992).
Enforcement of intellectual property laws is a problem in most developing 
countries. In the Philippines for example, limited enforcement is evident in 
the backlog of pending applications and cases of patent disputes for settlement 
in domestic courts. These delays reduce the effective life of a patent. Of the 
362 cases pending in the Philippines in September 1992, only 3 cases were 
resolved in that month, while 15 new cases were filed.
Table 2.1 Distribution of invention patents granted in selected countries, 1965, 1975 
and 1990, in per cent
1965 1975 1990
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
Industrial Countries
Germany, Fed. Rep. of 59.7 40.3 49.6 50.4 38.8 61.2
Japan 66.2 33.8 79.2 20.8 84.8 15.2
USA 80.1 19.9 64.7 35.3 52.4 47.6
NICs
Hongkong .. 2.1 97.9
Singapore .. .. .. .. 0.0 100.0
South Korea 61.2 38.8 48.0 52.0 32.9 67.1
ASEAN
Malaysia3 4.3 95.7 1.3 98.7 4.5 95.5
Philippines 4.0 96.0 10.4 89.6 3.0 97.0
Thailand*5 •• 25.0 75.0 5.0 95.0
a l 980 figures for 1975. 
^ 1982 figures for 1975.
Source: World Intellectual Property Organisation, World Industrial Property Statistics, various issues, WIPO, 
Geneva.
2.5 TRIPs and the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing 
Countries
The agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property is annexed to 
the Marrakech agreement that established the World Trade Organisation. To
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comply with the agreement requires revisions to existing patent law 
legislations, systems and practices in industrial and developing countries. 
Developing countries with inadequate protection face major changes. A 
number of developing countries will have to revise their patent laws to raise 
protection up to 20 years and to cover both product and process patents. 
Moreover, many developing countries provided only limited protection on 
pharmaceutical and chemical products; to comply with the minimum standard 
set out in the agreement these countries must expand the coverage of 
protection on pharmaceutical and chemical products.
For the Philippines, compliance with the agreement entails significant 
changes in laws and practice notwithstanding the well established patent 
system. Changes will include revisions in the patent laws to accommodate 
protection of plant varieties, an extension of patent protection to 20 years and 
additional legal reform in to ensure stricter enforcement of patent laws.
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Appendix 2.1. Overview of Patent Protection Among WTO Member Countries3
GATT Member Countries Duration 
of Patent 
Protectiond
Membership in Major 
WIPO Conventions
P-Paris Convention, 
B-Beme Convention, 
U-Intemational Convention 
for the Protection o f New  
Varities o f Plants (UPOV) 
GPB-Grants Plant Breeder's 
Rights but not a member of  
UPOV
Available Patent Protection
1 -Petty Patents, 2-Pharmaceuticals,
2a- Processes in pharmaceutical production 
patented under some circumstances, 
3-Food Products, 3a-Processes in food 
production patented under some 
circumstances, 4-Chemical Products, 
5-Plant/Animal Varieties, 5a-Plant Varieties 
but not animal varieties, 
6-Surgical Procedures, 
7-Microorganisms and Products Thereof
Developing Countries and Transition Economies
Angola . . P
Antigua and Barbuda . . . . . .
Argentina 5,10,15 GD P,B 3,4,5,6,7
Bahrain . . . .
Bangladesh*5 16 GD,EP P 2,3,4,5,6,7
Barbados 15 FD,EP P,B 2,3,4,7
Belize
Benin*5 . . P,B ..
Bolivia 15 GD P,B 5,6,7
Botswana*5 20 FD . . 2,3,4,5,6,7
Brazil 15 FD P,B 1,2a,3a,5,6
Brunei , ,
Burkina Fasob P,B
Burundi*5 P
Cameroon 10 GD P,B 2,3,4,7
Central African Republic*5 10 FD,EP P,B 2,3,4,7
Chad*5 20 FD P,B 3,4,5,6,7
Chile . . P,B,GU 2,3,4,5,6,7
Colombia 5 GD,EP B 2a,3a,4,7
Congo 10 FD,EP P,B 2,3,4,7
Costa Rica B . .
Cote d'Ivoire 10 FD,EP P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Cuba 10 FD P 7
Cyprus 20 FD P,B 2,3,4,7
Czech Republic 15 AD P,B 5
Dominica . . , , , ,
Dominican Republic 5,10,15 GD P 2,3,4,5,6,7
Egypt 15 FD,EP P,B 4,5,6,7
El Salvador . . B
Fiji . . B
Gabon 15 FD,EP P,B 2,3,4,7
Gambia*5 20 FD P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Ghana 20 FD P,B 3,4,7
Grenada , . , ,
Guatemala , . . .
Guinea Bissau*5 .. P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Guyana .. . . . .
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GATT Member Countries Duration
of Patent 
Protection^
Membership in Major 
WIPO Conventions
P-Paris Convention, 
B-Beme Convention, 
U-Intemational Convention 
for the Protection o f New 
Varities o f Plants (UPOV) 
GPB-Grants Plant Breeder’s 
Rights but not a member o f  
UPOV
Available Patent Protection
1 -Petty Patents, 2-Pharmaceuticals,
2a- Processes in pharmaceutical production 
patented under some circumstances, 
3-Food Products, 3a-Processes in food 
production patented under some 
circumstances, 4-Chemical Products,
5-Plant/Animal Varieties, 5a-Plant Varieties 
but not animal varieties,
6-Surgical Procedures,
7-Microorganisms and Products Thereof
H aiti 5 ,1 0 ,2 0  G D P 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
H o n d u ras . . P ,B
H o n g k o n g . . . . . .
H u n g ary 20  FD P ,B ,U 4,5
In d ia 14 PD B 5,7
In d o n es ia . . P 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
Israel . . P,B
Jam a ica . . B . .
K en y a 20  FD P,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,7
K o rea  R ep u b lic  o f 12 PD P 1,2 ,5 ,6 ,7
K uw ait , , M ..
Lesotho*3 20  FD P ,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
M acau . . M ##
M adagascar*3 . . P ,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
M alawi*3 16 P D ,E P P ,B 2 a ,3 a ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
M alay sia 15 G D P,B 2 ,3 ,4
M aldives*3 . .
Mali*3 10 F D ,E P P,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,7
M alta . . P,B . .
M auritiana*3 10 F D ,E P P ,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,7
M au ritiu s 14 F D ,E P P,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
M ex ico 14 G D P ,B 2 a ,3 a ,7
M o ro cco 20  FD P ,B 3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
M ozam bique*3 , , . . . .
M yanm ar*3 M M
N am ib ia . . B ..
N ic a ra g u a . . . .
Niger*3 10 F D ,E P P ,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,7
N ig e ria 20 FD P 2 ,3 ,4 ,6 ,7
P ak is tan 16 G D ,E P B 3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
P arag u ay . . B . .
P eru 5 G D B 4,7
P h ilip p in es 17 G D P ,B 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
P o lan d 15 FD P ,B 1,7
Q a ta r . . , ,
R o m an ia P ,B , ,
Rwanda*3 20 FD P ,B 2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7
S a in t K itts  an d  N e v is . . . .
S ain t L ucia , # B
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Available Patent Protection
1-Petty Patents, 2-Pharmaceuticals,
2a- Processes in pharmaceutical production 
patented under some circumstances, 
3-Food Products, 3a-Processes in food 
production patented under some 
circumstances, 4-Chemical Products, 
5-Plant/Animal Varieties, 5a-Plant Varieties 
but not animal varieties, 
6-Surgical Procedures, 
7-Microorganisms and Products Thereof
St. Vincent & Grenadines . . , , , ,
Senegal 10 FD,EP P,B 2,3,4,7
Sierra Leone*5 20 FD . . 2,3,4,5,6,7
Singapore . . . . . .
Slovak Republic P,B , ,
Sri Lanka 15 GD P,B 2,3,4,7
Suriname . . P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Swaziland . . P
Tanzania 20 FD P 2,3,4,7
Thailand 15 FD B 4,6,7
Togo*5 . . P,B . .
Trinidad and Tobago 14 GD P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Tunisia . . P,B . .
Turkey 5,10,15,20 FD P,B 4,6,7
Uganda*5 20 FD P 2,3,4,7
United Arab Emirates . . . . . .
Uruguay 15 GD P,B 1,3,5,6,7
Venezuela 5,10,15 GD B 5,6,7
Yugoslavia . . P,B . .
Zaire*5 20 FD P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Zambia*5 16 PD P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Zimbabwe . . P,B . .
Industrial Countries
Australia 16 PD,EP P,B 2,3,4,5,6,7
Austria 18 PD P,B 2,3,4,7
Belgium 20 FD PjB.U 2,3,4,7
Canada 17 GD P,B 3,4,7
Denmark 20 FD P,B,U 2,3a,4,7
Finland 20 FD P,B 4,7
France 20 FD P.B.U 2,3,4,7
Germany 20 FD P,B.U 1,2,3,4,7
Greece 15 FD P,B 3,4,5,6,7
Iceland 15 GD P,B 4,5,6,7
Ireland 16 PD,EP P,B,U 2,3,4,5,6,7
Italy 20 FD P,B,U 1,2,3,5a,7
Japan 15 PD P,B,U 1,2,3,4,5,7
Liechtenstein 20 FD P,B 2,3,4,7
Luxembourg 20 FD P,B 2,3,4,6,7
Netherlands 20 FD P,B,U 2,3,4,7
GATT M ember Countries Duration 
of Patent 
Protectiond
M embership in M ajor 
W IPO Conventions
P-Paris Convention, 
B-Beme Convention, 
U-Intemational Convention 
for the Protection o f New  
Varities o f Plants (UPOV) 
GPB-Grants Plant Breeder's 
Rights but not a member of 
UPOV
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GATT Member Countries Duration
of Patent 
Protectiond
Membership in Major 
WIPO Conventions
P-Paris Convention, 
B-Beme Convention, 
U-Intemationai Convention 
for the Protection o f New 
Varities o f Plants (UPOV) 
GPB-Grants Plant Breeder's 
Rights but not a member of  
UPOV
Available Patent Protection
1-Petty Patents, 2-Pharmaceuticals,
2a- Processes in pharmaceutical production 
patented under some circumstances, 
3-Food Products, 3a-Processes in food 
production patented under some 
circumstances, 4-Chemical Products,
5-Plant/Animal Varieties, 5a-Plant Varieties 
but not animal varieties,
6-Surgical Procedures,
7-Microorganisms and Products Thereof
New Zealand 16 PD P,B,U 2,3,4,5,6,7
Norway 20 FD P,B 4,7
Portugal 15 GD P,B 1,6,7
South Africa 20 FD P,B,U 2,3,4,7
Spain 20 FD P,B,U 1,3,7
Sweden 20 FD P,B,U 2,3,4,7
Switzerland 20 FD P,B,U 2,3,4,7
United Kingdom 20 FD P,B,U 2,3,4,7
USA 17 GD,EP P,B,U 2,3,4,5,6,7
aBased on GATT membership as of April 15, 1994 and patent protection of 1988. 
bLeast developed countries according to the United Nations.
cAccording to GATT, developing countries include Lantin America, Europe (Romania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia), Africa (excluding South Africa), the Middle East and Asia (including Oceania) less the 
OECD members therein. Transition economies include the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
the Slovak Republic.
dFD from filing date; PD from publication date; GD from grant date; EP extension possible-normally 
5 years.
Source: Primo Braga, C.A., 1995. Trade-Related Intellectual Property Issues: the Uruguay
Round agreement and its economic implications, presented at the Uruguay Round and 
the Developing Countries, A World Bank Conference, January 26-27, 1995.
Siebeck, W. E., 1990. Strengthening Protection of Intellectual Propertyin 
Developing Countries: a survey of the literature, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
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Chapter 3
Intellectual Property Right Protection and Trade: The Conflict 
Between Industrial and Developing Countries
The divergence of interests between industrial and developing countries over 
the protection of intellectual property has been highlighted in the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. While the benefits of increased patent protection will 
almost certainly increase incomes of patent holders in industrial countries and 
increase net national income, these gains may result in costs for the developing 
countries.
3.1 Accounting for Intellectual Property in Trade: The Interest of 
Industrial Versus the Interest of the Developing Countries
Intellectual property can be accounted for in international commerce either 
directly or indirectly. The indirect approach involves the embodiment of 
patented information in goods and services passing in trade. The direct 
approach records intellectual property in international trade in two ways: first, 
innovating firms or individuals may opt to sell or to rent their patented 
information for royalties and licensing fees; and second, firms may choose to 
retain control over the use of their valuable ideas through direct foreign 
investment. In the latter case, returns to intellectual property are included in 
fees from affiliates, repatriated profits and capital income (Maskus 1990).
Trade in intellectual property and technology intensive goods
Despite a number of limitations and difficulties inherent in measuring
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international trade in intellectual property1 2, it would be vital to show the basic 
indicators of this trade to see how the interest among the developing and 
industrial countries diverge from each other when it comes to issues related to 
intellectual property. The developing countries included in the analysis are 
ASEAN countries and newly industrialising countries. These countries 
include most of the fast growing economies of Asia which have been 
identified by industrial countries like the United States, Japan and the 
European Union as engaging in unfair trade because of inadequate protection. 
The Philippines will be highlighted throughout the analysis.
The share of intellectual property and technology-intensive goods in 
exports and imports of the identified countries are shown in table 3.1. 
Intellectual property-intensive goods are selected based on the prominence of 
intellectual property disputes and the inclusion of goods that rely on the major 
forms of protection like patents, trademarks and copyrights (Maskus 1990). 
Technology intensive goods3, on the other hand, represent goods have high 
ratios of research and development expenditures in value added. Trade in 
intellectual property as embodied in goods has been growing rapidly in recent
‘These measurement problems include: (1) disentangling the effect of the value of intellectual 
property on the traded prices of goods and services; (2) the fact that trade in inputs is often 
intra-firm in nature suggests that prices may have little relation to the economic value on the 
underlying intellectual property; and (3) direct market transaction measures like licensing fees 
may be an unreliable indicator of the economic value of intellectual property because possible 
changes in policy regimes can affect its exploitation (Maskus 1990).
2The list of intellectual property intensive goods was obtained from Maskus (1990) and 
includes: pharmaceuticals, perfumes and cosmetics, polymerization products, metal-working 
machine tools, automatic data processing machines, electronic micro-circuits, motor vehicle 
parts, travel goods and handbags, measuring and controlling instruments, watches, printed 
matter, toys and sporting goods, and recorded discs and tapes.
3 The Krause system of classification was used to identify the products included in this group. 
Technology intensive goods is composed of: chemical elements and compounds, petroleum 
and coal, medicinal products, fertilizers, explosives and pyrotechnical products, plastic 
materials, other chemicals, machinery, electrical machinery and equipment, aircraft, photo and 
cinema supplies, and developed cinema films.
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years (table 3.1). Also evident from table 3.1 is that the share of intellectual 
property and technology intensive goods in total exports has become 
increasingly significant for the ASEAN developing countries and the newly 
industrialising countries in Asia. The Philippines illustrates this clearly, 
particularly in electronic microcircuits, and measuring and controlling 
instruments. The export share of these two goods in total manufactured 
exports was negligible until late in the 1970s, when their share increased 
sharply, reaching 20 and 22 per cent respectively, by 1990.
Figure 3.1 shows the trend of revealed comparative advantage indices 
(RCA) of selected intellectual property goods across countries (regions) 
computed using 3.1
where X refers to exports, superscripts k and T stand for the commodity and 
total exports respectively. The first subscript indicates the reporting country 
(region) while the second, indicates the trading partner which in this case is the 
world. The index is also known as the export specialisation ratio and is 
defined as the country's (region's) sectoral share of intellectual property and 
technology intensive goods divided by the world sectoral share of intellectual 
property and technology intensive goods.
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Table 3.1 Share of intellectual property and technology intensive goods in selected 
countries and regions, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1990 and 1993, in per cent
Country/Region 1965 1975 1985 1990 1993
USA
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Exports 13.1 13.3 21.0 23.2 23.9
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Exports 34.7 38.0 45.1 44.9 44.6
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Imports 4.8 8.2 13.6 18.5 21.8
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Imports 10.4 13.8 20.6 25.1 27.9
European Union
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Exports 10.6 12.0 14.1 16.8 16.9
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Exports 27.3 29.9 31.7 32.3 33.7
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Imports 6.7 9.0 12.7 15.8 17.3
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Imports 16.9 19.6 24.4 28.2 28.7
Japan
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Exports 8.5 9.5 19.6 26.6 29.0
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Exports 17.1 22.3 29.2 38.1 40.9
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Imports 4.4 4.2 6.3 10.5 12.7
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Imports 11.7 8.6 13.3 17.2 19.0
Newly Industrialising Countries
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Exports 7.2 16.2 20.0 29.1 34.0
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Exports 5.3 11.3 17.6 29.0 36.3
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Imports 7.4 12.1 17.8 25.8 28.4
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Imports 17.5 25.6 27.4 34.6 35.9
ASEAN
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Exports 0.4 1.8 10.0 18.1 28.4
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Exports 0.6 2.0 8.7 15.1 30.0
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Imports 8.1 7.8 17.8 25.4 28.2
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Imports 22.6 34.2 35.4 43.0 44.0
Philippines
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Exports 0.1 0.1 12.2 33.2 19.4
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Exports 0.4 1.1 9.2 23.5 15.3
Share of IP Intensive Goods, Imports 7.2 7.8 10.9 32.6 14.0
Share of Technology Intensive Goods, Imports 27.2 32.2 22.8 45.2 31.8
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on United Nations Trade
Statistics, 1995.
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Figure 3.1
Selected countries and regions: revealed comparative advantage indices of 
intellectual property intensive goods, 1965-93
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on United Nations Trade 
Statistics, February 1995.
Industrial countries like the United States, Japan and EU have a strong 
comparative advantage in intellectual property-intensive goods. Middle 
income countries comprising ASEAN and the newly industrialising countries 
have recently been catching up in this trade. RCA figures for specific IP and 
technology intensive goods ( Tables 3.2 and 3.3) suggest that the United States 
has a strong comparative advantage in automatic data processing machines, 
motor vehicle parts, printed matter and recorded disc and tapes, chemical 
compounds, manufactured fertilisers and aircraft, electronic microcircuits, and 
measuring and controlling equipments, explosive and pyrotechnical products, 
electro-medical and x-ray equipments. The interest of the United States then is 
for foreign nations to strengthen intellectual property protection in order to 
prevent residents of other countries from copying, as well as from importing 
infringed goods elsewhere.
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The EU also shares the same interests as the United States; however, its 
concern is directed more towards the protection of pharmaceutical products, 
perfumes and cosmetics, and polymerisation products. Japan, on the other 
hand, overwhelmingly relies on its high technology-intensive exports of metal 
working machine tools, automatic data processing machines, measuring and 
controlling instruments and both electrical and non-electrical machineries.
The interests of middle income countries like the newly industrialising 
countries and the ASEAN are different from those of the industrial countries. 
The comparative advantage of the middle income countries relies on non- 
sophisticated and mostly labor intensive goods like travel goods and handbags, 
watches, toys and sporting goods and electronic micro-circuits (table 3.2). 
These countries are criticised for having a weak system of protection for 
intellectual property. However, most governments of developing countries 
believe that production of this type of goods may be enhanced more by 
technological diffusion or the dissemination of ideas from other countries 
which may be hampered by strengthening intellectual property protection. 
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that as these countries become more 
technologically sophisticated, their interest may change toward the provision 
of non-discriminatory intellectual property protection, particularly in the area 
of patent protection (Maskus 1990).
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Table 3.2 Revealed comparative advantage indices of selected countries and regions 
in selected intellectual property intensive goods, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1993
Country/Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
USA
1970 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 2.1 2.5 2.2 0.2 1.9 0.0 1.4 0.7 1.9
1980 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.7 3.0 2.4 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.1 1.2 1.0 1.9
1990 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.5 1.7 1.7 1.6 0.1 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.7 2.0
1993 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.8 0.1 1.4 0.1 1.6 0.7 2.0
EU
1970 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 0.3 1.5 1.0 1.4
1980 1.5 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.2 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.2 0.3 1.8 0.9 1.1
1990 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.5 1.2 0.8 0.9 0.2 1.5 0.6 1.0
1993 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.3 1.4 0.5 1.1
Japan
1970 0.4 0.5 2.3 0.6 1.6 0.9 0.4 2.0 1.1 1.8 0.4 3.1 1.1
1980 0.3 0.2 1.0 2.0 1.7 2.4 0.9 0.3 1.8 3.4 0.4 1.6 3.6
1990 0.3 0.2 0.6 2.3 2.1 2.5 1.6 0.1 2.1 1.8 0.3 0.7 1.6
1993 0.3 0.2 0.7 2.4 1.8 2.4 1.7 0.0 2.0 1.6 0.3 0.6 1.2
NICs
1970 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 3.2 0.2 6.8 1.5 1.6 0.7 7.7 0.2
1980 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 4.7 0.2 11.7 2.0 7.7 0.7 8.8 1.9
1990 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.7 3.0 3.1 0.2 3.5 1.8 3.3 0.7 3.5 1.5
1993 0.2 0.4 1.3 0.9 3.2 3.1 0.2 1.8 2.0 2.0 0.8 1.9 1.2
ASEAN
1970 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3
1980 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 4.5 0.1 0.4 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.7
1990 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 2.5 3.9 0.1 0.9 1.9 1.0 0.5 1.1 0.6
1993 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 2.9 3.1 0.1 0.8 1.8 0.8 0.4 0.9 0.6
Philippines
1970 0.1 0.0 0.0 . . . . . . 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1980 0.1 0.0 0.2 . . 0.0 1.1 0.3 1.1 0.4 0.9 0.0 1.2 0.0
1990 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.0 7.1 0.2 2.3 3.3 3.1 0.0 1.9 0.0
1993 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.6 2.8 0.3 1.4 1.4 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.1
Legend:
1- Pharmaceuticals
2- Perfumes and cosmetics
3- Polymerisation products
4- Metal-working machine Tools
5- Automatic data processing machines
6- Electronic micro-circuits
7- Motor vehicle parts
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on United Nations Trade 
Statistics, 1995.
8- Travel goods and handbags
9- Measuring and controlling instrument
10- Watches
11 -Printed matter
12- Toys and sporting goods
13- Recorded discs and tapes
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Table 3.3 Revealed comparative advantage indices of selected countries and regions in 
technology intensive goods, 1970, 1980,1990 and 1993
Country/
Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
USA
1970
1980
1990
1993
EU
1970
1980
1990
1993
Japan
1970
1980
1990
1993
NICs
1970
1980
1990
1993
ASEAN
1970
1980
1990
1993
Philippines
1970
1980
1990
1993
1.6 2.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.2 0.6 1.2 1.8 4.5 1.8 1.6
1.4 0.2 1.2 2.1 1.2 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.2 0.8 2.6 2.3 4.6 2.2 2.3
1.3 1.4 1.0 1.9 1.5 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 2.1 1.6 4.3 1.4 1.1
1.2 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.4 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.3 2.1 1.3 3.7 1.2 0.8
1.2 0.6 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 0.6 1.5 1.0
1.5 0.6 1.5 0.9 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.4
1.2 0.9 1.4 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.0
1.3 0.9 1.6 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.1 1.0 0.8 1.2 0.5 1.2 1.2 0.7
1.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.5 1.6 0.3 0.9 1.3 1.9 0.5 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.4
0.9 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 1.0 0.6 1.4 1.9 2.4 1.0 1.8 0.1 2.1 0.3
0.8 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.6 1.7 1.1 2.2 2.3 0.1 2.6 0.1
0.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.6 1.7 0.9 1.7 2.4 0.1 2.4 0.1
0.1 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 2.0 0.1 0.1 1.3
0.3 6.4 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.1 2.3 0.3 0.1 1.6
0.4 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.0 0.1 2.2 0.2 0.4 3.3
0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.0 0.1 3.1 0.1 0.5 3.0
0.1 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.0
0.1 6.2 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.0 1.9 0.3 0.0 0.4
0.4 2.0 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.1 2.5 0.2 0.5 0.3
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 3.1 0.1 0.5 0.4
0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1
0.4 3.9 0.1 1.6 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 4.7 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 3.5
0.2 0.0 0.1 2.9 1.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 5.0 0.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 5.4
Legend:
1- Chemical elements and compounds
2- Petroleum and coal
3- Medicinal products
4- Manufactured fertilisers
5- Explosives, pyrotechnical products
6- Plastic materials
7- Other chemicals
8- Non electrical machinery
9- Electric power machinery
10- Electric distributing machinery
11- Electro-medical and x-ray equipment
12- Other electrical machinery
13- Aircraft
14- Photo cinema
15- Developed cinema film
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on United Nations Trade 
Statistics, 1995.
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The trade intensity indices for selected intellectual property and 
technology intensive goods are presented in tables 3.4 and 3.5 respectively. 
The intensity index is a useful measure to assess the relative importance of a 
particular bilateral trading relationship. The index is defined in equation 3.2 as 
the share of a country's exports going to another country, divided by the share 
of the other country's world imports net of the first country's imports. The 
index exceeds unity where trade specialisations are complementary or where 
trade resistances are lower than average.
On balance, it could be deduced that there has been a decline in the 
intensity of trade in intellectual property and technology-intensive goods 
among the fast growing economies of Asia (tables 3.4 and 3.5). With the great 
expansion of trade since 1965, bilateral trading relationships of the ASEAN 
and the newly industrialising countries with other industrial countries like 
Japan and the United States has become significant. This is due in part to 
improvements in communication and transport which in recent years have 
diminished resistances to trade between these countries, and in part to changes 
in the mix of goods produced and consumed as these economies developed. 
The complementary relationship between the Philippines, ASEAN and the 
NICs is largely due to outsourcing activities. Multinational corporations in 
technology-intensive industries are prominent in this trade and their 
outsourcing activities yield trade between ASEAN and the home economies or 
the NICs and the other countries considered in the study. The Asia-Pacific 
regions for example are part of a significant global network of aerospace 
subcontractors. Countries like Japan South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and
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Indonesia provide major aerospace components and assemblies directly to 
airframe and engine manufacturers in North America and Europe (Lefebvre et 
al 1997). With manufacturing operations and assemblies located outside the 
industrial countries, product development is often done jointly with firms from 
developing countries. In the case of the electronics industry in the Philippines, 
although most local subsidiaries and joint ventures with foreign firms are 
exporting, it is often done as part of a complementing scheme with other 
ASEAN-based subsidiaries (Lapid 1996).
A number of broad conclusions can be drawn from examining the trade 
flows of intellectual property and technology intensive goods. First, trade in 
these types of goods has been growing rapidly in recent years for both 
industrial countries and the fast growing economies of Asia. In this regard, the 
interest of most industrial countries, particularly the United States, in bringing 
issues related to intellectual property in the GATT system seems to be 
understandable given the potential threat of cheating and infringement 
(Maskus 1990). The kind of intellectual property right system envisioned by 
the industrial countries for the developing countries is to have a system of 
protection that does not discriminate against foreign goods, thereby enabling 
foreign firms in these countries to obtain patents to protect products that 
industrial countries export directly to developing countries, and to protect 
products produced in developing countries by subsidiary firms of foreign 
multinational corporations.
Second, the interest of industrial countries in trade in intellectual property 
as embodied in goods, is for the protection of research and development or 
technology-intensive products. The interest and comparative advantage of the 
developing Asian economies is in relatively labour-intensive exports.
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Table 3.4 Trade intensity indices3 of selected countries and regions in selected 
intellectual property intensive goods, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1990 and 1993
From
Year
To
USA EU Japan NICs ASEAN Philippines
USA 1965 - 0.7 1.9 0.9 0.9 1.6
1975 - 0.7 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.3
1985 - 0.7 2.1 1.2 1.1 2.7
1990 - 0.6 2.1 1.1 1.0 1.5
1993 - 0.5 1.5 0.8 1.2 3.7
EU 1965 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3
1975 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1985 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
1990 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
1993 0.2 1.7 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.7
Japan 1965 2.4 0.3 - 8.2 5.1 6.8
1975 1.8 0.3 - 4.8 3.7 4.9
1985 1.9 0.4 - 2.8 1.8 2.1
1990 2.1 0.5 - 2.6 2.1 2.0
1993 1.7 0.5 - 1.9 1.9 3.4
NICs 1965 1.6 0.2 0.4 3.2 21.5 2.9
1975 4.0 0.4 4.1 2.2 5.6 3.0
1985 2.3 0.4 2.3 1.6 3.1 4.0
1990 2.1 0.4 2.0 1.6 2.3 2.2
1993 1.4 0.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.0
ASEAN 1965 0.1 0.1 0.7 6.1 30.5 0.9
1975 2.9 0.4 2.9 3.4 9.2 1.9
1985 2.2 0.4 2.3 2.1 5.0 3.8
1990 2.2 0.4 1.7 2.2 3.3 2.2
1993 1.6 0.5 1.4 1.5 2.3 1.4
Philippines 1965 1.3 0.7 15.8 7.0 4.6 -
1975 0.3 0.2 7.7 5.7 10.9 -
1985 2.0 0.4 4.5 2.8 4.4 -
1990 3.0 0.4 3.1 2.5 2.2 -
1993 2.0 0.6 2.0 1.9 1.3 -
aThe intensity of trade index is the share of one country/region's exports going to another country/region 
divided by the latter's share of world imports (net of the first country/region's imports). It exceeds unity 
where trade specialisations are complementary or where resistances to trade are lower than average.
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on United Nations
Trade Statistics, 1995.
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Table 3.5 Trade intensity indices3 of selected countries and regions in technology 
intensive goods, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1990 and 1993
From
Year
To
USA EU Japan NICs ASEAN Philippines
USA 1965 - 0.7 1.8 0.9 0.7 2.1
1975 - 0.6 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.4
1985 - 0.6 1.8 1.0 1.7 7.4
1990 - 0.5 1.9 1.0 1.4 2.2
1993 - 0.6 1.7 0.9 0.9 1.6
EU 1965 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3
1975 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
1985 0.3 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.6
1990 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
1993 0.4 1.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4
Japan 1965 4.4 0.3 - 5.7 3.4 4.6
1975 2.1 0.4 - 4.3 3.6 5.4
1985 1.9 0.5 - 2.4 1.5 2.5
1990 1.9 0.5 - 2.1 1.8 1.4
1993 1.8 0.5 - 2.1 1.8 2.7
NICs 1965 4.4 0.5 0.3 2.5 11.6 1.7
1975 4.1 0.4 2.5 1.8 4.0 1.9
1985 2.2 0.4 1.8 1.1 1.7 2.7
1990 1.8 0.4 2.2 1.1 1.4 1.3
1993 1.7 0.4 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.2
ASEAN 1965 0.1 0.0 0.4 8.5 30.0 0.7
1975 3.3 0.4 1.7 3.1 9.5 2.3
1985 2.1 0.4 1.8 2.0 4.3 3.8
1990 2.1 0.4 1.1 1.8 2.1 0.8
1993 1.7 0.4 1.8 1.7 2.9 2.3
Philippines 1965 1.2 0.0 12.4 14.2 12.2 _
1975 3.6 0.3 4.2 3.2 2.8 -
1985 2.2 0.6 2.2 2.3 3.9 -
1990 2.9 0.5 1.0 1.8 1.3 -
1993 2.3 0.4 3.3 2.1 1.4 -
aThe intensity of trade index is the share of one country/region's exports going to another country/region 
divided by the latter's share of world imports (net of the first country/region's imports). It exceeds unity 
where trade specialisations are complementary or where resistances to trade are lower than average.
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on United Nations
Trade Statistics, 1995.
Third, although exports of the majority of the product lines considered are 
dominated by the industrial countries, evidence shows that the ASEAN and the 
newly industrialising countries are catching up in the export of technology-
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intensive goods and goods with intellectual property embodied. Furthermore, 
trade-intensity indices reveal that the pattern of trade in these types of goods 
has changed in recent years. Exports of these goods coming from the newly 
industrialising countries and the ASEAN to the industrial markets have 
increased since 1965.
Technical assistance agreements and licenses.
A more direct way in which intellectual property can be accounted for in 
international commerce is through license fees and royalties for its use. This 
kind of payment can be made within firms; a parent company can charge fees 
from its foreign affiliates for the use of technology or a specific brand name. 
Direct trade in intellectual property can also be between unaffiliated firms 
through the sale of technology and licenses to produce and distribute under a 
particular trademark franchise or copyright (Maskus 1990). Irrespective of the 
choice between the above types of direct trade in intellectual property (foreign 
direct investment and unaffiliated sales), the structure of a country's 
intellectual property protection will surely influence the profitability of each 
form of international exploitation. For example, the provision of limited 
foreign protection on patents may push firms to choose foreign direct 
investments over licensing, because reliance on trade secrets under the control 
of the home country will prove to be more effective in appropriating rents on 
technological information. The trend of technology trade in industrial 
countries is shown in table 3.6. The balance of technology trade is defined as 
the difference between receipts of royalties and license fees earned by the 
reporting country for the use of their technology and payments made for 
importing technology information from the rest of the world. While this is a 
narrow measure of direct trade in intellectual property, it is the most readily 
available indicator. The United States is a clear leader in this trade, making it
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the most significant global exporter of technology services among industrial 
countries. Some additional insights on the composition of technology trade in 
services of the United States are provided in table 3.7. This confirms that the 
United States is a substantial net exporter of technology to both industrial and 
developing countries: however, trade transactions with the former dominate. 
A large proportion of US trade in intellectual property is intra-firm rather than 
inter-firm in nature (Santikarn 1984; Maskus 1990).
Similarly, intra-firm technology trade transactions are commonly observed 
in the technology trade of ASEAN countries. Since in the 1970s, in Thailand, 
75 technology contract recipients were being served by the 50 largest suppliers 
of technology and 71 per cent of these recipients are affiliates of the 
companies making transfers. In 1981, 73 per cent of total technology 
payments were intra-firm (Santikarn 1984). In the Philippines, 637 out of 
1298 (49%) contracts filed at the Bureau of Patents Trademarks and 
Technology Transfer from 1979 to 1991 were contracts of foreign subsidiaries 
or foreign majority owned companies. However, licensing agreements 
between the parent company and its subsidiary have significantly declined in 
recent years.
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Table 3.6 Technology trade of industrial countries, 1965, 1970, 1975, 
1980, 1985, in million US dollars
Country/Y ear Receipts Payments Balance3
USA
1965 1534 135 1399
1970 2331 225 2106
1975 4300 473 3827
1980 6860 768 6092
1985 •• •• 8500
Japan
1965 17 166 -149
1970 59 433 -374
1975 161 712 -551
1980 378 1439 -1061
1985 •• •• -200
United Kingdom
1965 138 131 7
1970 273 255 18
1975 493 484 9
1980 . . . .
1985 •• 200
West Germany
1965 75 166 -91
1970 119 306 -187
1975 308 729 -421
1980 . .
1985 •• •• ••
France
1965 169 215 -46
1970 344 357 -13
1975 1313 1035 278
1980 . . . .
1985 . . . .
aBalance is the difference between receipts and payments.
Sources: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1989. OECD Science and 
Technology Indicators Report No.3, OECD, Paris.
Santikam, M. 1984. 'Trade in technology: ASEAN and Australia', ASEAN Australia 
Economic Papers, 8:1-57.
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Table 3.7 US receipts and payments of royalties and fees associated with foreign direct 
investments and unaffiliated foreign residents, 1979 and 1987a, in million US 
dollars
Net Receipts Net Payments Balance
Year/Region
Number Share^ Number Shared Number Share*5
Foreign Direct Investment-Related Affiliates
1979
Industrial Countries 3885 80.0 497 95.2 3388 78.2
Developing Countries 969 20.0 25 4.8 944 21.8
Total 4854 100.0 522 100.0 4322 100.0
1987°
Industrial Countries 6753 95.3 853 101.2 5720 94.4
Developing Countries^ 327 4.7 -10 -1.2 337 5.6
Total 6900 100.0
Unaffiliated Foreign Residents
843 100.0 6057 100.0
1979
Industrial Countries 923 83.8 234 97.1 689 80.0
Developing Countries 179 16.2 7 2.9 172 20.0
Total 1102 100.0 241 100.0 861 100.0
1987
Industrial Countries 1839 86.7 554 98.4 1285 82.4
Developing Countries 283 13.3 9 1.6 274 17.6
Total 2122 100.0 563 100.0 1559 100.0
aFDI-related affiliates and unaffiliatcd foreign residents excludes Communist countries 
^Balance is the difference between receipts and payments.
cFor 1987, the breakdown of unaffiliated receipts and payments was estimated.
negative entry means that US affiliates' payments to LDC parents were less than US affiliates' receipts from LDC
parents.
Source: Maskus, K. 1990. 'Normative concerns in the International Protection o f  Intellectual Property', The
World Economy, 13 (3):379-409.
The net balance position of developing countries which are engaged in 
technology trade with the United States verify the status of developing 
countries as strong importers and weak exporters of intellectual property (table 
3.7). The interest of the United States in the direct trade in intellectual 
property is evident. Strengthening intellectual property right property right 
protection in developing countries would protect foreign technical assistance 
agreements and licensing of process inventions which in the current state of
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technology transfer agreements can easily be adapted and applied by local 
subsidiary firms.
3.2 Perceived Economic Effects of Intellectual Property Right Protection:
The Case of Developing Countries
Positive effects of improved patent protection
Efficient property rights and economic growth. Rapp and Rozek (1990) 
suggest that there is a causal linkage between economic development and the 
presence of efficient property rights, including intellectual property rights. In 
all studies of growth and its determinants, both human capital accumulation 
and technological change are identified to be crucial factors. Economic 
growth requires increases in productivity growth which in turn require 
technological innovation. Innovation creates the possibility for an economy to 
increase production of goods as well as allow the development of a more 
diversified range of products. Yet innovations are the outcome of a sustained 
individual or group effort in order to create new products or to find other 
efficient means of producing existing products. It is a key hypothesis that, 
when inventors retain the rights to the output of their inventive effort, the 
incentive to devote time and resources to innovation is increased; thus, proper 
assignment of property rights brings forth innovations that provide increases in 
productivity and ultimately lead to economic growth.
In support of the above hypothesis, Rapp and Rozek (1990), find that a 
country's level of economic development correlates closely with its level of 
patent protection. Another interesting finding is that a significant relationship
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exists between economic modernity4 and intellectual property protection; 
countries with stronger patent protection experience more rapid economic 
development. As argued by the author, this is because a well developed patent 
right system enhances the rate of innovation and investment in innovative 
activities.
Encourage domestic innovation. One argument for strengthening 
protection of intellectual property rights is that increased protection stimulates 
indigenous innovation even in developing countries. A country's share of the 
world market for a specific product or service depends on the resources 
devoted to R&D, to generate new process and new products (Fagerberg 1988). 
Empirical studies undertaken in industrial countries indicate that patent 
protection is an important factor that stimulates R&D activity. Mansfield 
(1986) conducted a survey of firms in the United States to assess the impact of 
patenting on innovation. He found that at least half of the patented 
innovations in the sample would not have been introduced without patent 
protection. The sample was heavily weighted towards the drug industry. 
Another study by Levin et.al (1987) showed similar results and suggested that 
patent protection had increased its significance to US firms and that a limited 
number of industries still overwhelmingly accounts for this increasing 
significance.
There is little empirical evidence on the effects of intellectual property 
protection in developing countries. Would patent protection induce domestic 
firms to undertake research and development activities in developing 
countries? The development of indigenous entrepreneurial ability is dependent
4The measures of modernization used in the model include variables like per capita domestic 
variable, percentage of household with electricity, percentage of households with water, 
presence o f a social security system, infant mortality rate, percentage o f workforce in 
agriculture, proportion of physicians to total population, etc.
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on other considerations too such as industrial structures, education levels of 
the workforce and the general policy environment.
Generate appropriate technology. One argument for introducing stronger 
patent protection of intellectual property rights is that it would generate 
technological innovations suited to the needs and resource-base of developing 
countries. A weak system of intellectual property right protection discourages 
research activities that require large research outlays (Mansfield 1989). For 
the benefit of developing countries for example, inventors in the industrial 
countries would need the incentives to develop technologies suitable to market 
requirements and relative factor prices in developing countries. There is very 
little empirical evidence to suggest this. Theoretical analysis along these lines 
are discussed by Diwan and Rodrik (1990). The study suggests that the share 
of developing countries in global consumption would have to be large in order 
to realise some gains from strengthening intellectual property protection which 
induce foreign innovation directed towards the markets of developing 
countries.
Facilitate technology transfer. Strengthening intellectual property 
protection could facilitate technology transfer. A weak system of intellectual 
property protection is a major disincentive to transfers of technology to 
developing countries. An OECD survey identified problems related to 
intellectual property protection as significant barriers to licensing in 
developing countries (Frischtak 1989). A recent survey done (Mansfield 
1993) indicates that intellectual property protection in developing countries 
may affect the decision of US based manufacturing industries to license their 
technology abroad (See Appendix 3.1).
Foreign direct investments. The protection of intellectual property rights 
is linked to foreign direct investment decisions in developing countries.
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Foreign firms generally avoid investing in areas where intellectual property 
protection is inadequate (OECD 1989). Other studies show that although 
weak protection of intellectual property rights is identified as a problem, 
investment decisions are complex and other considerations are more important 
such as the general economic condition (Frischtak 1989).
The effect of intellectual property right protection on the transfer of 
technology as part of foreign direct investment by US firms was examined by 
Mansfield (1993). Using random sample of 100 major firms in six industries 
(chemical and drug, transportation equipment, electrical equipment, 
machinery, food and metals), the survey shows that protection of intellectual 
property rights in host countries is relevant to some but not all types of the 
firms' investment decisions (see table 3.8). Protection of intellectual property 
rights was more relevant for decisions to invest in research and development 
facilities than for investments in sales and distribution outlets. Variations 
across industries were evident. While firms in the chemical and drug industry 
reported a major role for intellectual property rights in their investment 
decisions, firms in the food industry considered patent protection to be of 
minor significance. Many US firms believe that protection of intellectual 
property in India and Nigeria was too weak to permit them to invest in joint 
ventures with local partners or to transfer their most effective technology to 
wholly owned subsidiaries (see Appendices 3.2 and 3.3).
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Table 3.8. Percentage of US firms in six industries where strength of intellectual 
property rights protection has strong effects on direct investments, 1991
Type of Investment
Industry3
Sales and 
Distribution  
O utlets
Rudimentary 
Production  
and A ssem bly  
Facilities
F acilities to 
M anufacture 
C om ponents
F acilities to 
M anufacture 
C om plete  
Products
Research and 
D evelopm ent 
F acilities
Meai
Chemical and Drugs 19 46 71 87 100 65
Transportation Equipment 17 17 33 3 3 80 36
Electrical Machinery 15 40 57 74 80 53
Food 29 29 25 43 60 37
Metals 20 40 50 50 80 48
Machinery 23 23 50 65 77 48
Mean 20 32 48 59 80 48
aThe number of firms in the sample in each industry is chemicals, 16; transportation equipment, 6; electrical equipment, 35; food, 
8; metals, 5; machinery, 24. However, not all firms responded to all questions.
Source: Mansfield, E. 1993. 'Unauthorized use, of intellectual property: effects on investment, technology
transfer and innovation', Chapter 5, in M. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee and R. Schoen (eds), Global 
Dimensions o f Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, National Academy Press, 
Washington.
Trade considerations. Conforming with the TRIPs agreement should 
protect developing countries from the possibility of trade sanctions. This is 
important for export-oriented economies being studied here.
Negative effects of improved patent protection
Administrative Costs. The administrative costs of adopting the TRIPs 
agreement is one argument used against the reform in developing countries. 
Brazil, for example, spends US$ 30 million per year to maintain the National 
Institute of Industrial Property, the agency responsible for patents, trademarks, 
computer software registrations and regulations for technology transfers 
(Primo Braga 1990c). Even so, this institute has a backlog of 
claims/applications. This is common in developing countries where patent 
offices receive thousands of patent applications, filed mostly by foreigners, 
particularly from the United States and Japan. The number of examiners is 
usually small. In the Philippines, the examination and evaluation period for
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granting patents can take from 2 to 15 years. These delays in the processing of 
patent applications reduce the period of effective patent protection in most 
developing countries.
The administrative costs of strengthening protection of intellectual 
property rights will not be trivial for developing countries. Alternative ways 
of improving the system, however, could reduce the financial burden. 
Suggestions include: (1) the charging of user fees; (2) using international 
cooperation such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Patent 
Documentation Center to reduce processing and (3) the networking of patent 
offices with agencies in industrial countries (Primo Braga 1990c).
Increase technological dependence. Strengthening the protection of 
intellectual property in developing countries is often criticised on the grounds 
that it would increase their technological dependence (the dependency 
concept). Inherent in this is the view that technology transferred from 
industrial countries, through direct investment or licensing, represents the 
perpetuation of an inequitable distribution of income. The dependency 
concept has been challenged by others (Lall 1975 and Balassa 1986). In a 
world characterised by growing trade and international investment, it may be 
ineffective to equate technological dependence with self reliance (Primo Braga 
1990c).
Increase in royalty payments. Another concern about technological 
dependence of developing countries is that increased royalty payments are a 
drain on the current account, and protection of intellectual property rights 
would exacerbate the problem. The patent statistics show only a small 
proportion of patent grants are held by domestic nationals in developing 
countries. Increased payments for foreign technology may be justified from 
the point of view of developing countries, but the long term impact of patent
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reforms on the balance of payments is difficult to forecast. The potential 
effects of foreign investment flows and exports of technology affects the 
forecasts (Primo Braga 1990c).
Increase in prices. Some developing countries argue that TRIPs could 
increase prices and make technological diffusion more costly (Subramanian 
1994; Nogues 1993). Price changes are difficult to forecast in countries with 
high levels of protection and many price distortions. A study of audio, video 
and software products suggests that in some countries the increase in prices 
would be substantial (a doubling of prices) (MacLaughlin, et al 1988). 
Welfare losses and rent transfers from the pharmaceutical industry of a 
selected group of developing countries as a result of strengthening patent 
protection have been analysed by Maskus and Konan (1994) based on 
alternative scenarios. The worst case in terms of price increase and welfare 
losses occurs when a domestic competitive industry becomes a foreign-owned 
monopoly as a result of patent protection. Results from this case generate 
dramatic increases in prices, varying from 25 to 67 per cent and report 
substantial consumer losses which exceed the gains to the monopolist. These 
results however, as pointed out by the authors may be unrealistic and relies 
heavily on very restrictive assumptions. The impact on prices and consumer 
losses are significantly reduced if one assumes in the pre-reform stage that the 
dominant foreign firm faces competitive imitators and producers of generic 
drugs that are close substitutes of the patented drugs. Moreover, the economic 
significance of price effects should be properly evaluated along with other 
factors, such as quality and informational spillover benefits to consumers 
(Primo Braga 1990c).
Misallocation o f resources. Another perceived negative effect of 
increased patent protection in developing countries is that it may lead to
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resources being misallocated if too much incentive results that could lead to 
wasteful and repetitive research and development activities. Combined with 
existing trade distortions in developing countries, such reforms may lead to 
potentially inefficient investments (Nogues 1990a).
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has considered the divergent interests of the industrial and 
developing countries in the protection of intellectual property rights. The 
industrial countries as substantial producers of intellectual property want 
intellectual property protection to be strengthened in developing countries for 
three reasons: (i) to protect products they export directly to developing 
countries; (ii) to protect products made in developing countries by subsidiary 
firms and licensees and (iii) to protect technical assistance agreements and 
licensing of process inventions.
Strengthening intellectual property right protection have both positive and 
negative repercussions in developing countries. The most important gain is 
better access to advanced technologies which is very essential if developing 
countries are to foster new industries that can compete in the competitive 
international market. This benefit however, do not come without costs, at least 
in the short run.
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Appendix 3.1 Percentage of major US firms reporting that intellectual property 
right protection is too weak to permit licensing their newest or most 
effective technology, by industry and country, 1991
Industry3
Country Chemicals
b
Transportation
Equipment
Electrical
Equipment Food Metals Machinery Mean
Argentina 62 0 26 12 0 29 22
Brazil 69 40 29 25 0 73 39
Chile 47 20 22 12 0 25 21
Hongkong 33 20 38 12 0 14 20
India 81 40 38 38 20 50 44
Indonesia 73 20 33 25 0 37 31
Japan 12 20 17 0 0 0 8
Mexico 56 20 28 25 0 36 28
Nigeria 73 20 32 38 20 25 35
Philippines 47 40 34 12 0 24 26
Singapore 25 40 24 12 20 0 20
South Korea 38 20 34 12 40 29 29
Spain 6 0 14 0 0 14 6
Taiwan 44 40 55 25 20 36 37
Thailand 73 80 36 12 0 25 38
Venezuela 62 20 21 12 0 26 24
Mean 50 28 30 17 8 28 27
aThe number of firms in the sample in each industry is chemicals, 16; transportation equipment, 6; electrical equipment, 35; food,
8; metals, 5; machinery, 24. However, not ail firms responded to all questions.
^The chemical industry includes pharmaceuticals.
Source: Mansfield, E. 1993. 'Unauthorized use, of intellectual property: effects on investment, technology
transfer and innovation', Chapter 5, in M. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee and R. Schoen (eds), Global 
Dimensions o f  Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, National Academy Press, 
Washington.
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Appendix 3.2 Percentage of US major firms reporting that intellectual property 
right protection is too weak to permit them to invest in joint 
venture with local partners, by industry and country, 1991
Industry3
Country Chemicals
b
Transportation
Equipment
Electrical
Equipment Food Metals Machinery Mean
Argentina 40 0 29 12 0 27 18
Brazil 47 40 31 12 0 65 32
Chile 31 20 29 12 0 23 19
Hongkong 21 20 38 12 0 9 17
India 80 40 39 38 20 48 44
Indonesia 50 40 29 25 0 25 28
Japan 7 40 10 0 0 0 10
Mexico 47 20 24 25 0 17 22
Nigeria 64 20 39 29 20 24 33
Philippines 43 40 31 12 0 18 24
Singapore 20 40 24 12 20 0 19
South Korea 33 20 21 12 25 26 23
Spain 0 0 10 0 0 4 2
Taiwan 27 40 41 25 20 17 28
Thailand 43 80 21 12 0 20 31
Venezuela 40 20 19 12 0 20 18
Mean 37 30 28 16 7 21 23
aThe number of firms in the sample in each industry is chemicals, 16; transportation equipment, 6; electrical 
equipment, 35; food, 8; metals, 5; machinery, 24. However, not all firms responded to all questions. Some firms 
reported they had too little information and experience regarding particular countries to provide this information. For
these countries, firms of this sort are excluded, 
generally very small.
^The chemical industry includes pharmaceuticals.
The number of firms that had to be excluded for this reason is
Source: Mansfield, E. 1993. 'Unauthorized use, of intellectual property: effects on investment, technology
transfer and innovation', Chapter 5, in M. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee and R. Schoen (eds), Global 
Dimensions o f Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, National Academy Press, 
Washington.
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Appendix 3.3 Percentage of US major firms reporting that intellectual property 
right protection is too weak to permit them to transfer their 
newest or most effective technology to wholly owned subsidiaries, 
by industry and country, 1991
Industry3
Country Chemicals
b
Transportation
Equipment
Electrical
Equipment Food Metals Machinery Mean
Argentina 44 20 21 12 0 14 18
Brazil 50 40 24 12 0 39 28
Chile 47 20 21 12 0 27 21
Hongkong 21 20 38 12 0 14 18
India 81 40 38 38 20 41 43
Indonesia 40 20 31 25 0 23 23
Japan 0 0 14 0 0 0 2
Mexico 31 20 21 25 0 22 20
Nigeria 67 20 25 25 20 23 30
Philippines 47 40 28 12 0 17 24
Singapore 12 40 21 12 0 0 14
South Korea 31 20 28 12 40 22 26
Spain 0 0 7 0 0 13 3
Taiwan 19 40 41 25 0 35 27
Thailand 60 80 31 12 0 18 20
Venezuela 50 20 18 12 0 18 20
Mean 38 28 25 15 5 20 22
aThe number of firms in the sample in each industry is chemicals, 16, transportation equipment, 6; electrical
equipment, 35; food, 8; metals, 5; machinery, 24 However, not all firms responded to all questions.
^The chemical industry includes pharmaceuticals.
Source: Mansfield, E. 1993. 'Unauthorised use, of intellectual property: effects on investment, technology
transfer and innovation', Chapter 5, in M. Wallerstein, M.E. Mogee and R. Schoen (eds), Global 
Dimensions o f Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology, National Academy Press, 
Washington.
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Chapter 4
Results from Theory: The Implications of Intellectual Property 
Protection in Developing Countries
This chapter reviews the theoretical literature to obtain some guidance on the 
economic implications of patent protection for developing countries. It covers 
traditional analysis of patent protection and recent theoretical models that 
analyse the impact of patent protection in a North-South framework. One 
major limitation of the latter models is that they have failed to take explicit 
account of both positive and negative effects of stronger patent protection in 
developing countries. While such a shift in policy would allow rent payments 
to be extracted from technology users in developing countries, and be 
transferred to technology producers, mostly residents of industrial countries 
(rent effect), the former can still benefit through increased access to newly 
developed technologies, which is vital for development (production effect). 
To address this limitation, a model along these lines is introduced and 
comparative analysis based on it shows that the welfare impact of increased 
patent protection in developing countries depends on which effect dominates. 
Developing countries gain if the improved access to foreign technology is 
channelled efficiently to improve production techniques. In these 
circumstances, the benefits outweigh the costs. However, loses are possible if 
the cost effect dominates and full benefits are not derived from the new 
technologies.
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4.1 Early Studies
Concerns about protection of intellectual property rights date back to the 19th 
century. Early debates on intellectual property focused on the broad 
implications of monopolies (Machlup and Penrose 1950). In the second half 
of the 19th century, the debate became more intense and three main arguments 
supported the protection of intellectual property rights: natural law thesis, the 
monopoly thesis and the 'exchange for trade secret thesis' (Primo Braga 
1990a).
Natural law thesis is based on the notion that the idea is the property of 
the creator because it is the manifestation of the creator's personality or self 
(Hughes 1988). The monopoly thesis argues that special incentives like patent 
protection are necessary' to encourage innovators and capitalists to engage in 
research and development activity which is socially desirable. The last 
argument regards patent protection as an important function of knowledge 
creation which is beneficial to society's welfare.
Despite criticism from those who oppose protection of intellectual 
property and the inconclusiveness of the academic debate in this area during 
the 19th century, patent protection was adopted by many nations. International 
agreements for the protection of intellectual property at the world and regional 
levels were introduced. The Paris Convention (1883) dealt with patents and 
trademarks and the Berne convention (1886) dealt with copyrights.
Interest in the economics of intellectual property was revived in the 1950s. 
The new literature stressed the ambiguity of patent protection under different 
circumstances. However, like the earlier debates the analyses remained 
basically descriptive and failed to come up with an appropriate theoretical 
framework from which to analyse the implications of intellectual property 
right protection.
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J.A. Schumpeter (1934) set the stage for the modem economics of 
technical change. His contribution was the traditional view that a monopoly 
stmcture is conducive to innovation. Arrow (1962) put forward a 
contradicting view that competitive environments would give greater 
incentives to innovate. However, in proving his point Arrow recognised the 
role of patents in encouraging innovation. His recognition and treatment of the 
incomplete appropriability of information became the fundamental modem 
economic theory on intellectual property.
Information obtained should, from a welfare point of 
view, be available free o f charge (apart from the 
transmission costs). This ensures optimal utilisation of 
information but provides no incentive for investment in 
research... In a free economy, inventive activity is 
supported by using the invention to create property 
rights. To the extent that it is successful, there is an 
underutilisation of investment. The property rights may 
be in the information itself, through patents and other 
similar legal devices, or in the intangible assets o f the 
firm if  the information is retained by the firm and used 
only to increase its profits ( cited by Primo Braga 1990a).
This provided economic theory with a unifying approach to intellectual 
property. It laid the basic groundwork for theoretical studies into the 
implications of patent protection as an allocator of resources. Recognising the 
interaction between the present allocation of knowledge and its future 
production have led some economists to look for second best solutions; thus, 
the optimal term of patent protection became a major topic of research.
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4.2 The Theory of Optimal Patent Life
William Nordhaus (1969) made a significant attempt to bring economic theory 
into patent policy. His basic inquiry was how much protection should be 
accorded to inventors and innovators? Nordhaus' work was revised by Scherer 
(1984) who added flexibility to the model.
The Nordhaus model was concerned with process innovation. Following 
Arrow, he initially assumed that production takes place under perfect 
competition, with constant costs and price of OCq (figure 4.1 below). One firm 
in the industry undertakes innovation which reduces costs from OCq to OCj. 
When an innovating firm secures a patent on the innovation, it can either drive 
other firms from the market, producing the original output and enjoy a 
monopoly rent of ECqC iB or it can license the patent to existing producers 
charging a royalty payment that extracts the same rent.
Nordhaus noted that even though a patent implies some sort of monopoly 
power, it does not allow the patent holder to charge a price above OCq In 
addition, if demand is not very elastic in the neighbourhood of the competitive 
price, the optimal post-invention price and quantity under a patent monopoly 
will be identical to those in the pre-invention equilibrium. Nordhaus called the 
above case run-of-the-mill, representing inventions that reduce costs of 
production but are insufficient to induce a price reduction or output expansion. 
This is unlike the case of drastic cost reductions (at OC2) where it would be to 
the advantage of the innovating firm to reduce price and expand output.
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Figure 4.1
Output and quasi-rent effects of innovation
S/unit
MR Demand Curve
-0 Quantity of output per year
Source: Scherer, F.M. 1984. Innovation and Growth: the Schumpeterian 
perspectives, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
To introduce an invention that reduces production cost, research and 
development expenditures would be incurred. For any given task of 
production there exists at some time an invention-possibility frontier (IPF) 
that relates the percentage unit production cost reduction to the outlays 
incurred by the firm on research and development.
In Nordhaus' original paper, a very simple IPF function was considered; 
B = ß/?a , where R represent research and development expenditures and a  is
assumed to be less than 1, implying diminishing marginal returns to 
innovation. Scherer (1984) revised this assumption and argued that an 
inflected function for B(R) should be more appropriate because at the onset it 
is reasonable to assume that there is increasing returns to research effort and 
after which the function exhibits diminishing returns.
For simplicity, Nordhaus generally focused on the case of run-of-the-mill 
inventions so that the annual monopoly rent to the patent holder is a linear 
function on the percentage cost reduction B(R). For a given patent life i.e. 
T=T*, the monopolist's total discounted quasi-rent function Q(B,T*) is 
represented by a straight line.
57
The patent life is a government policy variable, and in the model as the 
government increases the life of the patent, the years that the patent recipient 
can command monopoly rents increases; i.e. the quasi rent function shifts to 
the right (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2
Innovation and patent life
Q(B,5) Q(B, 10) Q(B,20)
Source: Scherer, F.M. 1984. Innovation and Growth: the
Schumpeterian perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.
This model presents several significant comparative static results. First, 
the larger the elasticity of demand in the neighbourhood of the pre-invention 
and post-invention equilibrium, the shorter is the socially-optimal life of the 
patent. Second, if a given cost reduction is relatively easy to achieve (the IPF 
curve is steeper and ceteris paribus the equilibrium induced level of cost 
reduction is larger), the shorter the socially-optimal equilibrium life should be. 
Third, the area of the welfare triangle rises quadratically with increases in 
B(R), while the patent holder's monopoly rent rises only at a linear rate with 
B(R).
An immediate policy implication of this model is that a uniform policy of 
long-lived patent protection is not optimal since different industries, different 
technologies and different market demands require different optimal-patent
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lives. Another significant implication is that, run-of-the-mill cases, the losses 
from monopoly are smaller than the gains from innovation. From this it can be 
presumed that patent grants which are too long are better than those which are 
too short, so long as trivial innovations could be prevented from receiving 
patents (Nordhaus, 1972).
4.3 Patent Races
The industrial organisation literature has been enriched by numerous insights 
regarding a firm's incentive to innovate under market structures ranging from 
monopoly with blockaded entry to pure competition (Scherer and Ross 1990). 
The emphasis since the 1980s has focused on the use of game theory to 
incorporate research and development dynamics into the economic models. In 
these models, research and development rivalry can be compared to a race for 
a patent. The intuition behind this is that innovation has both winners and 
losers. The first to innovate gains an advantage over its rivals (Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz 1980, Harris and Vicker 1985).
In the Dasgupta and Stiglitz model (1980b) the structure of the game 
ensures that at most one firm would engage in research and development. The 
mere threat that an industry leader in research and development is prepared to 
incur additional research outlays if any potential entrant appears is a sufficient 
signal to warn its rivals. In a model with several time periods, Harris and 
Vicker (1985a; 1985b) suggest that expenditures of the leading firm in the first 
period can be a sufficient signal that it will surely win the race. And the rivals 
having observed this will decide to withdraw. Thus, the leading firm could 
proceed at its own pace without fear of competition.
One major disadvantage of the models discussed above is that they fail to 
account for uncertainty and risk. There are two possible sources of
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uncertainty: one is on the value of payoffs and the second is the completion 
time (Hay and Morris 1991). The two cases assume that the firm with the 
largest payoff would win because it would set its research budget to pre-empt 
its rivals. On the other hand, Fudenberg et al. (1983) posed an alternative 
inquiry into identifying the circumstances into which pre-emption would not 
take place. When there is imperfect information, a firm cannot monitor its 
rival's research and development activities correctly; hence, it is possible to 
expect a follower to steal a march and eventually become an industry leader.
Another possibility is that in a race that involves several stages of 
research, even though one firm is ahead in the current stage, a follower may be 
able to jump ahead at a latter stage. This possibility was explored by 
Grossman and Shapiro (1987) using a monopoly model with two stages.
A third possibility is that the winner takes all assumption may be too 
strong and the non-innovating firm may derive benefits from innovations by 
other firms. The intuition behind this is that the spillover effects of research 
and development may weaken the incentive to win the patent race. Dasgupta 
(1988) argued that if spillover effects are sufficiently large, firms will prefer to 
be followers, and as a result will not invest in research and development. The 
outcome instead of being a race will be a waiting game where each firm will 
hope that others innovate. Licensing represents the formalisation of spillover, 
and it ensures that some benefits to the rival firms are returned to the 
innovating firm in the form of license fees. This has two implications for the 
patent race. First, firm who wins the race will get the license fees, and second, 
licensing offers a strategic advantage to the technological leader. By issuing 
licenses to the follower, the leader dissuades the follower from conducting its 
own research and development activities. Katz and Shapiro (1987) formulated
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a model along these lines where the losers can share the benefits of innovation 
either through imitation or licensing.
Sah and Stiglitz (1987), assumed that firms are not restricted to conduct 
only one project. The analysis shows that how one characterises a firm's 
choice has a strong influence on the conclusions drawn from economic 
analyses of research and development.
Aoki (1991) attempted to explain industry dynamics through innovative 
activity by firms. She argued that, in research-intensive industries (like 
pharmaceutical and highly technical electronic industries), the continuous 
introduction of new products from research and development investments is a 
critical factor for the survival of the firm. In such an environment, firms invest 
in research and development not only to gain profit but also to maintain the 
level of their technology and knowledge. A firm's research and development 
behaviour then is based on dynamic considerations, and this behaviour itself 
will generate the dynamics of the market.
4.4 International Welfare Implications
The demand for analyses of the implications of intellectual property protection 
in a North and South trading context has increased over the last few years, a 
result of the inclusion of intellectual property in the GATT multilateral 
negotiations. In this area of research, four theoretical studies stand out as 
suitable frameworks for evaluation. Three studies employ a partial 
equilibrium framework (Chin and Grossman 1988; Diwan and Rodrik 1991 
and Deardorff 1992) and Helpman (1993) provides an analysis using a 
dynamic general equilibrium model of two regions, North and South. The 
former represents the point of view of the industrial countries while the latter 
refers to the developing countries.
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Chin and Grossman
The model (1988) adopts a linear quadratic Cournot duopoly in an integrated 
world, with one firm in the North and one firm in the South, to analyse the 
welfare impact of patent protection in a 2-country trading system (North and 
South). It is assumed that only Northern firms can innovate and that resources 
have to be devoted to research and development. On the other hand, the 
Southern firm can practice reverse engineering at negligible cost.
The innovating firm in the North can reduce the cost of production by A if
A2/
they spend / a  . Both firms can produce some homogeneous goods at 
constant marginal cost but final marginal cost in the South depends on whether 
or not the South is willing to enforce patent protection. At every price, it 
assumed that a fraction ( / §  ) of demand comes from the South.
The modelling of patent protection is restricted to the case of a simple 
binary choice between protection and no protection. Chin and Grossman's 
comparative static results suggest that if the South does not protect the 
intellectual property rights of the North, the market structure becomes a 
symmetric duopoly, with common costs in the two markets. However, if the 
government in the South actually prevents local firms from infringing patent 
rights of the North, three equilibria may arise, depending on the effectiveness 
of research and development in reducing production costs. If the parameter, y, 
which describes the effectiveness of research and development activity in the 
North, is relatively small, the Northern firm will be modest and asymmetric 
duopoly will characterise the final stage of competition. If the North's research 
and development activity is highly effective, the innovating firm in the North 
will find it optimal to lower its cost, so much so that it will enjoy an 
unrestricted monopoly position in the product market. For intermediate values 
of y, the Northern firm will act strategically to induce exit by its rivals.
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Strategie predation can occur when the final position in the product market is 
one of monopoly. However, the Northern firm will find itself restricted to 
choose a level of research and development expenditures that is sufficiently 
large to guarantee non-positive profits for its rivals.
Having analysed the repercussions posed by the two alternative regimes of 
protection and no protection in the South on the behaviour of the two firms, 
Chin and Grossman (1988) then examines the level of welfare in each country. 
This is done by computing the difference in the level of welfare with 
protection and without protection. Welfare comparison in the first case, where 
the effectiveness of research and development in the North is low, suggests 
that if a duopoly outcome results under protection and if the South's share of 
world consumption is relatively small, the Southern residents achieve higher 
national welfare when intellectual property rights are not protected. Within 
the range of parameter values which would capture a monopoly position (when 
y is relatively high), if property rights are recognised, protecting foreign 
intellectual property right can benefit the South only when the research and 
development activity is high and the South has much to gain in consumption 
from the fruits of the North's research efforts. In the last case, where the range 
of parameter values for which strategic predation is the outcome of patent 
protection, a Southern share of less than 88 per cent is a sufficient condition 
for the South to prefer non protection of intellectual property.
Comparing the welfare level of the North with protection or without 
protection o f intellectual property rights in the South implies that the North 
unambiguously benefits if the South protects foreign intellectual property. 
This result is not dependent on research and development productivity or 
market structure.
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Conflict between the interests of the South and the North is illustrated by 
the results of welfare comparisons. If the Southern country is small compared 
to the innovating North, the country would benefit more from not protecting 
foreign intellectual property. But welfare comparisons in the North reveal that 
it would benefit from protection.
Diwan and Rodrik
Like Chin and Grossman's (1988) model, the Diwan-Rodrik (1991) model tries 
to investigate the issue of intellectual property rights, emphasising the conflict 
of interests between the North and the South. The limitations of the Chin and 
Grossman model are probably the strong point o f this one. For example, Chin 
and Grossman's model failed to account for differences in technological needs 
and tastes between countries. Other differences highlighted in the paper are (i) 
the Diwan and Rodrik model allows for a continuum of potential technology 
with a different distribution of preferences in the region; this allows for more 
flexibility in the interpretation as between product or process innovation; (ii) 
the model also allows for the free entry of Northern firms into the research and 
development sector, unlike Chin and Grossman's model which is characterised 
by duopolistic competition; (iii) the Diwan-Rodrik model offers more choice 
in terms of patent protection rather than concentrating on the simple binary 
choice of protection and no protection; and (iv) the Diwan and Rodrik model 
assumes that markets of the North and South are segmented owing to the 
differences in the patent laws of the two regions. The inclusion of all these 
desirable features is not without cost. In exchange for all these, the Diwan and 
Rodrik model does not get into the details of strategic interaction between 
Northern and Southern firms competing in oligopolistic markets.
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The assumptions of the basic model are: First, only Northern firms can 
innovate. This assumption may not be too restrictive provided the firms in the 
North have a strong comparative advantage in research and development. 
Second, an unlimited spectrum of potential technologies exist, indexed in the 
model by a continuum variable (j>e(-oo,oo). The range of discovered 
technologies on the other hand is characterised by a lower bound and an 
upper bound (j)^  which are endogenous. Third, consumers are differentiated
by taste. Consumers in the North and the South have preferred sets of 
technology. Finally, there is a fixed cost required to develop each technology. 
Marginal cost of innovation in this model does not play an important role and 
is ignored in the analysis. Expansion of the range l >$u \ tends to increase 
costs as resources used in the innovation process are bid up. Cost then is 
represented as c -  c (§ l - ( t)t/)with c’>0 and c">0. The purpose of this is to
illustrate the reality that resources allotted to research and development are 
limited.
Aggregate consumer welfare in the North is represented by
where B is a continuous distribution function representing the distribution of 
Northern consumers. For simplicity, it is assumed that B((j>) is a single peaked
symmetric distribution which is normal.
Consumers in the South have the same parameters but the distribution is 
centred on a mean to the right of that of the North (see Figure 4.3). The mass 
of Southern consumers is assumed to be a fraction, y of those of the North (y< 
1). Aggregate consumer welfare in the South is represented to be
= f  B(iMb
J-CO J-O0
(4.1)
(4.2)
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The pricing behaviour of the firm in this model is linked with the patent 
law observed in the particular region. Suppose an innovator faces immediate 
competitors who could imitate the same technology by incurring unit cost a, 
which can be thought of as the unit cost incurred by imitators if they are 
brought to court. The strategy of the incumbent innovating firm is to then 
charge a price equal to the unit cost of the potential entrants. This removes the 
profit incentive to enter. Following the logic of this assumption a somehow 
parameterises the restriction of the prevailing patent laws in the North a e  
[0,1). Analogously, this role is played by ß in the South where ße[0,l).
Figure 4.3
Distribution of Northern and Southern consumers
aB[<p)+ßy[<p-S) S]
Source: Diwan, I. and Rodrik, D. 1991. 'Patents, appropriate technology and 
North-South trade', Journal o f International Economics, 30 (12): 27-47.
Total Northern profits are then given by
nc*t ,<|>„) = £"[aß(<j))+ßyß((|)- s m  -M>ü -4 > i ]c (4.3)
Social welfare in the North or the sum of consumer benefits and profits 
can be written as
(4.4)
^(<t>l A u ) =  [  (1 -  p)B& = T f  (1 -  P W  -  5 )4
J -o o  J -o o
(4.5)
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The second term in the expression represents the transfer of profits from the 
South to the North: it is therefore subtracted from the Southern welfare.
Comparative static results show that patent protection will have a positive 
effect in the North; however, this will occur at the expense of some products 
that are particularly suited to Southern requirements. On the other hand, 
increased patent protection increases the innovations, that are more appropriate 
to Southern needs (those on the right hand of the distribution). The likelihood 
that this result occurs varies positively with three factors: (i) the degree to 
which existing innovations mirror Northern requirements; (ii) the diversity in 
tastes between the two regions and (iii) the magnitude of the cost increases as 
the range broadens.
The second part of the Diwan and Rodrik's paper considers welfare 
analysis of assigning different rates of patent protection in the South. The 
findings are that (i) a global planner assigning greater weight to South's 
welfare would require a higher level of patent protection in the North; (ii) in an 
uncoordinated equilibrium, a reduction in taste differences between the two 
regions would reduce patent protection in the South and (iii) again in an 
uncoordinated equilibrium, an increase in the relative market size of the South 
would increase Southern patent protection. Northern patents, on the other 
hand, are found to be insensitive to these changes.
The authors emphasised one important implication of the arguments 
presented which would be vital in the North and South negotiations on the 
conflict of intellectual property rights. The North and South can take different 
turns in different product lines. In products where taste differences between 
the two regions are not extremely large (like computer softwares and 
textbooks), the South has a greater incentive to free ride. But in products 
where taste differences are evident like in the case of some pharmaceutical and
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agricultural innovations, the South can gain more if it strengthens patent 
protection.
Deardorff
This simple theoretical model examines the welfare effects of extending patent 
protection from the country where invention takes place to another country 
that is only a consumer of the invented products. Inherent in the model 
therefore, is the assumption that only the North can innovate and that 
information on how to produce the good becomes freely available worldwide 
once an invention is discovered. For simplicity, the demand for invented 
goods is assumed to be linear and identical for all consumers and the function 
relating to optimal surplus is linear as well.
The model starts with the very simple case of a single invention in a single 
country where consumer demands for the invented good are identical. It 
shows that the effect of a patent grant to inventors is to change production 
from a perfectly competitive case to a monopoly condition, where equilibrium 
output decreases, price increases and a deadweight loss results. However, the 
patent holder earns a profit which provides some returns on the cost of 
invention. Unfortunately, often even this return may not be enough to 
compensate the inventor for his efforts. If one considers the ex ante problem of 
whether the invention is worth doing from the society's point of view, it is 
clear that the invention is worth the cost to society as long as the optimal 
consumer surplus exceeds the opportunity cost of research and development. 
Since only a fraction of the optimal consumer surplus accrues to the patent 
holder when protection is provided, it could be expected that some worthwhile 
inventions will not be created even in a regime of patent protection. Patenting 
therefore, in this case is an imperfect method of fostering inventions in two 
respects. First, it leads to monopoly distortions of consumer choice and
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second, it fails to encourage all worthwhile inventions. The latter result is 
reinforced in the model because it is assumed that if there is patent protection 
granted to inventors, then production will take place under monopoly. The 
level of invention that would then result under the regime of patent protection 
will be where the monopoly profits from the marginal invention is equal to 
research cost. This level is much less than the optimal level of invention 
which should include all inventions that yield an optimal consumer surplus 
greater than the cost of research. In the model this is represented as the level 
of inventions at which the optimal consumer surplus per dollar is greater than 
1. Figure 4.4 below illustrates this point where n ,  S and I stand for profit, 
consumer surplus and level of inventions respectively in Country A where 
consumer demand for invented goods are identical. The optimal level of 
invention to society is given by 1°, however, even with patent protection, the 
level of inventions is restricted to Ir.
Restricted patent protection. Consider a case of restricted patent 
protection (i.e. protection only in country A and no protection in country B) 
wherein monopoly profits would only be earned in country A. From the point 
of view of the innovating firm, the optimal level of invention is given by Ir 
where the marginal per dollar profit in country A intersects the horizontal line 
1. Gross profits for country A in this case are given by the area xj+x2+x3 
while consumer surplus is area Xj. Given the cost of invention being the area 
xj+x2, the net gain to country A is the area xj+x2. In this case, where there is 
no patent protection in country B, consumers can free ride; thus receiving the 
optimal consumer surplus, represented by the area, z^+z2+z3
Extended patent protection. Figure 4.4 also shows the effect of extending 
patent protection to country B, which is only a consumer of the product 
invented in country A. In this case, Country A will also be entitled to earn
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monopoly profits in country B. This will stimulate inventive activity and 
investment in country A; thus, the level of invention increases from Ir to Ie 
where total profits from the two sources from the marginal invention just 
covers the cost of research. Total profits for country A is represented in the 
top panel by line nA+nB. Consumer surplus in Country A expands to include 
X5, while profits now include X5+X5 which is earned from the domestic market 
and x4+X7+xg which is earned from county B.
Figure 4.4
Welfare effects of patent protection
Country A
Country B
Source: Deardorff, A.V. 1992. 'Welfare effects o f global patent 
protection, 59: 35-51.
On the other hand, consumers in B, earn a smaller consumer surplus under 
monopoly (SmB) as a result of patent protection. This is given by the area 
Z1+Z4. The monopoly pricing brought about by patent protection causes 
Country B to lose a substantial portion of their consumer surplus, relative to 
the regime of no patent protection.
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It is clear (Figure 4.4) that country A, the innovating country 
unambiguously gains from extending patent protection to country B. 
Consumers in Country A gain from the availability of more invented products 
and the monopolistic inventors gain profits in both markets.
Helpman (1993) considers the debate between the North and South on the 
protection of intellectual property right in a model using a dynamic general 
equilibrium framework, in which the North innovates new products and the 
South imitates. Welfare evaluation of strengthening intellectual property 
protection is provided by considering the effects of protection on (i) the terms 
of trade, (ii) interregional allocation of production, (iii) available product 
choice, and (iv) intertemporal allocation of consumption spending. The 
analysis proceeds in two stages. The first considers a case of an exogenous 
rate of innovation and focuses on the first two welfare components. The 
second proceeds by endogenising the rate o f innovation while looking at the 
four components. Moreover, the model also considers the impact of tightening 
intellectual property right protection in developing countries in the presence of 
foreign direct investment.
Exogenous rate o f innovation. The model assumes that the North 
innovates and introduces new products at a constant exogenous rate,
where n is the number of products which society knows how to produce. The 
South on the other hand, engages in reverse engineering and imitates Northern 
products at the exogenous rate
Helpman
(4.6)
(4.7)
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where ns represents the number of products that the South knows how to 
produce while nh refers to the number of products not yet imitated by the 
South.
The policy of strengthening intellectual property protection in the South is 
interpreted in the model to be a decline in the rate of imitation. Thus,
m = m -  p (4.8)
where the value of p is zero when the South reverse engineer, however, p 
increases as intellectual property protection in developing countries is 
tightened.
Individuals in the two regions are assumed to have identical preferences 
and that consumers allocate spending only across the available invented 
products in the market. Moreover, the Northern firm can charge a monopoly 
price to a product which has not been imitated and that wages are higher in the 
North than in the South. Therefore, because welfare is higher the higher the 
real spending, an increase in the proportion of goods manufactured in the 
North hurts consumers in both regions with a fixed nominal expenditure.
Welfare effects in this case are examined based on the impact of patent 
protection on the interregional allocation of production and the terms of trade. 
In both these channels, it is clear that the South would lose from strengthening 
patent protection. Such a policy would shift products away from developing 
countries and into the industrial countries. If this happens, demand for factors 
of production declines in less developed countries and increases in the latter. 
The industrial countries' terms of trade improves and the terms of trade in 
developing countries worsens.
Does the North necessarily gain from strengthening patent protection? 
The result may be ambiguous because Northern consumers loses as a result of
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the interregional allocation of production, however, they gain from the 
improvement in terms of trade. The model then reconciles these two effects 
and identifies that for economies in a steady state, there always exists a 
feasible range of imitation in which strengthening intellectual property hurts 
both regions. There is however, also a range in which such a policy regime 
benefits the North and hurts the South. The former occurs when the rate of 
imitation is relatively small.
Endogenous Innovation. This case examines the impact of strengthening 
intellectual property protection on the rate of innovation. The result suggests 
that the reform would initially raise the rate of innovation but the rate of 
innovation subsequently declines. Moreover, the initial acceleration of 
innovation is insufficient to compensate southern residents for its loses as a 
result of the changes in the interregional allocation of production and the 
decline in the terms of trade.
Finally, the model indicates that the South also loses from tighter 
intellectual property protection, even in the presence of direct foreign 
investment. The reason for this is that while the Northern multinationals 
lessen the negative impact of tighter intellectual property protection on the 
South's terms of trade, they do not eliminate the negative welfare impact 
brought about by the reallocation of manufacturing that brings about higher 
prices for a large fraction of products.
4.5 Toward a Model on Intellectual Property Protection: The Opposing 
Effects on Developing Countries
The models of the international welfare implication of patent protection are in 
broad agreement. Strengthening patent protection in developing countries 
would have a negative repercussion on their welfare. All these models failed
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to recognise however, that there are two opposing forces at work in a regime 
of stronger patent protection. Such a shift in policy would raise the cost of 
acquiring new technologies which may be welfare reducing for developing 
countries. However, there are also benefits in the form of increased access to 
foreign technology which may be vital to improve production techniques in 
these countries. The welfare impact then of increased intellectual property 
protection on developing countries would depend on which effect would 
dominate.
Assume a duopoly in an integrated world economy where one firm 
operates in the industrial North and the other is a locally owned firm in the 
developing South. The former firm is indexed as Awhile the latter is indexed 
as S. This model assumes that only firm N  can innovate (it is engaged in 
research and development activities in order to lower production costs) while 
firm S practices reverse engineering. This assumption is consistent with 
available international data on research and development and invention 
patents. Moreover, patents data in a developing country like the Philippines 
reveal that the majority of it represent grants to foreign nationals and 
corporations in developed countries like the United States, Japan and 
Germany.
Demand
For simplicity, assume that both firms are faced with a linear demand function 
for good Y. The inverse demand function is then given as
P = a - y Y y > 0 (4.9)
where y is the elasticity of demand and Y refers to world output which is 
equal to the combined output of the two firms ( Y = YN + Ys ).
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Cost function of the Northern firm
The Northern firm maximises profit based on the following cost specification 
where Yx is output and A is the firm's research and development effort.
X N ( YN , § N) = R(tyN) CN( YN) + D( $N , f i N) (4.10)
C * > 0 ,  C V f  > 0 ,  0 < R(§n) < 1, R ^ <  0,  R ^ „ >  0
D^n > 0 , \ > 0 , Dps < 0 , Z)ß.v < 0 , vßs < 0 , DfVß.v < 0
There are two components of the firm's cost function: the production cost, C N 
and the cost of undertaking research (D). The first component describes the 
production technology in which costs may be lowered as a result of the firm's 
research and development activities (R). Output may exhibit constant 
marginal cost while the marginal productivity of research and development 
efforts exhibits diminishing returns. This follows the assumption made by 
Nordhaus (1969) on the invention possibility frontier wherein the benefits 
from research exhibit diminishing returns.
The second component is independent of output and considers the costs 
incurred from the firm's research and development activities which may be 
affected by the strength of patent protection in both regions proxied by ß N and 
ß s for the North and South respectively. Research and development effort 
may exhibit constant or increasing marginal cost, while the impact of 
increased patent protection on the marginal cost o f research and development 
is negative, indicating that a stringent regime of patent protection effectively 
lowers the burden of research and development expenditures from the point of 
view of innovators. The intuition behind this is that a regime of stronger 
patent protection in both regions would enable the innovating firm in the North 
to extract some rents from other users of its developed technology (which can 
be its counterpart firm in the South or other industries in the North). This 
parameterisation allows some degree of flexibility into the model to assess the
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impact of stronger patent protection in the innovating industrial countries 
because analysis is not constrained to the simple binary choice of protection 
and no protection.
Southern firm's access to foreign technology
The Southern firm can gain access to foreign technology, TF developed in the 
North through licensing agreements. Technology made available to the 
Southern firm is an increasing function of the northern firm's research and 
development effort and the degree of patent protection in the South (see 4.11 
below). The justification for the latter is that the innovating firm in the North 
would be reluctant to make new technologies available to the Southern firm if 
the latter does not provide some form of protection to the former's intellectual 
property rights. This is consistent with the results of a survey conducted by 
Mansfield (1993) which indicated that a considerable percentage of US firms 
find that intellectual property right protection in developing countries is too 
weak to permit them to transfer their newest and most effective technology to 
developing countries.
TF =G(t>N,ß s ) (4.11)
7 V  > 0 ,  TF$S > 0
Cost function of the Southern firm
The Southern firm's cost function (4.12) is very similar to that of the North's 
except that instead of engaging in formal research and development activities 
to lower production cost C 9(T5), the firm engages in reverse engineering
activity (V), the success of which is determined by the firm's reverse 
engineering efforts ((J)5) and the use of foreign technology made available by 
the northern firm (Th). In this model, it is assumed that although the southern
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firm does not formally engage itself in formal research and development 
activities, its innovative effort is limited to the modification and adaptation of 
new and existing technologies. Thus, reverse engineering here is broadly 
defined broadly to also cover activities related to the efficient use and 
assimilation of technology made available by the Northern firm.
^ 5(y 5,({)5) = F((j)5, r F) c 5( r s) + £((i)5, r F) (4.12)
CSYs > 0 , CSYsYs ^ 0 ,
0<F((j) ,T ) < 1, Vf < 0, VjF < 0 , > 0, > 0, V^ s jf < 0
> 0 , EjF > 0 , E^ s^ s > 0 , E^ sjf > 0
Following Taylor (1993), the first component of the Southern firm's cost 
function relates to production while the second is associated with the costs 
incurred by the firm as a result of its reverse engineering activities. Again 
these costs are independent of production levels. Increases in both output and 
reverse engineering effort may come at increasing cost, but reverse 
engineering activities, undertaken by the firm can lower the first of these 
components. The second component, the cost of reverse engineering 
activities, E is parameterised to be an increasing function of the firms effort 
and technology imports from the North. From the point of view of the 
southern firm, it will practice reverse engineering as long as the benefit from 
such activity outweighs the cost, [Cs (Ys ) -  V(<\> S'TF )C S (Ts)] > E(§ s ,TF).
Profit maximisation by the Northern firm
Following the Cournot duopoly model, firm N  treats the parameters of the 
other firm as constant ( Ys ) when maximising profit. For the innovating firm 
there are two decision variables, namely: output and the level of the firm's 
research and development effort.
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Max n N = p (y n + y s)y n -  r(6n)c n(y n) -  i m n,&n9üs) (4.13)
{yA ,<)>v}
Differentiating 4.13 with respect to the decision variables gives the first 
order conditions:
n  V = a - y Y s + 2yYN -  R(<\>n)Cny" =0 (4.14)
f l V  = - R ^ C n(Yn) - D ^  = 0 (4.15)
Equation 4.14 equates marginal revenue to the marginal cost of 
production. After simple manipulation it can be seen that marginal revenue 
for the Northern firm is equal to
Mfl* = P ( l - g0 * ) (4.16)
/ X N
where 8 n is the elasticity of demand and X N is the share of Northern 
output to total output ( ^ / ) •  The denominator in 4.16 can be referred to as
the elasticity of the demand curve facing the northern firm. The smaller the 
market share the more elastic the demand curve it faces (Varian 1989). 
Similarly, equation 4.15 equates the marginal gain from research and 
development efforts of the innovating firm to its marginal cost from which the 
optimal level of research and development could be derived.
The second order conditions of profit maximisation require that the 
principal minors of the relevant Hessian determinant alternate in sign
w nr(j)n<t,r ITyy < 0 and \H\ > 0 .
The Hessian matrix for the model can be derived from the first order 
conditions to yield:
-2y - R ( ^ N)CNr V  „CNr«
-VcV W cN(r " ) - D*v (4.16)
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For the first order condition to be satisfied it is assumed that 
nV ^n  Vv >(nVyv)2. This is equivalent to saying that the profit
function is sufficiently concave in output quantities and research and 
development effort.
Profit maximisation for the southern firm
The profit function for firm S is given in 3.30 below
Max n 5 -  P(YS + Yn)Ys -  F((b5, TF)CS{YS) -  E(bs, TF) (4.17)
{rs> s'j
For the southern firm, the decision variables include output, Ys and the level 
of reverse engineering effort, 4>‘s . Differentiating 4.17 with respect to the
decision variables would generate the first order conditions.
n V  = a - ) F  -2yYs -  V(tys, Tf)Csys = 0 (4.18)
nv = - ^ C S(YS) - E^ s =0  (4.19)
Equation 4.18 has the standard interpretation as in 4.14. However, 4.19 
equates marginal revenue from reverse engineering to its marginal cost. 
Equilibrium values for the southern firm's output and level of reverse 
engineering could be derived from 4.18 and 4.19 respectively.
The second order condition is obtained from 4.18 and 4.19 to yield Hs
\h s I =
-2y - V ( $ s ,TF)CsrV -r*.cV
- V ^ C s(Ys) - E tV
As in the case of firm N, we need to impose that l l 'V ^ n V c  > (FlVrs)210 
ensure that the second order condition of profit maximisation is satisfied.
Comparative Static Analysis
This section reveals some comparative static aspects of the model. The idea is 
to find out how a change in any parameter will affect the equilibrium position
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and, in particular, he optimal values of the choice variables: 
YN*tYs*9ty ,v*and(j) s*. Using the implicit function theorem, the model can 
show the impact of changes in some exogenous variables on the equilibrium 
output of the two firms, the research and development effort of the innovating 
firm and the reverse engineering effort of firm S. An important consideration 
here is to show the impact of strengthening intellectual property protection on 
the equilibrium output and reverse engineering effort of the firm in the 
developing country.
•Firm in the North. Totally differentiating 4.14 and 4.15 yields
F m = —[ 2y + R ($N)C"r"y»}dYN =0 (4.21)
—k v - c''<r">+D*v'W" -^„cV rfr"- z v rVßs " =°
Holding all other variables constant, the impact of strengthening patent 
protection on the Northern firm’s equilibrium output and reverse engineering 
effort could be represented below as
dYN* V ?
- V C V
>o (4.23)
-2y -  R($n)Cny"yn
-V cV > o (4.24)
Equation 4.23 implies that equilibrium output of firm N  would increase if 
patent protection in the South is strengthened. Moreover, equation 4.24 
suggests that if patent protection is strengthened in developing countries, 
research and development effort of the innovating firm in the North will 
increase. This is because increased patent protection in the South enables the 
innovating firm in the North to recoup some of their R&D investments, 
thereby, encouraging more research and development activities which at the
(4.22)
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same time enhances production. From this, it follows that an exogenous 
increase of patent protection in the South would raise the profit of the 
innovating firm in the North..
•Firm in the South. Totally differentiating 4.18 and 4.19 will give
f s' =-[2y + F ( < ^ r F)c V H rfy s - F t , c V 4 s - c V r rfr V d ß
- c V ^ r V ' # "  = o (4.25)
F: S- ^ C Sy^dYs - V ^ TfTF^ C s(¥s )dp s )</ß 5 
r 4>S7.fr f'*»cs( r s) 4 A' = o (4.26)
dYs*
c V ^ y r V
^ r V c ’ + ^ r V - V ^ s C s(Ys ) - E ^ s
öß 5 “ \h s
-2y -  V($sTF)CSYsrs CSYsVTfTFf,s
5<|>x“ V^ TFTFr C s(Ys) + E ^ T f p*
0ßS ' \h s
< or > 0
> or < 0
(4.27)
(4.28)
From the point of view of the southern firm, the exogenous impact of 
stronger patent protection on the equilibrium values of output and reverse 
engineering effort of the Southern firm would have two opposing 
repercussions, the increase in marginal benefit due to lower production cost 
because access to foreign technology is increased and the rise in the marginal 
cost of reverse engineering as a result of rent payments to inventors. Thus, the 
result is indeterminate and would depend on which effect dominates. This is
illustrated in 4.27 and 4.28 by the indeterminate sign of
T' = TFp,* Cs + E stf )• The first term in parenthesis refers to the
production effect of having more technology available for the southern firm as 
a result of increased patent protection, while the latter refers to the rent effect 
which makes technology under such a regime more expensive because it will 
increase royalty payments to innovators.
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Proposition 1. If IV^ C s ysE ^ tF / > !C s ysVtFT I ^ s + V^ sCs ys V^5j.f / then
dY s*
aps < o . The left hand side refers to the marginal cost effect o f increased
patent protection while the right hand side represents the marginal benefits 
gained by the southern firm as a result o f increased patent protection. The 
former considers the negative impact o f patent protection on the reverse 
engineering activities o f the firm. Stronger patent protection will increase the 
marginal cost o f reverse engineering activities because foreign technology 
would be more expensive. The benefits, on the other hand include the 
reduction in the marginal cost o f production due to the availability of more 
advanced foreign technology and the increased productivity o f the firm's 
reverse engineering efforts. Similarly, if
^ ' C V i y r f / > / C V K r f n V y  +K|SC V ^ r ,  / then ^ < 0 .
Proposition 1 indicates that if  the negative cost effect dominates, then 
equilibrium output and reverse engineering would decrease, thus profit also 
decreases as a result o f stronger patent protection.
dY'
d<J)
Proposition 2. Alternatively, if  IV SjtFC l > I E  StF / then 5 > 0 and
> 0. Proposition 2 demonstrates an alternative scenario for developing
countries regarding patent protection. If the positive production effect 
dominates over the negative cost effect then equilibrium output and reverse 
engineering effort would increase as a result o f stronger patent protection. 
Moreover, given that equilibrium output o f the Northern firm increases as 
well, the original Cournot equilibrium world output will be exceeded, reducing 
product prices and benefiting consumers as well.
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Implication
The model suggests one important implication of increased patent protection 
among developing countries. Such a policy may be transformed into an 
effective mechanism that could work for their own advantage. This could be 
done through the appropriate selection and efficient use of foreign technology 
which would be otherwise unavailable, to improve production techniques. In 
this case, the benefits could outweigh the increased cost of acquiring the 
"standard" technology which would previously have been reverse engineered. 
This result however, is more likely to happen if a country has achieved a 
considerable technological capability as in the newly industrialising countries 
(NICs) who are capable of efficiently assimilating acquired foreign 
technology. On the other hand, for countries with limited production and 
technological capability, the negative cost effect is likely to dominate over the 
benefits, thus increased patent protection is more likely to reduce welfare of 
these countries at least in the short run.
The above implications of the model raises questions on the conditions 
under which the net benefit from strengthening intellectual property protection 
would accrue to developing countries, Because of individual idiosyncracies 
there is no single prescription applicable to all developing countries; however, 
the critical elements could be identified. These elements include: (i) 
technological capability, (ii) an appropriate structure of incentives for 
investment and production and (iii) the existence of institutions that effectively 
support industrial and innovative activities.
Technological capability. Patent protection is designed to increase the 
supply of commercially viable innovations globally. The increase in the 
supply of new ideas however, would be irrelevant if physical investment on 
new technologies is not made or if there is no trained workforce that could
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assimilate and apply these new technologies; thus, the ability and skills of a 
country to set up and operate industries over time would largely determine the 
impact of stronger patent protection in developing countries. In order to take 
advantage of the positive impact of stronger patent protection, developing 
countries need to have the ability to muster the financial resources and 
effectively absorb and assimilate new technologies.
Incentives. The effectiveness of patent protection as an instrument to 
strengthen the technological capabilities of developing countries is enhanced if 
there is a competitive environment where firms perceived innovative activities 
as vital for their survival; thus, the structure of incentives in production and 
investment would affect the outcome of a shift toward stronger protection in 
these countries.
Incentives arising from market forces and from government policies affect 
the pace of physical and human capital accumulation as well as the extent to 
which inputs are exploited in production (Lall 1992). In developing countries, 
the outcome of a regime of stronger patent protection will be affected by the 
incentives brought about by the country’s industrial, trade as well as 
macroeconomic policies.
A good industrial policy that promotes technological development is one 
that ensures that domestic firms operate in a competitive environment. Firms 
facing competition are likely to face greater incentives to innovate because of 
the perceived threat to their position if new competitors are first to develop 
new products and processes.
In terms of trade policy, allowing imports in the country increases the 
pressure on domestic firms to manufacture better quality products made 
available at the least possible price. Similarly, by encouraging exports, it
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exposes domestic firms to international competition and opens up new market 
opportunities.
Macroeconomic policies, both fiscal and monetary will certainly affect the 
decision of firms to undertake innovative activities. Interest rate along with 
other policies affecting the country’s financial sector will have an impact on 
the number of players in the finance market and the extent of competition 
which in turn impacts on the cost and availability of finance. Likewise, 
inflation and exchange rate movements will also influence the decisions of 
domestic and multinational corporations to innovate. Moreover, taxation 
policies will also influence the profit considerations of R&D activities.
Institutions. In addition to the legal framework supporting property rights 
and industrial activity, institutions will play an important role in providing 
technological information services, R&D centers, testing services and product 
standards, education and training (Lall 1992 and WB 1987).
For developing countries, a strong information system is important in 
upgrading existing technologies and enabling firms to get access to new 
technologies. Likewise, establishing a closer link between research and the 
country’s industrial sector would facilitate the transfer of technology to 
industry. Public R&D institutes in South Korea served as useful transfer 
agents of technology by undertaking joint research projects with industries. 
Thus, enabling them to have enough technical knowledge that aided them in 
identifying foreign technology and its suppliers as well as providing them with 
bargaining power in negotiating technology transfer (Kim and Dahlman 1991).
With increased competition in the world market, firms in developing 
countries should improved the quality of goods produced for both local and 
export markets by establishing product standards and providing testing 
services. WB (1987) emphasizes the importance of norms and standards in
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aiding the diffusion of technology in developing countries. Norms and 
standards facilitate interchangeability and compatibility and enable firms to 
translate quality into something quantifiable. Moreover, the development of a 
standard calls for a procedure to be followed to attain such standard which in 
effect provides an implicit way of technological diffusion.
An important component of a country’s technological capability is its 
technical human capital resources. The technical competence of an industrial 
workforce could be greatly improved through education offered by various 
formal and in-firm training services. Lall (1992) compared technological 
capabilities of many developing countries and concludes that South Korea and 
Taiwan’s larger technical skill endowments compared to other developing 
countries explain their ability to handle more complex industrial technologies.
4.6 Conclusion
The theoretical literature on intellectual property protection has progressed 
remarkably since the 1950s. The main thrust of early studies justifies the 
protection of intellectual property based on the notion that reliance on market 
incentives alone is not enough to ensure optimal investment on research and 
development. Thus, protection aims to stimulate innovative activities by 
creating transitory rights to enable the inventor to appropriate some returns for 
his invention.
In recent years, increased attention to the economic implications of 
intellectual property has been demanded as a result of the inclusion of 
intellectual property in the GATT and the TRIPs agreement. Since then the 
focus of theoretical models on intellectual property had shifted toward the 
economic implications of patent protection on a North-South context, the 
former being producers of technology while the latter being technology users.
86
Majority of these models are in broad agreement that intellectual property 
protection would most often benefit the North and put developing countries at 
a disadvantage. They have failed to recognise, however, that a regime of 
patent protection from the point of view of developing countries will have two 
opposing effects. Firms in the developing countries could benefit from the 
increased access to new technology necessary to improve their production 
techniques. However, the increase in rent payments from the South to the 
North could be welfare reducing. The net effect then is entirely dependent on 
which effect dominates.
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Chapter 5
Technological Capability and Philippine Economic Performance
The preceding chapter has discussed the critical elements necessary for 
developing countries to take advantage of the positive effects of patenting. 
These elements include (i) technological capability, (ii) incentives and (iii) 
institutions. These elements will be examined in this chapter.
The country’s technological capability and economic performance is 
assessed vis-ä-vis other East Asian countries. The control group includes 
ASEAN and East Asian newly industrializing countries.
Patent protection is designed to increase the output of innovations with 
potential commercial use and application, by creating property rights to enable 
the inventor to appropriate returns on his invention. Consequently, patent 
policy aims to induce innovations (domestic and foreign) necessary for a 
country's development. Like any other policy, however, its effectiveness is 
enhanced by other policies like the creation of a competitive environment 
where there is demand for innovations to improve production or to create new 
products and policies that increase the availability of trained manpower 
capable of using the innovations efficiently. This chapter reviews the 
technological capability, economic performance and policies of the Philippines 
from the early 70s to the early 90s which have implications on the likely 
impact of stronger patent protection in the country. Performance of the 
Philippines will be assessed vis-a-vis other east Asian countries. The control 
group include ASEAN and newly industrialising countries.
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5.1 Technological Capability of the Philippines
Technological capability has three important components: production, 
investment and innovation (World Bank 1987). Production capability refers to 
the ability to operate technologies efficiently i.e. being able to produce goods 
at the lowest possible cost. Investment capability could be defined as a 
country's ability to choose the right investment projects that would generate 
economic activity and yield the maximum return possible. Finally, innovation 
capability consists of activities related to creating and putting new 
technologies effectively into economic practice .
Total factor productivity (TFP) growth could be decomposed into 
improvement in technical efficiency and technical progress. To the extent 
that changes in total factor productivity indicate how much of production 
growth is derived from the efficient use of inputs rather than on the physical 
increases in the quantity of inputs then it could be used as a proxy for 
production capability. Newly industrialising countries have high TFP growth 
rates (Table 5.1). This increased efficiency came from the better utilisation of 
installed capacity with existing technology, as well as the adoption and 
incorporation of new technologies. The Philippines has one of the lowest 
records (next to Indonesia) which indicates poor production capability.
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Table 5.1 Total factor productivity growth rates in selected east 
Asian countries, 1960-90
Country 1960-90 1975-90
NICs
Hongkong 4.7 4.3
Republic of Korea 2.4 3.3
Singapore 3.1 2.2
Taiwan 3.9 4.1
ASEAN
Indonesia 0.8 -0.7
Malaysia 2.2 1.08
Philippines 1.0 0.2
Thaila 2.6 2.6
nd
Source: Thomas, V. and Wong, Y. 1993. The Lessons o f East Asia: government policy and 
productivity growth, is East Asia an exception, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
At the micro level, the Philippines' poor production capability is also 
evident. It is however showing signs of improvement in recent years. Table 
5.2 summarises the results of various industry studies in the Philippines carried 
out to evaluate the impact of trade policy reform. The ratio of domestic 
resource cost to shadow exchange rate was used to indicate efficiency in 
production. A value of less than one indicates that the industry is relatively 
efficient and conversely, a value greater than one indicates that the firm is 
relatively inefficient. The result exhibits a wide dispersion of productivity 
differences among various manufacturing industries. Moreover, while the ratio 
of domestic resource cost to shadow exchange rate indicates that most of the 
industries covered are relatively inefficient, the level of inefficiency has 
generally been declining in recent years. This reduction in inefficiency is 
mainly attributed to the effects of trade liberalization (Pineda 1997 and Tecson 
1996) undertaken since the early 1980s.
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Table 5.2 Philippines: domestic resource cost/shadow exchange rate ratios, by 
manufacturing industry and end-use classification, 1983, 1988 and
1992
PSIC Industry Domestic Resource Cost/Shadow 
Exchange Rate3 
1983 1988 1992
Consum er Goods
311 Food 1.6 1.1 1.2
312 Other food 1.3 1.0 1.3
313 Beverages 1.9 1.2 1.1
314 Tobacco 1.7 1.2 1.3
322 Apparel 0.9 1.0 1.0
324 Footwear 0.9 1.1 1.0
332 Furniture & Fixtures exc. Metal 0.9 0.9 1.2
386 Furniture & Fixtures, Metal 4.1 2.7 3.9
Interm ediate Goods
321 Textiles 4.9 3.5 1.6
323 Leather Products 1.3 1.6 1.4
331 Wood Products 1.1 1.4 1.4
341 Paper Products 2.8 1.9 1.3
342 Printing, Publishing 2.7 1.9 1.0
351 Industrial Chemicals 2.2 3.1 1.1
352 Other Chemicals 1.7 1.2 1.0
353 Petroleum Refineries 1.5 1.8 1.2
354 Coal and Petroleum Products 2.0 0.6 0.6
355 Rubber Products 2.1 0.9 1.0
356 Plastic Products 2.6 1.2 1.6
361 Pottery and China 6.6 1.3 1.6
362 Glass Products 2.6 1.6 1.8
363 Cement 3.4 3.1 1.7
369 Other Non-Metal Mineral Products 6.6 1.8 1.6
Capital Goods
371 Iron and Steel 1.7 2.3 1.2
372 Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Products 1.3 1.7 1.1
381 Fabricated Metal Products 2.6 1.8 1.8
382 Machinery except Electrical 2.8 1.4 1.2
383 Electrical Machinery 2.9 3.9 1.2
384 Transport Equipment 2.4 1.4 1.6
385 Professional and Scientific Equipment 1.1 2.7 1.5
Total M anufacturing 1.7 1.5 1.2
Sources: Pineda, 1997. 'Effects of the Uniform Five Percent Tariff on Manufacturing', PIDS Discussion 
Paper Series No. 97-16.
Tecson, 1996. 'Philippine Manufacturing Industries and the Effects of Trade Policy Reforms 
on Structure and Efficiency', Catching up with Asia's Tiger, Vol II, Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies, Makati, Manila.
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The incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) in Table 5.3 gives a rough 
measure of investment capability.1 High ratios indicate inefficiency i.e. costly 
investment per unit of output derived from the investment. Furthermore, 
differences in ICORs reflect the capital intensiveness of industries in a 
particular country. Among east Asian economies in table 5.3, the Philippines 
has the highest ICOR, indicative of the country's poor investment capability. 
This is associated by Austria (1992) and the World Bank (1987) to the poor 
selection of projects, high cost and inefficient embodiment of the technology 
in projects and the poor choice of appropriate technology. In the Philippines, 
there are numerous accounts of comparatively poor technology choice and 
white elephant projects, in both the private and the public sector. In the 
private sector, most of the problem firms now comprise the majority of the 
non-performing portfolios of the Development Bank of the Philippines and the 
Philippine National Bank. On the other hand, in the public sector, the poor 
performance of public enterprises is demonstrated on their continued reliance 
on budgetary transfers from the national government (World Bank 1987).
Indicators of innovative capability in this study include: input measures 
such as research and development expenditures and the number of scientists 
and engineers engaged in research and development activities; and an output
1 ICOR measures the productivity of additional capital. In the simple Harrod Domar Growth 
Model (One Sector Growth Model), ICOR is assumed to be fixed and only changes in 
efficiency, rather than in technology can change the ratio which does not reflect reality. Later 
in the neoclassical models, ICOR becomes a variable and determined by the availability of 
savings and factor prices.
As a measure of the productivity of new investments across countries, it is important to 
recognize that it has some limitations. First industrial countries like the United States, and 
Japan tend to have higher ICOR primarily because capital is less expensive to labour. For 
most developing countries however, the differences in ICORs have little to do with differences 
in the relative scarcity of capital. The differences are more likely a result of the differences in 
the efficiency among countries with which capital and other inputs are managed. Second, 
large downturns in the economy can sometimes distort the relationship between new 
investment and the incremental increase in output (World Bank 1987).
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measure using patents data. These measures however, should be treated with 
caution because of their limitations. For the research and development 
expenditures data, the definitions may vary across countries and it only take 
into account expenditures on formal research and development, not including 
ideas that come out during the course of production or other informal 
technological effort which is common in developing countries. Informal 
technological effort is very difficult to capture in an aggregate indicator. On 
the assumption that all measures of technological effort (formal or informal) 
are likely to be correlated, the expenditures data on formal research and 
development will be used as an indicator of innovation capability. Patent 
applications and grants to domestic residents on the other hand, may be an 
understated measure of innovation output because not all inventions gets 
patented. However, it is the most readily available indicator.
Table 5.3 Incremental capital output ratios3 in selected east Asian 
countries , 1975,1980 and 1991
Country 1975 1980 1991
NICs
Hongkong 1.6 3.4 5.6
Republic of Korea 1.8 4.2 8.3
Singapore 5.7 4.7 7.0
Taiwan 2.1 5.5 3.3
ASEAN
Indonesia 2.6 2.7 4.8
Malaysia 2.0 4.4 4.7
Philippines 2.9 7.8 1263.4b
Thailand 2.9 4.3 5.6
aICOR is computed as the ratio of investment as a proportion of GDP in a 
given year to the growth of GDP in the following year.
^Figure for the Philippines is high because GDP growth rate for 1991-92 is too low.
Source: Author's calculation and basic data from the International Economic Data
Bank, The Australian National University, based on World Bank Data, 1994.
The Philippines engages in relatively less formal technological effort than 
its Asian neighbours (Table 5.4). The share of research and development 
spending to GDP is negligible. Also, the government accounts for around 66
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per cent of total research and development expenditures while, private industry 
accounts for only 16 per cent. The rest is for higher education and other non 
profit organisations. This is in direct contrast to the newly industrialising 
countries and Thailand, where the productive private sector accounts for the 
bulk of research and development expenditures. This reflects the increased 
effort of the productive sectors of the rapidly growing export-oriented 
economies to keep up with the increased competition in the international 
market. A classic example of this transformation is the Republic of Korea, 
which experienced a complete reversal in its shares of research and 
development spending. Prior to the country's take off, the government 
accounted for the majority of the research and development expenditures. But 
by the late 1980s, the private sector had become a major investor in research 
for its development.
Table 5.4 Research and development indicators3 in selected east Asian countries, 1970 and 1986
Applied Applied Applied
R&D/GDP R&D/Value R&DA^alue
(in per cent) Added Added Scientists & Engineers Engaged
Country (in per cent) (in per cent) in R&D in 1986
All Sectors Agriculture Industry ____________________________
Per 1,000
1970 1986 1970 1986 1970 1986 Total Workers in Mfg.
NICs
Republic of Korea 0.5 1.8 0.4 0.6 1.4 4.0 32,117 11.9
Singapore 0.1 0.5 0.3 1.3 2,401 9.4
ASEAN
Indonesia 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.6 24,895 5.6
Philippines 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 4816 1.09
Thailand 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.6
aR&D expenditures for industry is computed to be the difference between total R&D expenditures in agriculture.
Sources: Evenson, R. 1990. Strengthening Protection o f Intellectual Property in Developing Countries, World 
Bank Discussion Paper 112, The World Bank, Washington.
International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on World Bank Data, 1991.
The ratio of scientists and engineers engaged in research and development 
to total employment in the manufacturing sector shows the Republic of Korea
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still leads the ASEAN and the newly industrialising countries. Again, the 
Philippines came bottom of the list.
The same conclusion is drawn from using patents data as a measure of 
innovative capability. Two measures of innovative output namely invention 
and utility patents are presented in Table 5.5. The former covers formal 
technological effort. The latter reflects adaptive innovations. Utility patents 
are a useful proxy for informal technological effort since they have a lower 
invention requirement. In practice, inventions covered by utility patents do not 
require novelty vis-a-vis international inventions but only vis-a-vis national or 
regional inventions (Medalla, Mikklesen and Evenson 1982). Among the 
ASEAN and the newly industrialising countries, only the Philippines and the 
Republic of Korea provide protection for such inventions.
Table 5.5 Invention and utility patent applications and grants to domestic residents3 
in selected east Asian countries, 1990
Country Invention Patents per Million 
Population in 1990
Utility Patents per Million 
Population in 1990
Applications Grants Applications Grants
NICs
Hongkong 3.7 4.0 . .
Republic of Korea 211.7 59.5 481.5 112.9
ASEAN
Malaysia 5.2 1.3
Philippines 2.4 0.5 6.0 3.1
Thailand 1.3 0.1 . .
a 1990 invention patents data and 1989 utility patents data.
Sources: World Intellectual Property Organisation, World Industrial Property Statistics, 1990.
International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on World Bank Data, 
1994.
5.2 Overall Economic Performance
Economic performance follows the same pattern as technological 
capability, the Philippines is the weakest among the control group. Its lack of 
technological capability has been associated with slower industrialisation. In
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terms of economic growth, the country has been out-performed by its Asian 
neighbours (see Table 5.6). The Philippines achieved high growth rates in the 
70s but the economy slowed down in the beginning of the 1980s. 1986-89 was 
a period o f recovery after experiencing negative growth rates during the 
political crisis of the early 80s. That spurt of growth was also short lived as 
adverse shocks like the coup attempt of 1989, the earthquake of 1990, the Gulf 
crisis in August of 1990 and the continued power shortages which constrained 
domestic capacity since 1991 all appeared to reduce confidence.
The Philippines poor technological capability has hampered development 
in two respects. First, it constrained the growth of the Philippine 
manufacturing sector, which accounts for a quarter of its gross domestic 
product in 1992 (see Table 5.7). Average growth rate for over two decades has 
been very low compared to the other ASEAN and the newly industrialising 
countries principally due to poor productivity performance (Austria 1992).
Table 5.6 Average annual growth rate of real GDP in selected east Asian countries, 
1961-92, in percent
Country 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-1992
NICs
Hongkong 9.4 9.5 7.9 5.0
Republic of Korea 8.4 8.7 9.2 4.7
Singapore 8.9 7.0 7.6 5.8
Taiwan 9.7 9.8 6.4 6.5
ASEAN
Indonesia 3.9 7.2 5.7 6.3
Malaysia 6.5 7.9 6.0 7.9
Philippines 5.2 6.2 1.8 0.0
Thailand 8.2 6.7 8.0 7.3
Sources: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on World Bank 
Data, 1994.
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators o f  Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, various issues.
Secondly, technological backwardness hindered the diversification of 
domestic manufacturing toward the production of more sophisticated products. 
While its Asian neighbours have diversified away from traditional industries,
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manufacturing in the Philippines has remained predominantly traditional 
(Table 5.8).
Table 5.7 Selected east Asian countries: industrial performance in manufacturing, 
1963-92, in per cent
Country Manufacturing as a Average Growth Rate of Manufacturing
____________________ proportion of GDP, 1992 1963-1973 1974-1983 1984-1992
NICs
Hongkong 14.7
Republic of Korea 32.0
Singapore 27.9
Taiwan 32.9
ASEAN
Indonesia 21.0
Malaysia 28.8
Philippines 25.1
Thailand 28.3
8.5 8.0
20.0 13.2 11.2
17.0 7.0 7.8
16.4 12.9 ••
6.1 14.7 11.8
6.6 9.2 11.2
8.1 2.3 0.0
13.0 7.9 11.2
Sources: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on World Bank Data, 1994. 
Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators o f  Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, various issues.
Table 5.8 Structure of industrial manufacturing activity in selected east Asian 
countries, 1970, 1980 and 1990, in per cent
Country Traditional Goods2 Capital Goods*3
1970c 1980 1990 1970c 1980 1990
NICs
Hongkong 54.3 44.2 21.6 13.7 19.1 22.1
Republic of Korea 40.4 30.3 20.0 11.2 15.6 32.2
Singapore 19.2 10.4 7.0 14.9 30.3 52.5
Taiwan 39.3 30.3 25.8 16.0 19.4 29.9
ASEAN
Indonesia 79.2 46.4 41.8 1.8 12.8 11.3
Malaysia 31.0 35.7 21.6 6.9 17.6 33.2
Philippines 44.7 37.4 54.0 8.0 10.3 11.6
Thailand 56.7 51.7 48.9 9.6 11.67 13.4
aTraditional industries include food processing, beverages, tobacco, textiles and clothing. 
^Capital goods just consider machinery, electrical machinery and transport equipment. 
c 1973 for Hongkong and 1976 for Taiwan.
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, UNIDO, 1994.
5.3 Technology Policy in the Philippines
The Philippine economy is the weakest performer in Southeast Asia. The 
review on the technological capability, economic growth and industrial
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performance highlighted that it is lagging behind its neighbours in almost all 
indicators considered. This is surprising for a country that was rated next to 
Japan in the 1950s, with better prospects than the Republic of Korea in the 
1960s. What has gone wrong in the Philippines? What are the factors that 
contributed to the poor technological capability and industrial performance of 
the Philippines relative to its Asian neighbours? Poor technology policies 
have clearly not helped.
Technology acquisition.
Developing countries can gain access to new technology in several ways. 
They can encourage direct foreign investment to bring in technology, it can 
purchase elements of needed technology through licensing agreements, it can 
import capital goods, or it can develop its own. The importance of new 
available technologies in inducing technological capabilities of a country 
raises concern on appropriate policies necessary to facilitate acquisition of 
foreign technology, diffusion, and development of own innovative activities.
•Foreign direct investment. The Philippines has taken active steps to 
attract foreign investment as a source of technology transfer. The country is in 
theory open to direct foreign investments, although there are restrictions on the 
maximum degree of foreign ownership. Foreign investment is allowed in all 
areas of economic activity. However, industrial investment is regulated once 
foreign equity participation exceeds 30 percent of capital stock, in which case 
approvals are required from the Board of Investment (World Bank 1987). In 
the 1990s, the commitment of the government to attract foreign investment is 
manifested with the enactment of the Foreign Investment Act of 1991. The 
new system drastically reduced the areas where foreign investment is not 
allowed.
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The distribution of foreign direct investments among industrial sectors 
appear to favour less traditional industries (Table 5.9), although a large share 
is in "unclassified industries". This somehow manifests an achievement in the 
area of managing foreign direct investment where it was geared toward less 
traditional industries where it has greater contribution to the economy in terms 
of acquiring new technology. That foreign direct investment has gone to 
sectors where it has greatest potential to contribute to new technology 
acquisition manifests an achievement.
Table 5.9 Selected east Asian countries: distribution of foreign equity 
investment in manufacturing, by industry, 1975, 1985 and 1991, 
in percent
Industry 1975 1985 1991
Chemicals 11.6 26.5 25.6
Food 12.0 22.1 17.0
Basic Metals 15.0 10.6 9.8
Textiles 8.2 4.4 5.0
Transport Equipment 3.0 7.9 7.3
Petroleum 13.8 6.2 5.0
Metal Products 12.7 2.6 2.6
Others 23.8 19.8 28.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Board of Investment, Department of Trade and Industry, Philippines, unpublished data.
Compared with its neighbours, the Philippine policies toward foreign 
direct investment are open and reasonable. However, foreign investment 
inflows in recent years have been declining and not keeping up with other 
countries (Table 5.10). Portfolio investment in 1990 decreased 61 per cent 
from the preceding year. There are a number of factors which affect 
investment decisions of prospective investors but a favourable investment 
environment is a major consideration. Investment incentives in the Philippines 
are by and large competitive but, it has lagged behind in the implementation of 
major policy reforms such as deregulation of industries and the lessening of
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bureaucratic procedures that face the potential investor. Poor economic 
performance is also a major disincentive to foreign direct investment.
Table 5.10 Selected east Asian countries: foreign direct investment as 
a percentage of GDP, 1975,1985 and 1992
Country 1975 1985 1992
NICs
Hongkong 0.0 0.8 0.3
Republic of Korea 0.2 0.2 -0.2
Singapore 4.5 4.6 9.3
Taiwan 0.2 0.4 -0.3
ASEAN
Indonesia 1.5 0.4 1.4
Malaysia 3.6 2.2 7.8
Philippines 0.6 0.0 0.4
Thailand 0.2 0.4 1.8
Source: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University,
based on World Bank Data, 1994.
• Technology transfer. The transfer of technology to the Philippines is 
regulated by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer 
(BPTTT) which is attached to the Department of Trade and Industry. Since 
the 1970s, control levels have been implemented to reduce foreign exchange 
disbursements, because of balance of payments problems; in 1984 
disbursements were cut by around 96 percent when the balance of payment 
crisis were at its height (Appendix 5.1).
The BPTTT facilitates technology transfer agreements with foreign 
nationals or companies for the use and exploitation of patents and trademarks, 
technical know-how information and technical services. Under the Bureau's 
rules and regulation the enterprises applying for technology transfer 
agreements must submit audited financial statements, proof of patent or 
trademark registration and information about the supplier of technology along 
with the application form. The Bureau examines the application and makes 
decisions (normally within 60 days) based on the appropriateness of 
technology and reasonableness of the payment. It evaluates the restrictive
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business clauses demanded by technology suppliers, such as limits on exports, 
access to new technology and 'tied purchases' of inputs from the technology 
suppliers to make sure that domestic industries will not be disadvantaged. If 
the contract is approved, the firm gets a Certificate of Registration which is 
necessary for foreign exchange remittances and to qualify for government 
payments. In the Philippines, there is a general provision that royalty 
payments are set at five per cent of sales and the duration of technology 
transfer agreements is set at five years.
From 1979 to 1991, the Bureau registered 1298 agreements. In 1990, it 
estimates that the projects made possible by the imported technology generated 
21 billion pesos worth of exports and generated 75,000 jobs. The Technology 
Transfer Registry also recorded export sales of licensed products contributed 
around US$ 6 billion to foreign exchange earnings. The licensed products 
penetrated export markets as a result of improved quality arising from 
technology transfer.
In terms of assets transferred, there has been a strong preference for 
bundles rather than single elements of technology transfer (Table 5.11). 
Among the single elements, knowhow is the most prevalent type of asset 
transferred. It involves training and personal interaction between technology 
recipients and suppliers.
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Table 5.11 Philippines: distribution of types of asset transferred in 
technology transfer agreements , 1979-91, in percent
Types of Asset Transferred Shares
Patents, trademarks, knowhow 26.6
Patents, trademarks 0.9
Patents, knowhow 5.7
Trademarks, knowhow 24.3
Patents 0.1
Trademarks 9.5
Knowhow 17.6
Consultancy 9.5
Software 2.5
Management 1.6
Distributorship 0.7
Total 100.0
Source: Bureau of Patents Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Philippines,
unpublished data.
The distribution of technology transfer agreements among Philippine 
manufacturing industries, indicates that the transfers of technology were 
concentrated in non-traditional industries as was the case with foreign 
investments (Table 5.12). In particular, technology transfer agreements are 
most common in the chemical and drug industries which require sophisticated 
technology.
Table 5.12. Philippines: industry distribution of technology transfer
agreements, 1980, 1985 and 1992, in percent
Country 1980 1985 1992
Food and Beverage 13.1 14.5 18.3
Chemical and Drugs 20.5 38.2 45.2
Basic Metals and Metals Products 8.2 10.9 4.3
Electrical Machinery 18.0 14.5 9.7
Transport Equipment 13.8 10.9 2.2
Others 26.2 11.0 20.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Bureau of Patents Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Philippines, unpublished data.
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•Capital good imports. The importation of capital goods with embodied 
technology is an important source of foreign technology. Technical assistance 
from the equipment manufacturer is also important although it is not registered 
as a formal technology transfer. The importation of capital equipment has 
generally been less restrictive than final good imports. Nevertheless, the 
Philippines, like Indonesia and Thailand has relied less on technology imports 
than the newly industrialising countries (Table 5.13). The relatively 
unrestricted access to imported capital goods in the Philippines, may have 
reduced the need for this mode of technology transfer. This is in direct contrast 
to the experience of the Republic of Korea in the 1960s when it relied heavily 
on capital good imports as part of its early industrialisation efforts. Through 
reverse engineering South Korea has developed its own local and export- 
oriented capital goods industry. Capital goods import has been low in recent 
years.
Table 5.13 Selected east Asian countries: capital good imports3 as a proportion of 
gross domestic investment, 1975,1985 and 1992, in per cent
Country 1975 1985 1992
NICs
Hongkong 49.6 94.2 134.1
Republic of Korea 33.4 39.4 24.9
Singapore 94.1 109.1 174.8
Taiwan 40.7 52.9 57.5
ASEAN
Indonesia 23.3 14.8 26.6
Malaysia 46.8 63.8 109.0
Philippines 26.2 16.3 36.8
Thailand 28.7 28.9 37.6
includes machinery and transport equipment.
Sources: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on World
Bank Data, December 1994.
International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based 
on United Nations Trade Data, February 1995.
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Diffusion
In the Philippines, various institutions have been set up in order to facilitate 
the diffusion of technology, both at the international and national levels as part 
of its science and technology master plan. However, two factors have 
hampered technological diffusion: the lack of information about available 
technology because of poor access to international networks and the lack of 
capacity in domestic firms to use the information available. The Technology 
and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC) formerly known as the Technology 
Resource Center) claims to be linked to international databanks. But long 
delays in getting information discourages most firms from using it (World 
Bank 1987). TLRC is more active in the diffusion of national technology but 
it is limited to agriculture, home industries and small enterprise (World Bank 
1987). Other government institutions do not provide good information 
services.
A serious problem is the failure to make the most of technology transfers. 
An indicator of this is the proportion of agreements in a given year that 
represent contract renewals, implying that transfers are not efficiently absorbed 
and used to satisfy local needs (Figure 5.1 and Appendix 5.3). At the micro 
level, engineering firms provide a perspective into the problem of diffusion. 
Technology transfer in this sector has been limited to fabrication or assembly 
of a product without little regard to explaining why the product has to be put 
together in a particular way. This practice limits the local manufacturers' 
understanding of the standards and tolerances built into the product, the quality 
and components used, the strength specification and other design features 
which the original design team sought to maximise performance and minimise 
the cost of the product (World Bank 1987). Without this knowledge, diffusion 
of technology even within a firm is limited.
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Figure 5.1
Philippines: distribution of technology transfer agreements 
classified as new or renewal, 1979-90
Source: Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Philippines,
unpublished data.
Human capital stock and own R&D
One important element for technological development is technical skills in the 
workforce which depends on training and skill standards. Data on educational 
attainment are shown in Table 5.14. Primary education in the control group 
are at similar levels (i.e. above 95 percent) in recent years. Variations between 
ASEAN members and the newly industrialising countries appear in secondary 
education. Secondary education in the Philippines is the highest among the 
ASEAN countries apart from Singapore, because basic education policy is 
effective.
For higher education, the Republic of Korea is at the top with 32 per cent 
coverage, which is comparable to other industrialised countries. The 
Philippines is second after the Republic of Korea. 22 percent of higher 
education enrolments in the Republic of Korea were in the technical education, 
engineering, architecture, mathematics and computer related courses in 1988. 
The Philippines had a similar proportion, registering around 20 percent in 
1985.
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Table 5.14 Educational attainment in selected east Asian countries
Numbers Enrolled in School as a percentage of Age Group3 Adult
Country Primary Secondary Higher Literacy
Education Rateb
1965 1985 1965 1985 1965 1985 1990
NICs
Hongkong 103 105 29 69 5 13 88
Republic of Korea 101 96 35 94 6 32 96
Singapore 105 115 45 71 10 12 87
Taiwan 97 100 38 91 7 13 83
ASEAN
Indonesia 72 115 12 37 1 4 77
Malaysia 90 99 28 53 2 6 78
Philippines 113 114 41 63 19 26 90
Thailand 78 97 14 30 2 20 93
a l 965 and 1983 for Indonesia and the Philippines. 
^ 1983 for Taiwan and 1989 for Honkong.
Sources: Asian Development Bank. 1991. Key Indicators o f Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
Lall, S. 1990. Building Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries, OECD Publication, Paris. 
World Bank. 1986. World Development Report, The World Bank, Washington.
international Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on World Bank Data, 1994.
While the Philippines has one of the highest potential stocks of scientists 
and engineers among Asian developing countries (Table 5.15), this record is 
not evident in the actual proportion of scientist and engineers engaged in 
research and development. This may be indicative of the quality of local 
training. Most engineering schools only have bachelor's programs; in 1992 
only one offered graduate studies in engineering.
To encourage domestic innovation in the private sector the Philippine 
government created the Philippine Invention Development Institute to help 
local inventors obtain patents and to put inventions into commercial use. The 
absence of substantial government programs to support technology-related 
initiatives in industry, coupled with the lack of competitive market pressure 
because of protection, has constrained the research and development efforts of 
Philippine industries. The government accounts for the majority of research 
and development expenditures in the Philippines. Publicly funded research and 
development activities, however, do not provide much returns to the economy
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because its output has been unresponsive to the needs of domestic industries. 
Most of the outputs from these publicly funded researches do not give 
commercial returns, which diminishes the technology links between the public 
and the private sectors (World Bank 1987).
Table 5.15 Selected east Asian countries: potential scientists and engineers versus actual 
scientists and engineers engaged in R&D
Country Year
Potential Scientists 
and Engineers per 
Million Population Year
Actual Scientists 
and Engineers 
Engaged in R&D 
per Million 
Population
Scientists and 
Engineers Engaged 
in R&D as a 
percentage of 
Potential Stock
NICs
Hongkong 1986 26,458.7
Republic of Korea 1986 8,706.0 1986 1,142.4 13.1
Singapore
Taiwan
1980 14,303.6 1981 488.9 3.4
ASEAN
Indonesia 1980 1,305.5 1982 116.0 8.9
Malaysia 1982 1,793.1
Philippines 1980 36,646.5 1984 100.0 0.3
Thailand 1975 471.8 . .
Sources: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. 1990. Statistical Yearbook, UNESCO, 
Paris.
Lall, S. 1990. Building Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries, OECD Publication, Paris. 
World Bank. 1987. The Philippines: issues and policies in the industrial sector, Volume 2, The World 
Bank, Washington.
The Department of Science and Technology2 is the main institution 
responsible for science and technology in the Philippines. As a consequence 
of the country's poor R&D efforts, with its implications for productivity 
growth, a Presidential task force was set up in August 1988 to draw up the 
Science and Technology Master Plan (STMP). The plan generally sets out the 
desired goals and objectives for the science and technology sector3 to achieve 
technological development. The objectives include the modernisation of
2 Formerly known as the National Science and Technology Authority.
3The science and technology sector consists of the Department of Science and Technology 
system, other government agencies, private sector, and colleges and universities undertaking 
science and technology activities.
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productive sectors, upgrading of R&D activities and the development of 
science and technology infrastructure. To achieve these objectives, the main 
policies and strategies to be employed are: (i) generation and active diffusion 
of employment-oriented and high value-added technologies, (ii) emphasis on 
developmental research and development for commercial purposes, (iii) proper 
selection and acquisition of essential and appropriate technologies, (iv) 
adaptation, absorption, and mastery of imported technologies, (v) 
dissemination of appropriate technology, (vi) increasing accessibility to 
science and technology information and services, (vii) establishing research 
and development priorities, development of local materials and indigenous 
technologies, (viii) stimulation of private sector participation, (ix) 
development of high quality science and technology manpower, (x) expansion 
of science and technology education and training and (xi) the development of 
science and technology institutions. While these policies are commendable, the 
country's development of technological capability requires more efficient 
coordination between science and technology institutions. In the past, the 
Philippine government had set up various institutions to facilitate the 
development of the country's technological capability. While these institutions 
achieved a number of objectives, evidence shows that its success is always 
incomplete as the Technology and Livelihood Resource Center and the 
Philippine Invention Development Institute. The effectiveness of these 
government agencies would be enhanced if there is proper coordination among 
science and technology institutions and industry, each working in an integrated 
system with the industrial sector. In particular, the Department of Science and 
Technology and its attached agencies need to work closely with the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the education sector to strengthen 
technology information services and technology infrastructure.
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5.4 Trade and Industrial Policies
The Philippines could be considered as a middle-income country with a small 
open economy. The country's present industrial structure has been essentially 
been the same as it was in the 1970s when it was characterised as a dualistic 
economy. A small proportion of the labor force is employed in the capital- 
intensive manufacturing sector behind protection barriers and the remainder of 
the population is absorbed by the less productive agricultural and urban service 
sectors (Table 5.16).
Table 5.16 Philippines: structure of employment and output, 1985 and 1992
Sector Share of GDP, in percent
Share in Total 
Employment, 
in percent
Output Per Worker, 
in Million Pesos
1985 1992 1985 1992 1985 1992
Agriculture 24.6 21.7 49.0 45.4 0.01 0.03
Manufacturing 25.2 24.5 9.7 10.6 0.07 0.13
Services 40.3 45.0 36.8 38.5 0.03 0.06
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, 1993. Philippine Statistical Yearbook, National Statistical and
Coordination Board, Manila.
This structure has not been effective in generating productivity growth. 
The sluggishness of productivity growth in the Philippines is largely attributed 
to the many industries that have remained dependent on small domestic 
markets (World Bank 1987; 1993). The population is relatively large but the 
majority of its population is poor (Table 5.17). Less of their income is spent 
on sophisticated manufactures (Krugman 1990).
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Table 5.17 Per capita income of selected east Asian countries, 1985, 
1990 and 1992, in current US dollars
Country 1985 1990 1992
NICs
Hongkong 6,120 11,950 15,360
Republic of Korea 2,340 5,450 6,790
Singapore 7,800 12,400 15,730
Taiwan 3,113 7,905 10,154
ASEAN
Indonesia 580 560 670
Malaysia 1,980 2,360 2,790
Philippines 540 730 770
Thailand 810 1470 1,840
Sources: International Economic Databank, The Australian National University, United 
Nations Industrial Organisation, 1994.
The disadvantages and limitations of inward-oriented industrialisation is 
well documented in the trade literature (Cody, et al. 1980; Hughes 1988; 
World Bank 1993). This is exacerbated when the market is small as in the 
case of the Philippines because the size of the market limits specialisation. 
The car industry in the Philippines illustrates this point. The size of the 
domestic market is too small to enable the firm to attain efficient scale of 
production. In 1980, there were five car producers and annual production was 
placed at 26,000 units. Eight years later in 1988, only two producers were left 
and production declined to 10,800 units; average output per firm was on 
average 5,400. This is far behind industrial countries where an average 
producer produces 200,000 units annually in an individual assembly plant 
(Krugman 1990).
The experience of the newly industrialising economies provides a good 
solution for the Philippine economy. The solution is to specialise in a limited 
range of goods for export, rather than producing the full range for domestic 
consumption. Recognising that an export-oriented industrialisation is a critical 
pillar of economic development, the Philippines attempted to shift toward 
export promotion early in the 1970s. Export expanded significantly following
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the enactment of Export Incentives Act (Year) and the creation of export 
processing zones. The structure of exports also changed in the 1970s when 
non-traditional exports, like garments and electronics produced on a 
consignment basis, grew remarkably (Tecson and Nohara 1987). The increase 
in the share of export in GDP and the share of manufactures in total exports is 
shown in table 5.18. This indicates a significant transformation of the 
economy toward export promotion. However, the achievements are 
superficial. Despite some improvement in the Philippine export performance 
in recent years, outward orientation in its industries remains an illusion.
Table 5.18 Philippines trade and outward orientation, 1975, 1985 and 1992, in percent
Indicator 1975 1985 1992
Exports as a percentage of GDP 14.9 14.9 18.7
Imports as percentage of GDP 25.4 17.7 29.5
Manufactures Share to Total Exports 17.7 56.8 73.0
Commodity Share of Manufactured Exports
Electrical Machinery2 0.6 10.6 19.0
Clothingb 8.4 10.1 11.9
a Electrical machinery includes 7221,7222, 7231,7232, 7241,7242, 7249, 7250, 7262, 7291, 7292,
7293,7294, 7295, 7296, 7299 of the Standard International Trade Classification 
b Clothing includes 8411, 8412, 8413, 8414, 8415, 8420 of the Standard International Trade 
Classification
Sources: International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on World
Bank Data, 1994.
International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on United Nations Trade 
Data, 1995.
Non-traditional exports are dominated by labor-intensive assembly 
activities which ease the unemployment problem of the country but, this 
production is very import intensive. These industries add just a small fraction 
of value added to imported components, then re-export them. For example, 
the semi-conductor industry in 1987 accounted for 10 per cent of total exports, 
which appears to be significant (Table 5.19). In reality, its contribution to 
employment and value added was minimal.
I l l
Table 5.19 Philippines: semi-conductor industry, 1987
Indicator
Value, 
in Million 
US dollars
Percentage 
Contribution 
to Philippine 
Economy
Percentage of 
Manufacturing
Exports 586 10.2 15.9
Imported Inputs 447 0.4
Value Added 139 0.1 1.6
Employment (in thousands) 29 1.4
Source: Krugman, P., Alm, J., Collins, S., and Remolona, A. 1992. Transforming the Philippine Economy,
APO Production Unit, Inc., Quezon City.
The production of low value-added manufactured exports has little effect 
in restructuring the manufacturing industry. Much of the production of such 
goods takes place in export processing zones where linkages with the rest of 
the economy are weak. Imports for the promoted export industries are duty 
free, which means that inter-industry transactions are low, and there is a bias 
against potential domestic supplier of inputs. This is the reason why, despite 
the expansion of non-traditional exports like garments and electronics, the 
product shares of different industries in the manufacturing sector have changed 
little. The structure of industry remains more or less the same between 1970 
and 1991 (Table 5.20).
The lack of structural transformation in Philippine industries, even in 
recent times, is explained by the maintenance of protectionist trade policy. 
The Philippines adopted an import-substitution regime in the 1950s. The 
country began to shift toward promoting exports in the 70s; however export 
promotion policies have done little to offset the bias against exports brought 
about by currency overvaluation and import tariffs. Moves toward liberalising 
trade began to be observed in the early 1980s but lost political momentum 
with the balance of payments crisis of 1983 to 1985.
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Estimates of average effective protection rates for the key sectors of the 
economy (Table 5.21) show the protectionist orientation of trade policy. In 
spite of claims of outward orientation, trade and industry strategy has remained 
the same. It discourages exports and perpetuates inefficient industries through 
excessive protection. Consequently, it diminish any motivation to innovate or 
seek new technologies.
Table 5.20 Philippines: product shares manufacturing, 1970, 1980 and 1991, in percent
Industry 1970 1980 1991
Food 30.0 36.3 22.6
Beverages 5.0 3.2 7.1
Tobacco 6.6 4.5 3.4
Textile 5.9 4.5 4.3
Footwear and wearing apparel 3.8 4.4 4.7
Wood and cork products 4.2 2.9 3.5
Furniture and fixtures 0.7 0.5 1.2.
Paper and paper products 2.9 0.8 2.6
Publishing and printing 2.2 1.4 1.2
Leather and leather products 0.2 0.3 0.2
Rubber products 1.4 1.3 2.2
Chemical products 7.9 10.2 10.9
Petroleum and coal 7.2 5.9 12.3
Non metallic mineral products 4.2 2.5 4.0
Basic metals 4.2 3.7 4.2
Metal Products 3.1 4.5 4.3
Machinery 1.5 3.1 1.0
Electrical Machinery 3.0 5.0 6.7
Transport Equipment 4.2 3.8 2.3
Miscellaneous 1.4 1.1 0.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
International Economic Data Bank, The Australian National University, based on 
United Nations Industrial Organisation, 1994
113
Table 5.21 Philippines: average effective rates of protection3,1985, 1986 
and 1988, in per cent
Sectors 1985 1986 1988
Agriculture and Primary 21 15 15
Exportables -7 -1 -1
Importables 82 51 51
Manufacturing 73 60 56
Exportables -5 -1 -1
Importables 107 87 80
All Sectors 49 39 37
Exportables -7 -4 -4
Importables 102 81 75
3 The average ERP by major sectors was computed using the free-trade value added as 
weights. The ERP measure uses price comparisons rather than book rates and includes 
effective protection from tariffs, indirect taxes and quantitative restrictions.
Source: Medalla, E. 1990. An Assessment o f Trade and Industrial Policy, 1986-1988,
Philippine Institute for Development Studies Working Paper No. 90-07, Makati, 
Manila.
Investment policies in the Philippines have also distorted technology 
choice by encouraging capital intensive industries. By favouring import- 
substituting industries, technological efforts are geared to product development 
rather than to cost reduction of production. The Board of Investment (BOI) 
provides a system of investment incentives (tax holidays, duty free imports of 
capital goods) which promotes capital-intensive manufacturing. A comparison 
of the capital intensities between producers for the domestic market and export 
producers shows that an export-oriented industry tends to generate 
employment more than an inward-looking industry (Table 5.22).
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Table 5.22 Philippines: characteristics of BOI approved investments, 
1982 and 1988
Indicator 1982 1988
Domestic Producers:
Value (in Million Pesos) 102.5 48.0
Capital-labor ratio 1,783.0 560.0
Export Producers
Value (in Million Pesos) 25.9 63.7
Capital-labor ratio 149.0 154.0
Source: Krugman, P., Alm, J., Collins, S., and Remolona, A. 1992. Transforming the 
Philippine Economy, APO Production Unit, Inc., Quezon City.
Export promotion depends on a realistic and competitive exchange rate. 
The history of exchange rate policy in the Philippines is a record of delayed 
responses, followed by large fluctuations in the exchange rate. Devaluation 
follows the emergence of a balance of payment crisis (Dohner and Intal 1989). 
Real exchange rate indices of different countries show the Philippines' real 
exchange rate, using 1970 as base year, was on average, 6 percent above the 
1970 rate in the early 1980s (Table 5.23). In 1990 the peso in real terms had 
depreciated by 30 percent since 1970. Other ASEAN countries, however, 
allowed much larger depreciations. In Thailand the depreciation was around 
46 percent, in Malaysia 49 percent and in Indonesia 64 percent (Krugman 
1992).
Table 5.23 Real exchange rate indices in selected east Asian countries:, (1970=100)
Year Philippines Malaysia Thailand Indonesia
1970 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1980-1982 106.4 79.7 80.9 89.9
1989 72.3 52.9 56.4 35.7
1990 69.9 51.4 54.4 35.7
Source: Krugman, P., Alm, J., Collins, S., and Remolona, A. 1992. Transforming the Philippine
Economy, APO Production Unit, Inc., Quezon City.
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In retrospect, prolonged periods of trade protection policy in the 
Philippines has negatively impacted the degree of technological acquisition in 
the country.
First, limiting competition with imports through the use of tariffs and 
other import restrictions has reduced the need for technological acquisition. 
Tariff and other non-tariff barriers have raised the domestic price of imports, 
enabling local producers of import substitutes to operate at higher prices 
relative to free trade prices, thereby increasing their profitability and stifling 
the pressure for firms to adopt ‘best practice’ technology. The absence of 
foreign competition has allowed domestic firms to enjoy excess profit while 
producing at sub-optimal levels. This then gives domestic producers an 
incentive to spend more time in rent-seeking activities to ask for more 
protection instead of finding ways to cut cost and improve production 
techniques.
The country’s textile manufacturing industry has been a classic example 
in on the impact of trade protectionist policy on the motivation of firms to 
innovate. Since the 1950s the industry enjoyed high effective rates of 
protection. Austria (1996) found that even in 1983 when the country had 
promoted non-traditional exports like clothing and apparel, the effective rates 
of protection for textile primary and secondary industries still remained high 
at 90.6 per cent and 111.8 per cent respectively. It is not surprising then to see 
that prior to the reform in the late 1980s, more than 70 per cent of the firms 
in the textile industry (both primary and secondary) are considered as very 
inefficient based on DRC- SER ratio Austria (1996).4 The inefficiencies in 
production coupled with the lack of motivation of firms to invest in research
4 The definition used more than 1.5 in DSR-SER ratio is classified as highly inefficient.
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and development activities negatively impacted the industry’s competitiveness. 
The lack of incentive to innovate became apparent when most firms in the 
industry did not take advantage of the Textile Modernization Program (TMP).
The main objective of the TMP is to rehabilitate the industry by 
addressing some of its operating and structural problems. The program 
implemented in 1982 to 1985 was funded by the World Bank and loans were 
made available for firms that want to improve their technological capability. 
The program however, did not succeed since only a handful of firms in the 
industry availed of the loan, thus, the loan was returned to the World Bank in 
1984 (Austria 1996; WB 1987).
Second, too much protection hindered firms from being introduced to 
international best practice. The Philippines aiming to generate more export 
revenues in the 1970s, develop intermediate parts manufacturing and save 
foreign exchange implemented localization programs for motor vehicles, 
consumer electronics and diesel engines. Participating firms were required to 
use locally produced inputs in the production of final consumer goods. In the 
case of the motorcycle industry for example, foreign exchange was allocated 
for completely-knocked down imports. The allocation however of foreign 
exchange was based on the firm’s market share and the satisfaction of the local 
content targets. While the local content requirement benefited the suppliers, 
the Philippine experience had shown that it came with a high cost to society 
and after more than two decades of pursuing the local content program, the 
promise of export generation, the development of intermediate parts 
manufacturing, and efficiency in saving foreign exchange was not completely 
fulfilled (Pineda 1996).
The Philippine motorcycle industry demonstrates the failure of a 
protection-led-export-promotion policies. This failure is attributed to the
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narrowness of the domestic market, the input constraint that penalized the 
export sector and the foreign exchange undervaluation resulting from 
pervasive protection (Krugman 1990). If local inputs are competitive with 
imports then the local content requirement is unnecessary. However, in the 
Philippines the local inputs for motorcycle parts are more expensive and are of 
inferior quality. With no free access to a lower-priced or higher quality inputs, 
domestic firms were not introduced to best- practice technology. Worst of all, 
there are claims from industry sources that domestic producers are not making 
money from exports because the locally produced goods are uncompetitive in 
the international market (Pineda 1996). The restrictive trade regime had 
limited the country’s ability to exploit a full range of technological 
possibilities which largely depends on a broader range of inputs than what was 
produced locally.
Third, trade protection policies suppressed competition even among 
domestic firms and as a result have negatively impacted technological 
acquisition. Policies like quantitative restrictions, import licensing and various 
incentive programs made available to selected firms in specific industries have 
allowed domestic firms to exercise market power and have bred an 
oligopolistic market structure. In the absence of competitive pressures, firms 
were not force to adopt ‘best-practice’ technology and have engaged in rent- 
seeking activities instead of improving production efficiency.
The lack of competition is evident in the high degree of concentration that 
characterized Philippine manufacturing industries (Lindesy 1977; de Dios 
1986; Tecson 1996) . Such concentration which resulted from too much 
protection allowed incumbents to have excess profits resulting from higher 
prices and lower output than what would have prevailed in a more liberal trade 
regime. Quantitative restrictions and import licensing have been a powerful
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entry barrier into industries and have limited the access of firms to foreign 
technology. Moreover, since the 1950s, the government enacted various 
legislations that granted priviledges and incentives to selected firms in specific 
firms which then dampened down the competitive pressure to innovate and 
adopt superior technology.
Fourth, imports of capital goods that embody new technology was 
discouraged by a protective trade regime in the Philippines. The access of 
firms to capital good imports was limited through the use quantitative 
restrictions and import licensing. Worst of all, the use of bureaucratic 
discretion in allocating the import licenses discriminated the entry of certain 
firms . In the Philippines, such restrictions tend to put small and medium 
sized firms at a disadvantage since they do not have the financial capability 
and the political clout to influence the direction of decision making (Tecson 
1996). The country’s chronic balance of payment problem further exacerbated 
the negative technological implications of a protective regime. Since foreign 
exchange constraints need to be imposed during balance of payment crises and 
allocation is again kept in the hands of the bureaucrats, some firms were 
denied access to imported inputs and capital goods and equipment. (Tecson 
1996).
In an attempt to reform the protective structure it has built around its 
industries for over three decades of postwar industrialization, the Philippines 
since the early 1980s embarked on trade liberalization programs (Tescon 
1996). The first major reform was implemented through the Tariff Reform 
Program (TRP1-1981 to 1985) and the Import Liberalization Program in 1980. 
The former was designed to lower very high tariffs and even off the dispersion 
of the levels of protection among and within industry sectors while the latter 
aimed at lifting import restrictions or regulations. The trade liberalization
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efforts was however cut short due to the balance of payment crisis in 1983. By 
the end of 1985, the number of restricted items was back to its original level in 
1980.
With a new administration in 1986, the Import Liberalization program 
was again resumed and by the end of 1988, the number of restricted items 
dropped from 1802 lines in 1985 to 609 commodities in 1988. Recently 
liberalization measures were further expanded to include the removal of 
import restrictions on new motor vehicles, used trucks and buses, lifting of 
quantitative restrictions on sensitive agricultural products except rice and the 
liberalization of importation and exportation of petroleum products.
In the early 1990s, the second phase of the tariff reform program (1991- 
1995) got implemented through E.O. 470 which resulted to the elimination of 
the 40 per cent tariff, the decline in the number of lines with 50 percent tariff 
(from 1,172 to 208) and the increase in the number of lines with 30 percent 
tariff from 973 to 1,962 lines. After E.O 471, tariffs clustered around the 10, 
20 and 30 percent levels (Pineda 1997).
Despite all setbacks, the trade liberalization in the Philippines have 
reduced the number of items subject to import restrictions (from 1,829 in 1983 
to 609 in 1988). The average effective protection rate in the manufacturing 
sector declined from 42.8 per cent in 1983 to 28.3 percent in 1988. Moreover, 
the continuing trade reform in the 1990s has further decreased the average 
effective protection rate of the manufacturing sector to 20.7 per cent in 1992. 
The items subject to import restriction for both manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors further declined from 10.8 per cent in 1988 to 2.9 per cent in 1992 
(Pineda 1997).
The impact of the above trade reforms on the manufacturing sector was 
examined in two related studies by Tecson (1996) and Pineda (1997). The
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former examined the impact of the reform in 1983 and 1988 while the latter 
analyzed the effects of the trade reform using 1992 NSO establishment data. 
Both studies indicate that trade policy reforms since the late 1980s have 
promoted efficiency and improved resource allocation in Philippine 
manufacturing. The average DRC/SER ratio for the entire Philippine 
manufacturing sector declined from 1.7 in 1983 to 1.5 in 1988. The ratio 
further declined to 1.2 in 1992, indicating a reduction in overall manufacturing 
inefficiency (Table 5.2).
Compared to 1983, efficient industries expanded while inefficient 
industries contracted in 1988. Moreover, the proportion of efficient 
establishments rose from 43 per cent in 1988 to 49 per cent in 1992 and the 
share in production of the efficient industries went up from 52 per cent in 1988 
to 61 per cent in 1992.
On sectoral efficiency, Tecson (1996) found that efficient import 
substitution has taken place in most consumer good industries however these 
industries expanded at the expense of intermediate and capital goods sectors. 
Since these are input sectors, their inefficiencies adversely impacted the 
downstream industries that use them as inputs. This is in direct contrast to the 
Philippine ASEAN neighbours where industrialisation has been characterized 
by a stmctural change in the direction of the growing capital and intermediate 
good industries. The contraction of these sectors in the Philippines was largely 
responsible for the high degree of import dependence of its industries (Tecson 
1996). In 1992 however, Pineda (1997) found that there was a significant 
improvement in the efficiency of the capital and intermediate good sectors in 
response to the trade liberalization program of the government. The average 
DRC/SER ratio of intermediate good sector declined significantly from 1.9 in
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1988 to 1.2 in 1992 while that of the capital good sector fell from 1.5 in 1988 
to 1.2 in 1992.
While all these declining inefficiencies suggest that the Philippines is 
responding positively to the trade reform, more work still needs to be done in 
order to reform the negative effects of more than three decades of protectionist 
policies on the Philippines’ technological capability. The government’s 
current commitment to further trade liberalization and implement another 
uniform 5 per cent tariff by 2004 is a step towards the right direction in 
creating a more liberal trade regime that is conducive to innovation and 
growth.
5.5 Macroeconomic Policies
Like trade and industrial policies, macroeconomic policies in the Philippines 
have done little to foster innovative activity in Philippine industry. 
Inappropriate fiscal and monetary policies have distorted technological choice 
and have undermined the efficient allocation of resources.
The poor revenue collection record of the government, coupled with 
expansionary fiscal policies in the 1970s, has caused the government to run 
large deficits. To finance these deficits, the Philippines' government borrowed 
from world financial markets in the 1970s when the real interest rates were 
considerably low but floating. Lenders had few worries about sovereign risk. 
Because of the relative ease of borrowing and the wrong signals sent to 
markets, government spending went unrestrained and large capital outlays 
went into ill-advised projects which made little contribution to output or 
export.
Early in the 1980s, when foreign loans dried up and real interest rates rose 
sharply foreign debt became a severe burden. Because investment went to
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projects with low rates of return, debt service costs fell on the budget deficit. 
The government then turned to domestic borrowing which raised interest rates 
at home and money creation to finance its deficits. The increased interest rates 
crowded out private investment while high inflation created an unstable 
economic climate and distorted relative prices.
Financial and monetary policies in the Philippines failed to channel 
savings into investments with high productivity. Policy sustained a financially 
repressed system, where interest rates were regulated, below the market rate. 
Credit rationing followed because demand for credit exceeded the supply. 
Moreover, the low real cost of capital gave firms the wrong price signals, 
hampering the efficient allocation of resources based on the productivity of 
capital. In the Philippines, credit rationing is achieved using expensive 
collaterals as a criterion for credit allocation, rather than the expected returns 
to capital. This type of rationing process resulted to rent-seeking activities, 
practiced mostly by favoured industries which were protected by the 
protectionist industrial and trade regime.
5.6 Conclusion
The Philippines is one of the weakest performers in Asia. Its technological 
capability is lagging behind its Asian neighbors. This coupled with its poor 
macroeconomic and industrial policies failed to create an environment that is 
conducive to innovate or take advantage of new technology. If such policy 
orientation continues then it would diminish the gains associated with a regime 
of stronger patent protection.
While policies affecting technology in place, the prolonged periods of 
trade protection policies and inappropriate macroeconomic policies distorted 
both technological choice and the allocation of resources in the economy.
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They failed to provide the competitive environment necessary to promote 
innovation. Any benefits from stronger patent protection depend on changing 
these policy settings. The five year transitional period prescribed in the TRIPs 
agreement gives the Philippine government an opportunity to correct its past 
mistakes. The recent commitment of the government to further promote trade 
liberalization efforts is a step in the right direction.
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A p p e n d ix  5.1 P h ilip p in e s: o u tw a r d  r e m itta n c e s  fo r
c o p y r ig h ts  and  p a ten t r o y a lt ie s , 1 9 7 0 -1 9 9 1 ,
in m ill io n  U S  d o lla rs
Y e a r C o p y rig h ts  an d  P a te n t R o y a ltie s
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
3
3
3
5
10
11
11
16
17
18
19 
24 
23 
23
1
26
20 
31 
27
37
38 
56
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, unpublished data.
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Appendix 5.2 Philippines: number of technology transfer
agreements, classified as new or renewal, 1979-
90-
Year New Renewal
1979 42 37
1980 77 68
1981 38 42
1982 50 39
1983 57 44
1984 30 46
1985 13 51
1986 22 58
1987 24 46
1988 33 49
1989 77 69
1990 114 67
Source: Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Philippines,
unpublished data
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Chapter 6
Technical Efficiency and Innovation
Over the past forty years, attention has been given by economists and 
development planners to the importance of technological innovation in the 
achievement of productivity growth. Empirical studies indicate that 
improvements in technology account for a large proportion of productivity 
growth. The seminal study by Solow (1957) concluded that only a small 
proportion of US non-farm output per capita was explained by increases in 
capital intensity, while a significant proportion of this growth was associated 
with improved production practices and equipment, and the increased ability 
of the labor force. In a similar exercise, Denison (1973), confirmed that 
improved workforce education and advances in scientific knowledge were 
significant contributors to per capita output growth. These models have been 
criticised because the approaches were crude (Mansfield 1988). The 
contribution of technological change to output growth is equated with the 
residual, that increase in the output left when all increases in input have been 
allowed for. Because it is a residual, it contains other factors which may not 
have been measured among inputs. It does not isolate the effects of 
technological change alone. Subsequently, such a theme became the 
foundation of new growth theories (Lucas 1988; Grossman and Helpman 
1990b) which attempted to explain determinants of long run growth based on 
investments in human capital and new technologies.
While there is a large empirical literature linking productivity growth and 
technological innovation in industrial countries, little is known about this 
phenomenon from the point of view of developing countries. This chapter
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examines technical efficiency in Philippine manufacturing industries and 
relates it to various industry-specific determinants. In doing so, the aims are: 
(i) to establish the relationship between technical efficiency and innovation or 
advances in technological know-how in Philippine manufacturing industries; 
and (ii) to find whether patenting has a role in Philippine manufacturing.
A two-stage approach is adopted to the analysis. The first stage deals with 
the measurements of technical efficiency in various industries. These 
technical efficiency estimates are then used in the second stage in analysing 
some of its determinants. The stochastic frontier production function approach 
using the random coefficient regression model of Kalirajan and Obwona 
(1994) will be employed to measure potential output of industries from which 
technical efficiency estimates would be generated.
6.1 Technical Efficiency: Definition and Measurement
Technical efficiency as a concept expresses the degree to which observed 
output approaches the maximum possible, for a given level of input. In this 
study, technical efficiency estimates indicate the ability of an individual 
industry to produce the maximum allowable output based on a given 
combination of input levels and the technology, irrespective of demand and 
prices. Following this definition, technical efficiency in Philippine 
manufacturing industries will be measured as the ratio of the observed 
production level to the potential level which may or may not have been 
achieved by a particular industry. Inherent in this definition is the requirement 
that a standard of performance be first established against which the success of 
other industries will be assessed.
Two alternative techniques are available to estimate potential output: (i) 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) and (ii) the stochastic frontier production
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function (SFPF). The former was developed by Chames et al. (1978) and 
constructs the convex hull of observed input and output observations for a 
given set of firms using mathematical programming techniques. The convex 
hull is then used to represent potential output (Kalirajan and Obwona 1994). 
The latter approach (SFPF), on the other hand, relies on statistical techniques 
and potential output is derived from estimates of production function 
parameters.
6.2 Stochastic Frontier Production Function 
Constant slope-variable intercept approach
The stochastic frontier production function introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) 
and Meeusen van Broeck (1977) was an expansion of the deterministic 
production frontier designed to relieve excessive sensitivity to outliers. The 
stochastic production frontier is expressed as
Y'=Xß + E, (6 . 1)
and Ei = Vi -  U, (6.2)
where Y, denotes output of the production function for the i*h sample industry; 
Xt is a vector of associated inputs with Y{; ß is a vector of coefficients to be 
estimated and the composed error term Et .
The error term in the model is divided into two components: Vt , the 
symmetric error term and Ut , the asymmetric error term associated with
technical inefficiency in production. The former is assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed as N(0,g v) and independent of Ut . The latter is
assumed to be a non-negative random variable obtained by the truncation of 
the normal distribution at zero. In this model potential output is measured as 
the level of output when the inefficiency term (proxied by the random variable
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Ul ) is zero. It is to be noted that frontier production functions of this type are 
referred to as 'neutral shift' because the relevant coefficients, ß , other than the 
intercept term ß0 are held constant in the measurement of potential output.
The conventional constant slope variable intercept assumption of the 
stochastic production frontier may sound restrictive in some respects, primarily 
because observation-specific production behaviour varies across firms or 
industries. When taken into account, this could cause a non-neutral shift of the 
frontier. In line with this limitation, a stochastic frontier production function 
using a random coefficient approach has been proposed in the literature which 
would be used in this study. This alternative method then allows potential 
output to be modelled using the application of inputs regardless of its levels.
Random coefficient regression approach1
The random coefficient regression model describing a production function for 
a particular industry can be written as
Y, = ß oi+X,ßi (6.3)
where ß01 = ß„ + 6;
ß, = ß+v ,  (6.4)
where the error terms, 8, and v, are assumed to have the following 
characteristics:
£(s;) = 0;£(e^) = a f ;£ (s ;cy) = 0;£(v,) = 0;£(v;v’) = ¥  for i = j \  and 
£(v(v ;) = 0 for i * j  .
'This section draws heavily from Kalirajan and Obwona (1994). The author would like to 
thank Dr. Kalirajan for his valuable suggestions and Marios Obwona for giving me access to 
the use of the program TERAN which computes technical efficiency based on the random 
coefficient regression model.
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Xt and ß , are K x 1 vectors for each observation and ß i applying to a
particular observation is the outcome of a random process with mean vector 
ß , and covariance matrix T' . In this study, all variables ( Y for output and the
X's  for inputs) are in natural logarithms.
Combining 6.3 and 6.4 and writing everything in matrix notation the
model becomes
Y = X£>+ co, (6.5)
co; = s i + Xy i (6.6)
where co, is called the composite disturbance term. The first variable in the
X-matrix is 1 to represent the intercept term. It is assumed that both 
disturbance terms have zero means and that E(zl\ ,j) is equal to zero for all
i and k .
For the full sample observation, co, will have a mean vector of zero and a
variance-covariance matrix equal to 
.2cjj- + X}¥Xl 
0 
0
a  2 + X£¥X2
a j  + X4^
0
0
0 (6.7)
a t  + XXX.
Estimation procedure follows Swamy's (1970) approach of applying 
Aitken's generalised least squares to 6.5 in order to get estimates of ß with a
minimum variance:
ß = (X 'n -lX)“lX'Q-|Y (6.8)
and with covariance matrix given by
Qg = (X Q -‘x y 1 (6.9)
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One m ajor problem  with the feasible Aiken m ethod is that estim ation o f 
6.5 using 6.8 requires that 6.7 and 6.9 be known. In order to deal with this 
problem  Sw am m y and M ehta (1975) proposed to estim ate 4* using an 
interactive procedure beginning with an initial estim ate based on the data set. 
Convergence is reached (after several iterations) w hen stable values o f  ß and
4* are obtained.
The applicability  o f the model to the data set is checked following 
B reusch and Pagan (1979) assum ing normality. The test statistic is computed 
by repeatedly  applying least squares regression and the appropriate null 
hypothesis is H qiT' = 0 . Regression o f  this null hypothesis suggests that the 
use o f  the random  coefficient regression model is valid.
E stim ates o f  the frontier coefficients, ß 0 , ß, , ß 2 ,... ß ^  are chosen from
the individual response coefficient among different firms: however, one 
im portant consideration is that it should reflect the 'best practice' technique. In 
this m odel, the param eters o f  the frontier can be w ritten as
A fter identifying the param eters o f the frontier, the potential output o f the
U sing (6.11) as estim ates o f  potential output, technical efficiency o f 
individual industries can be calculated as the ratio betw een the actual observed 
output (in levels) o f  an industry divided by potential output (in levels).
P*- = m ax{ßy}, j  = 0,1,2,. . .K. ( 6 . 10)
ifl1 industry can be calculated as
K
( 6 . 11)
j=i
( 6 . 12)
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6.3 Estimating Technical Efficiency of Philippine Industries Using the 
Random Coefficient Regression Approach
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas technology, the production function to be 
estimated is given below as
where Yt , the output variable is measured using value added data; Xn is the 
number of employed workers; Xi2 is capital; and n is the number of firms in 
the industry.2 Moreover, ß0(the intercept term for the ith firm is equal to 
ß0 + ef and ß y represents the actual response of the output of firm i to the 
method of application of input j. Finally, s ■ refers to white noise.
The unit of analysis in this study is the manufacturing establishments, 
classified at the four digit Philippine Standard Industrial Classification (PSIC). 
This study employs 79 four-digit industries to estimate technical efficiency in 
10 manufacturing industries at the three digit level in the Philippines, observed 
from 1985 to 1988. The four to five digit level industries approach has often 
been used in the empirical literature to compute for industry technical 
efficiency due to the unavailability of firm level data3 (Torii 1992; Yoo 1992; 
Harris 1992; Torii and Caves 1992). A summary of the list of industries 
included in this study is given in Table 6.1. Only three digit industries which 
have at least 5 corresponding 4-digit sub-categories are included in the study, 
each observed in four time periods. The minimum requirement of at least 5
2 The applicability of the Cobb Douglas Production Function was tested using the Ramsey 
RESET (Regression Specification Error Test) Test. This comes as an option in the autoreg 
procedure in SAS. The results indicate that at the 5 per cent level of significance, only one 
(food industry in 1987) of the forty estimated equations had a misspecification problem. Since 
the use of the Cobb Douglas form of technology is valid for most of the industries, it was the 
production function that was used to estimate technical efficiency.
3Firm level data are often not available due to confidentiality requirements as in case of 
Australia, the Philippines and in many other countries.
(6.13)
j = i
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sub-industries is imposed by TERAN, the program used to compute technical 
efficiency (Kalirajan and Obwona 1994).
Table 6.1 Philippines: list of industries covered in this study, 1985-88
Industry PSIC Number of 4-digit PSIC 
Industries
Food 311,312 17
Textiles 321 7
Wood 331 7
Furniture 332 5
Non-Metallic 361,362,363, 369 6
Chemical Industries 351, 352 8
Metals and Metal Products 371,372,381 13
Machinery 382 5
Electrical Machinery 383 6
Transport Equipment 384 5
Source: the Author's.
The data is drawn from the annual survey of large manufacturing 
establishments in the Philippines, undertaken by the National Statistics Office. 
For consistency, only firms employing 20 or more workers are considered. 
Output is measured as value added at current prices deflated by implicit price 
indices based on 1985 prices. Labor input in this model is represented by the 
total number of paid employees in each industry. A capital stock series at 
constant prices for each individual industry was constructed as a proxy for 
capital services in the model. The data were constructed using the perpetual 
inventory approach (Austria 1992; Hooley 1985).
The NSO survey publishes two statistics which can be used in computing 
the capital stock data: fixed assets and investment expenditure. Some studies 
estimate capital stock simply by adjusting the depreciated values of fixed 
assets. This poses a major problem because since 1970, it has been a standard 
accounting procedure to value fixed assets at replacement cost, not at original 
cost. Estimates of which reflect the subjective evaluations so fixed asset 
values are not standard across firms. Even the date of reappraisals is not 
uniform so it is not clear whether the assets are being expressed at replacement
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cost of year t, or year t-1 (Hooley 1985). To overcome these problems, a 
capital stock series was constructed from the investment expenditure data at 
constant 1972 prices, using the perpetual inventory method,
where Kt is the capital stock, 6 is the depreciation rate and /, is the 
investment expenditure in each period for each industry. The depreciation rate 
varies between industries and is obtained from the survey based on the ratio of 
depreciation cost to the book value of asset. The average depreciation rate is 
10 per cent.
Equation 6.14 requires an estimate of the initial capital stock. This is 
done using the formula below where y is the estimated growth rate and 5 is 
the depreciation rate.
On the basis of the Breusch-Pagan LM test, the null hypothesis, 
HoiT' = 0 was rejected at the 5 per cent level in all the 10 industries; thus, 
lending support to the use of the random coefficient regression model 
(Appendix 6.1). Estimation was by done using the 4-digit level PSIC in each 
industry, in each time period. The parameters were estimated using weighted 
least squares to take into account the presence of heteroscedasticity.
Technical efficiency estimates in this study are given in percentages. A 
technical efficiency estimate of 70.9, for example, suggests that the industry is 
around 71 per cent efficient relative to its potential output, which is based on 
the coefficients of the 'best practice technique' in the sample. Overall, 
estimates generated in this study show wide variability across industries over
Kt = (1 - 5  )Kt_x + I t (6.14)
(6.15)
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time (see Figure 6.1 and Appendix 6.2). The results indicate that none of the 
manufacturing industry in the Philippines is technically efficient. Grouping 
these industries by end-use classification indicates that Philippine 
manufacturing is most inefficient in the capital good sector.4 The mean 
technical efficiency estimate of the consumer good sector represented by the 
food and furniture industry is 63 per cent over a four year period. For texile, 
wood, non-metallic and chemical industries which could be considered as 
intermediate good industries, the mean technical efficiency over the four year 
period is 72 per cent. However, the capital goods sector which is composed of 
metal products, machinery, electrical machinery and transport equipment 
registered the lowest mean technical efficiency estimate of 45 percent over a 
four year period. The capital good sector being relatively inefficient raise 
concern about the country’s long run development since this sector affect other 
downstream industries that uses its output. As Tecson (1996) noted, the 
structural weakness of the Philippines’ manufacturing sector as shown by the 
shrinking intermediate and capital goods sector is largely responsible for the 
country’s high degree of import dependence to run its industries.
4 Manufacturing industries by end-usage is classified as consumer, intermediate or capital 
goods. Consumer goods include food beverage, tobacco, apparel, footwear and furnitures. 
The intermediate goods sector on the other hand is consist of textile, leather, wood, paper, 
printing, chemicals and non-metallic products. Finally, capital goods include metals, 
machinery, transport equipment and professional equipment (Pineda 1997;Tecson 1996).
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Figure 6.1
Technical Efficiency Estimates
□ 1985
□ 1986
□ 1987 
■ 1988
50 --
20  - -
10 -
Machinery Electrical Transport
Machinery Equipment
Source: Author's estimation based on random coefficient approach.
Some caveats regarding the technical efficiency estimates. While the 
random coefficient approach facilitated the identification of a benchmark 
potential output in a given sample, comparison of performance are made in 
relation to the dominant observation in the sample; thus, an industry may be 
inefficient but since most firms are closer to the degree of efficiency of the 
‘best practice’ firm, the industry’s technical efficiency may be high. This 
explains why textile industry in the study despite being documented as an 
inefficient industry in the Philippines (Pack 1987) appear to be more efficient 
than the electronic industry which include electronics and is one of the biggest 
exports of the country. Second, as indicated by Stevenson (1980) and Caves 
(1990) different assumptions about firm-specific effects make comparisons 
from different studies on technical efficiency less meaningful. For example in 
the case of stochastic frontier approach, imposing the assumption of constant 
returns to scale may cause the mean response coefficients to be intractable.
This is because even when the condition of constant returns to scale is 
imposed on the response coefficients ( ß y ’s ), the possibility that ^  ß *)1 can 
not be ruled out due to the relationship that ß * = |max ß + v } (Kalirajan
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and Shand 1994). Other authors (Kalaitzandonakes et al 1992, Gong and 
Sickels 1992) who tried to compare results of technical efficiency estimates 
using various approaches found that efficiency varied widely when the data 
envelopment approach (DEA) and the stochastic frontier approach were used 
in the estimation procedures. Moreover Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) 
showed that in many cases the stochastic frontier approach and the DEA not 
only yielded different estimates but also provided different distributions of 
efficiencies among observations for the same data set. Based on all these 
comparative studies, Kalirajan and Shand (1994) suggest that efficiency 
measurement is determined by the choice of functional forms considered to 
represent the production technology. The data envelopment approach of 
measuring technical efficiency may be appropriate if the underlying 
technology is generally weak while information on scale and substitution 
possibilities is best handled by the stochastic frontier production function 
approach.
6.4 Determinants of Technical Efficiency: An Econometric Analysis
In recent years, increased attention has been placed on policies to enhance 
productivity growth in various industries. What factors and policies can 
account for the level of technical efficiency and explain industry differences 
over time? Farrell (1957) argues that any given production process may be 
inefficient because of two reasons: (i) either the production process is 
technically inefficient, i.e. it employs a larger bundle of inputs than the 
minimum required to obtain output or (ii) it could be allocatively inefficient, 
choosing the wrong combination of inputs given their relative prices and 
marginal productivities. To the extent that the technical efficiency estimates 
presented in the preceding section can be used as a proxy for allocative
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efficiency, then efficiency differences in industry may depend on incentives 
driven by innovation, capital, trade and industrial policy.5
Innovation. Technology in this study covers all known techniques for 
producing goods and services. Innovation or inventive activity, on the other 
hand, refers to efforts to discover new techniques of production which are 
major determinants of productivity growth. Patents granted in the Philippines 
are used as a measure of industry-specific technological advances over time. 
This definition of innovation sheds light on whether patenting in a developing 
country like the Philippines improves technical efficiency and productivity 
growth, as claimed by advocates of intellectual property right protection.
It is generally accepted in most empirical studies (Griliches 1984; 1990) 
that innovations is positively associated with productivity growth; however, 
with regard to technical efficiency the sign predictions may be ambiguous 
(Caves 1992b). Innovation can offset inefficiency by increasing the rate of 
technical progress or it can lift the frontier and give appearance of inferior 
technical efficiency on average.
Capital Policy. Increases in investment open new opportunities for firms 
to acquire new embodied technology that helps to improve productivity 
performance. Rapid capital accumulation has been identified as one of the 
principal engines of growth in successful East Asian countries. These 
economies have improved their respective capital markets and allocation in
5 Firm performance is generally evaluated based on its economic efficiency which has two 
components-technical and allocative efficiency. The former refers to the ability of firm to 
produce the maximum possible output from a given technology and bundle of inputs while the 
latter is the ability of the firm to equate its specific marginal value product with its marginal 
cost. Most analysis of efficiency measurement have focused on allocative efficiency estimates 
primarily because neo-classical theory presupposes full technical efficiency. Kalirajan and 
Shand (1994) however, stresses the importance of technical efficiency in the achievement of 
economic efficiency. They argued that if technical inefficiency exists in a firm, there is a high 
probability that it will exert an influence on allocative inefficiency and thus have a cumulative 
negative effect on economic efficiency.
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through: (i) the regulations that aimed to improve the project selection of 
private banks; (ii) the creation of financial institutions, particularly long-term 
credit (development) banks and (iii) directing credit to specific sectors and 
firms (World Bank 1994).
Trade and Industrial Policy. The experience of the newly industrialising 
countries in recent years has highlighted the role of international trade in 
productivity growth (World Bank 1993; Hughes 1992). Increased market 
competition from trade induces industries to perform better because foreign 
competition put pressure on domestic firms to adopt better technologies in 
order to survive. Nishimizu and Robinson (1984) found that export expansion 
leads to productivity due to economies of scale and incentives from 
competition. This finding is also consistent with Hooley’s (1984) study on 
Philippine manufacturing industries which found a positive association 
between export expansion and total factor productivity growth. Moreover, he 
also finds that tariff protection is negatively associated with productivity. 
More recently, Pineda (1997) and Tecson (1996) found that improved 
allocative efficiency in Philippine manufacturing may be linked to the 
country’s trade liberalization program that began in the early 80s. Increased 
import penetration and reduced concentration of manufacturing industries as a 
result of the tariff reduction programs have allowed the domestic market 
environment to become more conducive to competition than before the 
institution of the program.
The determinants of technical efficiency will be analysed using the log- 
linear regression model.
K
\nTEu = 6 0 + £ ln Z , , + U u i = 1,2,...10; / = (6.16)
y=i
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where TE refers to the mean technical efficiency estimate of 10 major 
industries discussed previously. Z represents the six industry specific 
explanatory variables namely: (i) patents grants, (ii) annual gross investment 
as a proportion of capital stock, (iii) industry exports, (iv) import penetration 
ratio, (v) tariff rate weighted by imports, (vi) the average size of 
establishments in the industry. U stands for the error term of the regression 
model.
Data
Patents as an indicator o f technological advances in the industry. What do 
patent statistics really indicate? A number of studies have looked into the 
sources of growth and the rate of technological change yet there remains no 
adequate yardstick to measure technical change. To this Griliches (1990) 
asserts
"...that in this desert of data, patent statistics loom up as 
a mirage o f wonderful plenitude and objectivity. They 
are available, they are by definition related to 
inventivesness, and they are based on what appears to be 
an objective and only slowly changing standard."
In this study patent grants to both foreign and domestic residents have 
been used to measure innovation and technological advances specific to the 
industry.
Using patents data as a measure of innovation has, however, a number of 
limitations: (i) not all inventions get patented, (ii) the quality of inventions 
varies significantly, and (iii) the standard with which to classify patents is not 
well defined. To deal with the first and second, it is important to recognise 
that patent counts do not always provide an exhaustive list of advances in
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technology. Thus, using this as a proxy variable underestimates the number of 
technological advances made in a particular industry. Patent grants are used 
instead of patent applications to rule out minor or repetitive inventions and 
thus, solely concentrate on a minimal quantum of inventions which has passed 
the scrutiny of the patent office on the criteria of technical significance, utility 
and marketability.
In dealing with the last problem, the sub-class system of the International 
Patent Classification (IPC) is used to concord the patents data with the 
Philippine Standard Industry Classification (PSIC) which is based on the 
International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC). Assignments of patents 
to a particular industry was based primarily on where it is more likely to be of 
'use'. Appendix 6.2 shows the industry classification of patents data that have 
been constructed to carry out this study. Basic data on patent grants were 
obtained from the voluminous records of the Bureau of Patents Trademarks 
and Technology Transfer in the Philippines. Cumulative patent grants over a 
five year period were used in the model as a proxy for innovation.
Investment as a proportion of capital. Data on current gross investments 
were taken from the survey of manufacturing establishments undertaken by the 
National Statistics Office. The series were deflated by the gross domestic 
investment deflator to yield an investment series at constant 1985 prices which 
was later divided by the capital stock series.
Exports. Exports data at three digit level ISIC in current US dollars were 
obtained from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics and supplied from tapes by 
the International Economic Databank (IEDB) at the Australian National 
University.
Import Penetration Ratio. This is defined to be the ratio of imports to 
consumption. Consumption, on the other hand is defined to be the value of
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production plus the value of imports less exports. This data were also drawn 
from UN Commodity Trade Statistics and United Nations Industrial 
Development Organisation and supplied by the International Economic 
Databank (IEDB) at the Australian National University.
Tariffs. It would be most appropriate to use the effective rate of 
protection, but estimates are unavailable for all industries and all time periods 
covered. Data on tariffs were obtained from the Tariff Commission of the 
Philippines, classified by products under the Philippine harmonised system of 
classification. The author reclassified this by industry using product 
descriptions and weighted the series using import data (see Appendix 6.3).
Size of average establishment in the industry. This is defined to be the 
ratio of number of employed workers to the number of firms in the industry. 
Data have been obtained from the survey of manufacturing establishments 
undertaken by the National Statistics Office.
Estimation: issues and methods
Industry as well as time series data have been pooled to estimate the 
parameters in 6.14. The analysis covers 10 manufacturing industries and 4 
time periods (1985 to 1988 inclusive). For the econometric method, there are 
a variety of models to choose from, the differences among which relate to 
assumptions made about the disturbance vector.
Pooled regression models. A summary of the possible taxonomy of 
models dealing with time series and cross-sections is given in table 6.2. 
Model 1A is a straight forward application of ordinary least squares where it is 
assumed that the intercept and the slope coefficients are common across all 
industries and over time. The classical assumptions on the residuals should
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hold in this case: Uit being identically and independently distributed with 
mean equal to 0 and variance a  u.
Following Johnston (1984), model IB allows for a variety of 
specifications, depending on the assumptions made about the error term. For 
example, one can relax the assumptions in Model 1A and allow for cross- 
sectional heteroscedasticity and timewise autoregression or a cross-sectionally 
correlated and timewise autoregressive model. Solving these models usually 
calls for the application of generalised linear regression (GLS).
Table 6.2. Taxonomy of time series, cross section models3
Model Assumptions about
Intercept Slope Coefficient Disturbance Term
1A Common for all i,t Common for all i,t E(uu ') = ct; /„
IB Common for all i,t Common for all i,t E(uu') = V
2A Varying over i Common for all i,t Fixed Effects
2B Varying over i Common for all i,t Random Effects
3A Varying over i,t Common for all i,t Fixed Effects
3B Varying over i,t Common for all i,t Random Effects
4 Varying over i Varying over i E(uu') = <J2uI n or E(uu') = V
aj refers to the cross-sectional unit and t refers to time.
Source: Johnston, J., 1984. Econometric Methods, 3rd edition, Me Graw Hill Book Company, New York..
Model 2 relaxes the assumption that the intercept term for each cross- 
sectional unit is the same, however, it retains the assumption that slopes are 
common. Model 2A, is known as the fixed effect model, where the effects in 
the cross-sectional units are captured by an intercept term, a  ,•. This is done by
adding binary dummy variables to capture the fixed effects of each cross-
sectional unit. This model can generate 'within' group estimates of the 
parameters based on within group deviations (Yit — Yi and Xit -  Xt ). Model
2B on the other hand , is known as the random effects or the error component 
model. This approach assumes a single constant term for all cross-sectional
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units however, the individual intercepts are added up in the error term; thus, 
Ult becomes
u u = a i + Z ' t  (6 1 5 )
where a , and s ;/are assumed to be drawn at random from N(0,ol) and 
N(0,g I) respectively. In this case a, is seen as an increment (which can be
positive or negative) to the common a  .
Model 3 is an extension of Model 2. However, it allows the intercept 
terms to vary across 2 dimensions (time and in the cross-sectional units 
considered). Again the fixed and random approaches are available. The fixed 
effect approach requires the inclusion of dummy variables for the time periods 
(bearing in mind that only m -1  dummy variables are needed to avoid a 
singular data matrix). Finally, model 4 allows some flexibility of variation in 
both the intercept and the vector slope coefficients. This model has a random 
effects version which can be extended to allow time specific as well as unit 
specific error components (Johnston 1984).
Fixed vs random effects. A benchmark is needed to evaluate the 
appropriateness of fixed and random effects models. The literature is weak in 
this area. In fact it has been suggested that the standard distinction between 
fixed and random effects models is erroneous (Greene 1991). The fixed effect 
model, from a practical standpoint, is costly in terms of losing some degrees of 
freedom. However, the random effects model has one major limitation in that 
it has to satisfy the condition that the individual effects are uncorrelated with 
the other regressors in the model, otherwise the regression coefficient becomes 
biased and inconsistent. Kmenta (1986) suggests that if there is any doubt 
about the correlation of the two, a test should be carried out. A possible test 
for the orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors was devised by 
Hausman (1978). Under the null hypothesis for this test, which is
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H0:E(X  s) = 0 , the generalised least squares estimator of the coefficients of
the random effect model should not be significantly different from the least 
square estimator of the coefficients in the fixed effect model.
In this study, the empirical model is estimated using two alternative 
pooled regression models: model IB. The random effect model is preferred 
over the fixed effect model due to the narrowness of the sample size. The loss 
of the degrees of freedom brought about by the inclusion of dummy variables 
is costly. Initial estimates also suggest that the fixed effects are uncorrelated 
with the explanatory variables.
Diagnostic testing suggests that the disturbances in the estimated equation 
specified in 6.14 are autoregressive and heteroscedastic. This is expected 
when dealing with pooled data analysis and to deal with this problem a cross- 
sectional heteroscedastic and timewise autoregressive model (Model IB) was 
adopted with the following characteristics:
autocorrelation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity, the sample observations 
have been subjected to a double transformation where the first was designed to 
remove autoregression and the other to remove heteroscedasticity. For 
simplicity, the author assumed that p has the same value for all the cross­
ed. 16)
Ult - (6.17)
Both Uit = pjUit_x + s,Yare assumed to be drawn from N(0,cj2ui) and
Upon recognition of the presence of timewise
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sectional units ( p,. = py = p ).6 In doing so the variance-covariance matrix
becomes
n  -
ofZ 0 •••
0 a \ Z  • • •
0
0
(6.18)
0 o  . . .  tt ’ , z
where Z = P (6.19)
PT- 1 P P
In order to find consistent estimates of all elements of 6.18 the following 
procedures were undertaken. First, the ordinary least squares method was 
applied to the pooled data set ( N  x T observations) and from the residuals an 
estimate of p was obtained as:
X X eiteit_ i
A -  ______  (<k om
Second, the dependent and the independent variables were transformed 
using
In order to maintain the original sample size of the dataset, the Prais and 
Winsten method (Greene 1991) was applied to the first observation of each 
cross-sectional unit.7
6It is important to note that an AR(1) scheme's stability requires that/p / < 1. Assuming then 
that p is common to all cross-sectional units diminishes the possibility of obtaining p 
estimates beyond the permissible range.
7This is done by applying the formulae Y*\ = y l - p l ^  and X*\ = J 1 -  pXj\ to the dependent 
and independent variables respectively.
K  = Yu -P  V ,  and y  = X„ -  for t=2,..T. (6.21)
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The third step is the ordinary least squares estimation of the entire model
based on the transformed variables. From the results the estimated residuals, 
U*t can be obtained. These are later on used to estimate the variance (g ,^) of
^  j|c
Ult which is given below as
o  1
T U ,
T -  K t=\
( 6 .22)
where K refers to the number of variables in the model.
The next task, removing heteroscedasticity, is done by applying weights to 
the transformed variables in 6.21. The weights used are 6 ui, derived from
6.22. And the last step is the estimation of the weighted variables using 
ordinary least squares . U** from the last regression model is asymptotically
nonautoregressive and homoscedastic.
Results
The estimated pooled regression coefficients of the determinants of technical 
efficiency in Philippine manufacturing are summarised in Table 6.3.
The result shows a positive association between the volume of innovation 
and technical efficiency. Except for electrical machinery, industries with many 
patent grants also have high technical efficiency. The chemical and drug 
industry for example, is highly concentrated (not too many firms) and patents 
are usually taken out by oligopolists; therefore, the spread of productivity is 
smaller. Patenting in this case ensures that productivity of most firms in the 
industry is high. This suggests that patent enforcement which encourages 
research and development activities (both at the domestic and international 
level), increases available technologies necessary for the operation of a 
particular industry.
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Table. 6.3 Estimated coefficients based on two alternative models
Variable Estimated Coefficient T-Statistics
Cross-sectionally Heteroscedastic
and Timewise Autoregressive M odel (IB)  
Cumulative 5 year patent grants 0.14 4.47
Investment as a proportion of capital stock 2.20 5.33
Exports 0.001 0.02
Import penetration ratio -0.02 -0.34
Tariffs -0.11 -3.49
Size -0.14 -0.41
Time trend -0.38 -1.18
Random Effects M odel (2 B )  
Cumulative 5 year patent grants 0.14 4.57
Investment as a proportion of capital stock 0.53 2.20
Exports 0.12 3.38
Import penetration ratio 0.08 2.24
Tariffs -0.08 -4.15
Size -0.11 -0.70
Time trend -0.07 -0.54
Source: Author's estimation
The level of technical efficiency in Philippine manufacturing has also 
largely been explained by its capital formation. This further emphasises the 
role of capital policy in attaining productivity growth in the country. 
Investment increases in industry can speed up the rate of the introduction of 
new technologies that is embodied in capital and the rate of technological 
progress as well.
The result also suggests that trade as well as competition policies has a 
positive role in attaining efficiency in Philippine manufacturing. Hooley 
(1985) also found a significant relationship between exports and TFP growth, 
suggesting a positive impact of outward looking policies on productivity 
growth. Moreover, a positive association with the import penetration ratio 
offers support to the notion that on balance exposure to foreign competition 
induces efficiency. The sign of the variable tariffs being negative is also 
consistent with economic theory. Protection is expected to have a negative
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impact on the industry's technical efficiency because it reduces foreign 
competitive pressure.
The size of an average firm in the industry has been added as an 
explanatory variable in the model as a proxy for economies of scale. 
Empirical studies suggest that there are significant scale economies as firms 
progress from small to medium size. This was found to be a significant 
variable in Hooley's study (1985) on the determinants of TFP growth in 
Philippine manufacturing industries. In this study however, it is an 
insignificant variable.
6.5 Conclusion
Productivity and innovation is one area of research where studies from the 
point of view of developing countries are seen to be deficient. This study 
attempts to address this by examining the relationship between technical 
efficiency and innovation in various manufacturing industries in the 
Philippines. The innovation variable used covers not only domestic 
innovation but also foreign inventive activity specific to a particular industry. 
Representing innovation in this way then allows us to draw some conclusions 
regarding the role of patenting in Philippine manufacturing. The finding that 
inventive activity significantly affects efficiency in Philippine manufacturing 
suggests that a developing country like the Philippines gains as well from the 
research and development efforts of other countries; thus patenting as a policy 
which encourages innovation may have positive effects on productivity 
growth.
It should also be emphasised that a number of other policy measures 
significantly affect technical efficiency in Philippine manufacturing. In 
particular, it was found that increases in capital investments is positively
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correlated with technical efficiency. This suggests that technology embodied 
in new capital can improve an industry's performance. Furthermore, the 
empirical analysis also confirms the role of openness to trade in achieving 
productivity growth.
The empirical analysis put forward in this study has some limitations 
attached to it. One of its strengths lies is the measurement of technical 
efficiency, and the observation of considerable interindustry differences in 
technical efficiency over time. However, the lack of theoretical model that 
provides formal underpinnings for the determinants of technical efficiency 
limits confidence in the set of variables included in this study. Other variables 
like the concentration ratio8, taking into account how industry structure 
(whether the industry as a whole is oligopolistic or perfectly competitive) 
affects technical efficiency in Philippine manufacturing may have been 
included in the model but data availability is a major problem.
8Caves and Barton (1990) suggests a negative correlation between the concentration ratio and 
technical efficiency. Inefficiency can appear when there are only few producers in the industry 
because: (i) the absence of strong competition allows other inefficient producers to survive; (ii) 
that when there are only few firms in the industry; (ii) fewer resources will be devoted to 
experimenting new ways to improve production; and (iii) imperfect competition generates 
inefficiency when partial collusive bargaining in oligopoly induce rent-seeking.
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Appendix 6.1 Breusch-Pagan LM test
Industry 1985 1986 1987 1988
Food 8.0 38.8 19.0 26.2
Textiles 7.0 11.1 6.9 7.7
Wood 10.4 11.2 17.4 15.9
Furniture 9.8 9.8 10.8 11.6
Non-Metallic 8.0 12.8 10.4 8.0
Chemical Industries 6.3 6.3 8.8 9.4
Metals and Metal Products 8.2 6.4 11.7 8.5
Machinery 13.7 9.7 12.8 9.1
Electrical Machinery 8.5 8.3 11.4 8.6
Transport Equipment 9.9 12.6 12.4 9.4
Source: Author's estimation based on random coefficient approach.
Appendix 6.2 Technical efficiency estimates of Philippine industries using the random 
_______________ coefficient approach______________________________________________
Industry 1985 1986 1987 1988
Food 41.3 33.8 41.6 13.7
Textiles 69.9 52.1 79.2 91.0
Wood 59.9 58.9 68.4 62.4
Furniture 46.6 50.6 58.7 90.1
Non-Metallic 74.4 72.4 84.8 79.5
Chemical Industries 81.4 71.7 73.3 69.1
Metals and Metal Products 59.0 52.4 44.7 52.6
Machinery 82.3 80.2 42.0 44.0
Electrical Machinery 20.8 25.8 15.2 25.3
Transport Equipment 87.1 61.7 10.1 9.7
Source: Author's estimation based on random coefficient approach.
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Appendix 6.3 Concordance between the Philippine Standard Industry Classification
(PSIC) and the International Patent Classification (IPC)
Description PSIC IPC
Food and Beverage 311+312+313 A21 + A22+A23+C12+C13
Tobacco 314 A24
Textile 321 D01+D02+D03+D04+D05+D06
Wearing Apparel 322 A41+A42
Leather 323 C14
Footwear 324 A43
Wood and Cork 331 B27
Furniture and Fixtures 332+386 A4 7
Paper and Paper Products 341 B31+D21
Printing and Publishing 342 B41+B42+B43+B44
Industrial Chemicals3 351 B01+B02+B03+B04+B05+B06+
B07+C01+C02+C05C07+C08+
A01N
Other Chemical Products15 352 C09+A61K+C11+A61+B08
Petroleum 353+354 CIO
Plastic, not elsewhere classified 356 B29
Non Metallic Mineral Products0 361+362+ B28+C03+C04
363+369
Basic Metals and Metal Products^ 371+372+ B21+B22+B23+C21+C22+
381+382 C23+C25+C30+B25+B26
Machinery except electrical 382 B24+F01+F02+F03+F04+
F15+F16+F17
Electrical Machinery1 383 HO 1+H02+H03+H04+H05+
F21+F22+F23+F24+F25+F28+
G06+G07+G08
Transport Equipment 384 B60+B61+B62+B63+B64
Professional and Scientific Instruments^ 385 GO 1+G02+G03+G04+G05
aThis classification includes basic industrial chemicals, inorganic acids, alkalies, inorganic salts and compounds,
organic acids, fertilisers, synthetic resins, man-made fibers, pesticides, etc.
^This classification includes paints, varnishes, lacquers, drugs, medicine, soap, cleaning preparations, perfumes, 
other chemical products not elsewhere classified. 
cThis classification includes pottery, china, earthenware, glass, clay, cement, etc.
^This classification includes iron and steel, non-ferrous metals and fabricated metals. 
eThis classification includes engines, turbines, machines, etc.
‘This classification includes electrical appliances, generators, radio, television, gramophone, signalling and detection 
equipment, wiring devices, ranges, batteries, etc.
^This classification includes quantity and controlling instruments, photographic instruments, watches, etc.
Source: Autor's classification based on
National Statistics Office, 1987. Annual Survey o f Establishments: manufacturing, National Statistics 
Office, Manila.
World Intellectual Property Organisation, 1984. International Classification, Vol. 9, WIPO, Geneva.
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Appendix 6.4 Concordance between the Philippine Standard Industry Classification
and the Harmonised System of Tariff Classification
Industry Harmonised System Chapter
Food and Beverage 16,17,18,19,20,21,22
Tobacco 24
Textile 50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60
Wearing Apparel 61,62,63
Footwear 64
Wood and Cork 44,45
Furniture and Fixtures 94
Paper and Paper Products 47,48
Printing 49
Industrial Chemicals 28,29,30,31
Other Chemicals 32,33,34,35
Petroleum 27
Plastic 39
Non-Metallic Minerals 68,69,70
Basic Metals and Metal Products 72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83
Machinery 84
Electrical Machinery 85
Transport Equipment 86,87,88,89
Source: Author’s classification based on
National Statistics Office, 1987. Annual Survey of Establishments: manufacturing, National Statistics 
Office, Manila.
Tariff Commission, 1990. Tariff and customs codes o f the Philippines: harmonized commodity 
descriptions and coding system, Vol. 1, Philippine Tariff Commission, Quezon City.
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Chapter 7
Inventive Activity in Philippine Manufacturing:
Its Nature and Determinants
This chapter looks into the general nature and determinants of domestic 
innovation in the Philippines. The demand for domestic innovation and 
foreign technology is analysed and treated as being jointly determined by 
characteristics of Philippine manufacturing industries, domestic prices and the 
supply of purchasable foreign technology. The latter variable is included in 
the analysis to find out how domestic innovation (which is generally adaptive 
respond to upstream inventions from the industrial countries) respond to 
upstream inventions in the industrial countries. If the relationship is strong 
and positive, then a regime of stronger patent protection in the Philippines will 
benefit the country because it will increase the supply of international 
inventions which complements adaptive innovation in the Philippines.
7.1 Nature of Inventive Activity in Philippine Industry
This section uses two rough measures of inventive activity: the research and 
development expenditures and patent statistics. The former provide a more 
accurate measure of inventive effort. It is not available in time series however. 
Despite a number of limitations, patent statistics provide some interesting 
insights as to the nature of inventive activity in the Philippines. 1
Like many developing countries, research and development activities in the 
Philippines are meagre compared to industrial countries. Research and
'See chapter 6 for the limitation of patent statistics as indicators of innovation.
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development expenditures account for less than 1 per cent of the country's 
gross national product (see table 7.1). Moreover, in figure 7.1, estimates of 
research and development expenditures by sector suggest that the government 
accounts for more than 60 per cent of formal research and development 
expenditures in the Philippines, while private industry accounted for only 20 
per cent. It is inventive activity in private sector, particularly in 
manufacturing, that forms the main focus of this study.
Table 7.1 Philippines: R&D expenditures as a percentage of 
GNP, 1980-90
Year as a proportion of GNPa
1980 0.26
1981 0.17
1982 0.19
1983 0.14
1984 0.12
1985 0.10
1986 0.10
1987 0.10
1988 0.10
1989 0.11
1990 0.11
Estimates for 1985 to 1990.
Source: Department of Science and Technology. 1990. Science and
Technology Master Plan, Department of Science and Technology, 
Manila.
Research and development expenditures in Philippine manufacturing is 
meagre. Formal research and development activities in Philippine 
manufacturing in the 1990 survey of establishments shows this clearly 
(National Statistics Office 1990). Only 11 per cent of all establishments 
surveyed were engaged in research and development activities. In 
manufacturing, at least, research and development is financed through 
companies' funds and the share of government and foreign funds is negligible.
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Figure 7.1
Philippines: sectoral distribution of R&D expenditures, 1979-843
100%
80% -
60 % -
II Non Profit Institutions 
□  Higher Education 
I ]  Private Industry 
B  Government
40% -
20% -
aThis is the latest data available at the time of writing.
Source: National Science and Technology Authority, R&D Expenditures and
Manpower in Private Industry, various issues.
Research and development expenditures in industry can be classified into 
three main activities: basic research, applied research and experimental 
development. The first refers to basic or fundamental research work 
undertaken primarily for the purpose of acquiring new knowledge about 
certain phenomenon, without any particular use in view. Applied research, 
deals with original investigation undertaken in order to acquire knowledge, but 
where the effort is directed toward a practical aim. Finally, experimental 
development, pertains to the systematic activity of drawing on existing 
knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience aimed particularly 
at producing new products or improving existing products and devices.
The average percentage distribution of research and development 
expenditures by type of research based on surveys conducted by the National 
Science and Technology Authority2 3 in 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982 show that
2Definition of each of these activities is based on that adopted by the UNESCO general 
conference in Paris (27 November 1978).
’ This office is now called the Department of Science and Technology.
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manufacturing industries are generally engaged in experimental development, 
which emphasises adaptive innovation rather than the search for basic of 
fundamental knowledge (Figure 7.2). This type of innovative activity is 
geared towards product development rather than process improvement.
Figure 7.2
Philippines: Distribution of average R&D expenditures in manufacturing 
___________ industries, by type of research activity, 1979-82^___________
Basic Research Applied
Research
Experimenta
Development
aThis is the latest data available at the time of writing.
Source: National Science and Technology Authority, R&D Expenditures and
Manpower in Private Industry, various issues.
How do invention patent statistics relate to inventive activity in Philippine 
industry? A survey done by Griliches (1990) on the relationship of research 
and development activities and patenting in developed countries confirms a 
positive association. In the absence of data on research expenditures, the 
readily available data on invention patents can therefore, be used as proxy. It 
is not appropriate, however, because research and development activities in 
developing countries are primarily informal and adaptive in nature.
Statistics on invention patents are summarised in table 7.2. It is clear that 
the majority of patents granted in Philippine manufacturing represent grants to 
foreign nationals. Of the few patents granted to domestic residents, only a 
handful are recognised in other countries. This indicates that invention patents 
originating from domestic residents in the Philippines have lower
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transferability abroad than those originating from industrial countries, like the 
United States, Japan and Germany.
Table 7.2 Philippines: manufacturing invention patents granted3, 1960, 1970, 1980 
and 1990
Year Number Percentage Domestic Percentage Foreign
1960 117 5.13 94.87
1970 519 3.47 96.53
1980 810 7.90 92.10
1990 990 2.22 97.78
aPatent statistics were classified based on the international standard industry classification using the subclasses of the 
International Patent Classification. See Appendix 6.3.
Source of basic data: Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
There is one form of innovative activity that is prevalent in the 
Philippines, however. This is in the area of adaptive inventions: in 
assimilating and modifying inventions imported from industrial countries. In 
the patent record, this activity is covered under petty or utility patents. Utility 
patents have a lower invention requirement than the traditional invention 
patents (Medalla, Mikklesen and Evenson 1982). The protection offered for 
this type of invention is only five years, much shorter than the 17 years granted 
to invention patents.
A summary of utility patents granted to domestic residents in Philippine 
manufacturing is given in table 7.3. Domestic nationals account for 98 per 
cent of total utility patents granted in the Philippines. While chemical or 
biogenetic technology inventions dominate invention patent statistics, the 
majority of utility patents are granted for mechanical technology. The major 
advantage of protecting such adaptation through petty patents is that it 
broadens the invention base by providing incentives for small firms to 
undertake innovative activity (Deolalikar and Evenson 1989; 1990; Mikklesen 
1984; Medalla, Mikklesen and Evenson 1982).
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Table 7.3 Philippines: domestic utility patents3, 1979-90
Industry Number Sectoral Share
(1979-1990) (as a percentage of total)
Food and Beverage 72 3.43
Tobacco 14 0.67
Textile 48 2.29
Wearing Apparel 46 2.19
Footwear 40 1.91
Wood 14 0.67
Furniture 356 16.96
Paper Products 11 0.52
Printing 87 4.14
Industrial Chemicals 176 8.38
Other Chemical Products 119 5.67
Petroleum 14 0.67
Plastic 17 0.81
Non-Metallic Minerals 42 2.00
Basic Metals and Metal Products 97 4.62
Machinery 289 13.77
Electrical Machinery 491 23.39
Transport Equipment 165 7.86
aUtility patent statistics were classified based ori the international standard industry classification using the
subclasses of the International Patent Classification. See Appendix 6.3.
Source of basic data: Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, Philippines, unpublished
data.
7.2 Determinants of Inventive Activity in Philippine Industry: An
Econometric Analysis
The foregoing suggests that the Philippines tends to underinvest in inventive 
research and development activities. Although the level of inventive activity 
in the country is low, the previous chapter indicates that it is related to 
technical efficiency and hence in productivity growth. The importance then of 
innovative activities in attaining productivity growth raises concern over the 
determinants of inventive activity in Philippine industry.
The approach used in this study is similar to that adopted by Deolalikar 
and Evenson (1989) for India. It is different from earlier studies, which have 
examined inventive activity in industrial countries by virtue of its demand 
system framework.
An input demand system is derived from a cost function of the ith
industry given below:
C  = C(w'j, Y') (7.1)
where w'j refers to input prices and Y‘ is output of industry i.
On the assumption that all prices are parametric, the factor demands can 
be derived from the cost function by Shephard's Lemma:
where x‘j is the j th factor demand of industry i. From (7.2) it is clear that 
demand for each factor depends on factor prices and the level of output.
There are five inputs used in this econometric analysis: labor, capital, 
intermediate inputs and technology, divided into foreign and domestic. Some 
justification is required for treating technology as a variable input. Normally, 
it is viewed as fixed investment, however, both domestic technology 
production and technology purchases in Philippine manufacturing exhibit 
some elements of variability.
Many of the contractual agreements embodying technology transfer to 
Philippine industry are relatively short term and change rapidly. Most of the 
technology transfer agreements have been of the independent type. Of all 
agreements recorded from 1979 to 1990, half involved technical collaboration. 
Statistics also indicate that there is a declining trend of licensing agreements 
between parent companies and their subsidiaries. Technology purchases vary 
across industries. The pharmaceutical industry has the highest number of 
registered agreements, and these are mostly collaborative, (see if you can 
insert)
(7.2)
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Domestic inventiveness in the Philippines is adaptive in nature, which is 
largely supported by a law protecting utility patents. Inventions of this sort 
may have an investment component. However, the time period over which 
there is a positive service flow from the investment is relatively short because 
'follow-on' inventions erode the rents associated with any given invention 
(Deolalikar and Evenson 1989).
For estimation purposes, an ad hoc specification for the input demand is 
used. Other explanatory variables, foreign inventiveness, foreign capital share 
and time trend have been added to equation (7.2). The latter is included to 
show the trend rate of change of the dependent variables. The input demand 
equation to be estimated is thus:
x'j = p,0 + i  ß ^ ' ,  + ß,Tr  + f,lSFS' + f,IPFP‘ + ß f7T + u ,  (7.3)
j= 1
where w ‘j  refers to input prices, Y' refers to industry output, FS‘ measures
foreign capital participation, FP' is a proxy variable for the supply of foreign 
innovations specific to the industry, T is a time trend variable and U‘ 7 is the 
error term. All the variables in the model are in natural logarithms so that the 
estimated coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities.
Of particular interest is the sign of ß /7>, the coefficient of foreign patents 
in the demand for local technology. ß,P in this equation expresses the
responsiveness of domestic innovation to the supply of foreign inventions. 
Deolalikar and Evenson (1989; 1990) suggest that this parameter could be 
positive or negative if the measurement of innovations (both domestic and 
foreign) uses patent statistics. To the extent that foreign firms or residents 
patent their inventions in the Philippines, to block domestic firms from 
reinventing the same product or process, the effect would be negative. 
However, patenting by foreign firms or residents may also have a positive 
effect on domestic innovations through the disclosure of inventions.
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Philippine firms can leam from this and modify and patent an adapted version 
in the Philippines.
The sample industries included in this study are observed in 11 time 
periods from 1979 to 1990. They are divided into three groups namely: light 
industries, chemical and drug, and engineering industries. The industries 
included in each of these broad categories are listed in table 7.4. Both time 
series and cross sectional data are been pooled within each of the three groups.
Table 7.4 Broad industry classification used in this study
Light Chemical and Drug Engineering
Food and beverages Industrial Chemicals Basic Metals
Tobacco Other chemicals Metal Products
Textile Petroleum Machinery
Wearing Apparel Electrical Machinery
Footwear
Wood
Furniture
Paper
Printing and Publishing 
Plastic
Non-metallic Products
Transport Equipment
Source: Author's classification.
The Krause system of classification (Tyers and Philips 1984) was used in 
assigning to the three broad categories. Technology-intensive industries based 
on the Krause classification were divided into two categories, chemical and 
drug which are highly intensive in imported technology and engineering 
industries which rely more on domestic technology. Light industries, cover all 
other industries which are not technology-intensive based on the Krause 
classification.
The characteristics of each of the three industry groups are shown in Table 
7.5. On average, light industries employ more labor relative to the other two 
industries while chemical and drug industries are intensive in capital and 
imported technology. The foreign equity share is highest in this industry.
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Domestic patenting, on the other hand, is concentrated in the engineering
sector.
Table 7.5 Means of production inputs and foreign share of production in Philippine 
____________ industries, 1979-90__________________________________________________
Variables3 Light Industries15 Chemical & Drugsc Engineeringd
Labor (in thousands) 211.7 173.3 174.8
Capital (in Million Pesos) 7.4 34.4 7.0
Intermediate Inputs 5.8 127.2 4.3
Technology Importse 10.8 116.3 41.4
Domestic Patents^ 35.8 125.2 146.6
Foreign Share 6.0 20.2 11.2
Sample Size 132 36 48
3 All variables except for foreign share have been divided by the total number of firms in the industry; therefore the 
means refer to the average firm in the industry.
k Light industries include food and beverage, tobacco, textile, wearing apparel, footwear, wood, furniture and 
fixtures, paper, printing and publishing, plastic, and non-metallic mineral products. 
c Chemical and drug industries include industrial chemicals, other chemicals, and petroleum. 
d Engineering include metals, machinery, electrical machinery and transport equipment. 
e Number of foreign licensing agreements multiplied by 1000 
* Number of utility patents granted multiplied by 1000
Source: Author's calculation.
Data
All industry data are taken from the Annual Survey of Establishments 
conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO) for large industries. The 
definition of large firms changes occasionally. In 1988 the definition of large 
establishments was changed from firms employing twenty or more workers to 
firms that employ fifty or more workers. The coverage of the published data 
contains inconsistencies. Statistical releases sometimes cover all 
establishments (both small and large), at other times is released only for large 
firms. A special tabulation of the industry data was requested from the 
National Statistics Office (NSO) to cover only large firms employing twenty or 
more workers.
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A capital stock series at 1972 prices for each individual industry was 
constructed using the perpetual inventory method (Austria 1992: Hooley 
1985).4 This approach is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
The number of paid employees according to the survey is used to measure 
labor input. Compensation data, deflated by the GDP deflator are used as a 
proxy for real annual wages at 1972 prices.
The value of output in each industry at current prices is from the survey of 
establishments. This was deflated by industry-specific price indices to obtain a 
series at constant 1972 prices. The series for intermediate inputs was derived 
from the difference between gross value of output and value added at constant 
1972 prices.
Since 1988, the survey of establishments have included the percentage of 
foreign capital participation in their questionnaires. Unavailability of data in 
earlier years, means this variable only varies across industries in the estimation 
and has no time component. Foreign capital participation is averaged across 
the three year period, 1988-1990.
Utility patents granted to Philippine residents are used as a proxy for local 
inventive activity. Utility patents, despite their limitations, provide a good 
proxy for adaptive inventions which are characteristic of domestic innovative 
activity in the Philippines. Two problems are associated with using utility 
patents as a measure of inventive output: classification and quality. 
Classifications problems arise from allocating utility patents to an industry. 
To overcome this problem, the author used the subclass system of patent
4 The formula used to compute for the capital stock series using the perpetual inventory 
method is given by Kt= (l-8)K t,j+It where K is capital, 8 is the depreciation rate and I is 
investment. The initial capital stock is computed as K0= I0 /  (y+8) where y is the average 
growth rate of capital
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classification and assignment to a particular industry is based on the industry 
of use rather than the industry that produced it. The problem is that the quality 
of the underlying inventions vary from patent to patent, differing in both 
technical and economic significance. Many patents are only minor 
improvements and have little economic value. However some prove to be 
extremely valuable. In order to minimise this limitation, the author just 
considered utility patents that has been granted rather than applications.
Data on utility patents were classified only according to the standard 
International Patent Classification (IPC). It was necessary to reclassify them 
using the IPC sub-classification codes to obtain consistency with the industry 
production data and its Philippine Standard Industry Classification. Appendix 
6.3 provides a record of industry description along with its corresponding 
PSIC and IPC classification. The data were obtained from the voluminous 
records of the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer in the 
Philippines.
The number of foreign technology agreements in the Philippine industry is 
used as a proxy for foreign technology input. This measure of foreign 
technology is not sensitive to quality differentials in technologies purchased 
across industries. The data set was obtained from the records of technology 
transfer agreements monitored by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and 
Technology Transfer.
The cumulative number of patents granted to foreign nationals over the 
past five years in the Philippines was used as a proxy for the supply of 
international inventions and technology. This is a relevant explanatory 
variable as far as domestic and foreign technology is concerned since demand 
for foreign technology may be constrained by supply of internationally 
available technologies. Because Philippine inventive activity involves
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modification and adaptation of existing technologies , the international supply 
is significant. The databases on the IPC classification are taken from records 
of the Bureau of Patents Trademarks and Technology Transfer. These patent 
statistics are reclassified to obtain a series consistent with PSIC (See Appendix 
6.3).
The data on prices are available for only three inputs: labor, capital and 
intermediate inputs. Hence, in the estimation process only three inputs have 
price elasticities. The price index of materials and fuel from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook is used as a proxy for prices of intermediate inputs, e .
The series for the price of capital was derived using the approach of 
Mendoza and Warr (1992). The price of capital goods is defined as:
p = (r + 5 )z (7.4)
where r is the discount rate, 5 is the depreciation rate and z is the asset price. 
The weighted average interest rate on money market transactions is used as the 
discount rate and the implicit price index for gross capital formation is used as 
a proxy for asset price. Data were obtained from the Central Bank of the 
Philippines and various issues of the Philippine Statistical Yearbook.
Estimation issues and procedures
Because industry-level variables represent totals over different numbers of 
firms in each industry, all dependent and independent variables (except the 
data on prices and foreign equity), are divided by the number of firms in the 
industry. This has two advantages: first, it allows the results to be interpreted 
for an average firm in the industry; second, it removes a potential source of 
heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the demand equations.
To deal with the pooled data set, a covariance model is adopted. The 
covariance model allows each industry to have its own intercept.. This is
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incorporated into the model by the introduction of dummy variables into the 
regression equations. Adding dummy variables isolates individual industry- 
shift effects, while assuming a high degree of similarity between technologies 
within each of the three industry groups.
The demand equations are were estimated using the Zellner's or seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR) method to take into account the interdependence of 
the error terms and the symmetry restrictions across equations. All prices are 
divided by the price of intermediate inputs to impose homogeneity of degree 
zero in prices. The symmetry restriction is only applied to capital and labor 
demand equations.
Results
The results are summarised in Table 7.6. These show the estimated own and 
cross price elasticities of input demands and report the effects of output and 
other determinants on an industry's demand for variable inputs. The empirical 
results are generally consistent with predictions from production theory. Three 
of the six own price elasticities have the wrong sign, and they are insignificant. 
The 'own price effect' of labor is insignificant, except for light industries. The 
weakness of the wage effects could be attributed to the trend in real wages, 
which tends to be flat over time. Another interesting result based on the 
estimates is that capital and labor have a complementary relationship for an 
average manufacturing firm in the Philippines. This result persists in all three 
industry groups and is statistically significant.
Technology imports are more responsive to prices than domestic 
patenting. A rise in wages stimulates an increase in technology imports in both 
light and engineering industries. This suggests that technology imports in 
these industries are of the labour-saving type. Moreover, in the case of light
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industries, an increase in the price of labour also decrease the demand for 
domestic innovation implying that labour and domestic inventive effort are 
complementary. A wage increase then will not only decrease the quantity of 
labour employed but also lead to a decrease in the relative importance of 
domestic innovation in production as firms search for other labor saving 
technology abroad to reduce cost. This is consistent with earlier findings 
about domestic innovation in the Philippines being of the blue-collar type that 
is heavily concentrated on product modification rather than process 
improvement (Deolalikar and Evenson 1989 and the WB 1987). The World 
Bank (1987) further argues that this largely stems from the main motivation of 
R&D which is product diversification rather than cost reduction. Such R&D 
orientation is typical for countries with relatively high protection and relatively 
little competition.
Both technology purchase and domestic innovation respond positively to 
international inventions in the engineering industries. Similarly, domestic 
innovation is found to be strongly correlated to foreign patenting in the 
chemical and drug industries. This indicates that technology-intensive firms 
respond positively to an increase in the supply of upstream inventions abroad 
lending support to the positive disclosure effect of patenting. However, the 
opposite is observed in the light industries where at the 5 per cent level, the 
elasticity of domestic innovation with respect to international inventive 
activity is negative. This suggests that the negative blocking effect tend to 
dominate in the case of light industries. This negative effect may be due to the 
presence of more product invention in these industries and patenting then 
works in the interest of foreign firms because foreign national obtain patent to 
block local residents from imitating and copying. The challenge then for the
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government is to find alternative means to enhance innovation in these 
industries.
Foreign ownership has little effect on domestic patenting except in the 
case of the chemical and drug industries. This implies that encouraging 
foreign direct investment in the chemical and drug sector will have a positive 
impact on domestic innovation in these industries.
All inputs have positive output elasticities which are statistically 
significant for the three basic input variables. The output variable in this 
model could be used as a proxy for the average firm size, which is a vital 
interest in the study of innovation in industrial countries. The general finding 
from these countries, with the exception of the chemical industry is that the 
relationship between the number of patents granted and firm size is an inverted 
U. Beyond a certain size, firm size does not have a positive influence on 
inventive effort (Scherer 1965; Johannison and Lindstorm 1971; Kamien and 
Schwartz 1975; Deolalikar and Evenson 1989, 1990). Empirical estimates in 
this study, however, suggest that firm size, although the relationship is 
positive, does not significantly affect domestic innovation, except in the 
chemical and drug industry.
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Table 7.6 Empirical estimates3
Industry
Elasticity Of
with respect to
Labor Capital Intermediate
Inputs
Technology
Imports
Domestic
Patenting
Light Price of labour -0.109 -0.106 0.017 0.815 -0.771
Price of capital
(-2.86)*
-0.106
(-4.23)*
-0.015
(0.26)
-0.044
(2.28)*
0.480
(-2.11)*
0.193
Foreign Patents
(-4.23)*
0.023
(-0.44)
0.096
(-0.92)
-0.019
(0.02)
-0.143
(0.75)
-0.314
Foreign Share
(1.12)
-0.995
(3.63)*
-5.650
(-0.59)
-2.618
(-0.83)
-3.433
(-1.77)*
-8.19
Output
(-2.69)*
0.609
(-11.77)*
0.687
(-4.40)*
0.752
(-0.00)
0.536
(-0.00)
0.253
Time Trend
(13.96)*
-0.009
(11.96)*
-0.017
(10.87)*
-0.023
(1.47)
0.174
(0.68)
-0.20
(-1.62) (-3.19*) (-2.46)* (3.48)* (-3.92)*
Chemical Price of labour 0.329 -0.047 -0.522 0.376 0.034
and Drug
Price of capital
(0.84)
-0.047
(-1.85)*
0.005
(-2.58)*
0.036
(-0.39)
0.812
(0.05)
-0.704
Foreign Patents
(-1.85)*
0.239
(0.17)
-0.078
(0.24)
0.468
(1.14)
0.779
(-1.41)
3.044
Foreign Share
(0.60)
0.53
(-1.82)*
-1.290
(2.58)
2.17
(0.91)
4.418
(5.08)*
9.358
Output
(3.19)*
0.249
(-7.12)*
0.691
(2.84)*
1.597
(1.23)
0.22
(3.70)*
1.079
Time trend
(10.04)*
0.002
(25.83)*
0.003
(14.11)*
-0.150
(0.42)
-0.12
(2.89)*
-0.388
(0.27) (0.63) (-5.60)* (-0.98) (-4.38)*
Engineering Price of labour 0.167 -0.082 -0.456 0.640 -0.157
Price of capital
(0.29)
-0.082
(-2.13)*
-0.104
(-1.60)
0.031
(1.70)*
-0.127
(-0.43)
-0.018
Foreign Patents
(-2.13)*
0.187
(-1.93)*
0.236
(0.17)
0.22
(-0.53)
1.10
(-0.080)
0.885
Foreign Share
(2.87)*
0.302
(2.64)*
-0.695
(0.88)
-0.435
(3.50)*
-1.969
(2.94)*
-0.599
Output
(2.12)*
0.457
(-3.45)*
0.575
(-0.76)
0.829
(-2.79)
0.013
(-0.88)
0.081
Time trend
(10.29)
-0.047
(9.84)*
-0.019
(4.55)*
-0.162
(0.059)
-0.091
(0.37)
-0.212
(-3.91) (-131) (-3.09)* (-136) (-3.30)*
aFigures in parenthesis are T-statistics of the estimated coefficient. * indicates that the variable is significant at the 5 per 
cent level.
Source: Author's estimation.
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7.3 Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the nature of inventive activity in Philippine 
industry and analysed the determinants of the demand for innovations in 
Philippine manufacturing. The characteristics of inventive activity in 
Philippine manufacturing are generally consistent with the findings of earlier 
studies. That is, domestic innovation in developing countries is generally 
adaptive. One important policy implication is that the recognition and active 
enforcement of utility or petty patents would benefit most developing 
countries, because it stimulates adaptive innovation. Two other studies 
support this conclusion. Dahab (1986) and Mikklesen (1985) conducted 
studies on agricultural implements in Brazil and the Philippines, respectively. 
Both concluded that patenting of utility models stimulated adaptive inventions 
in these countries and enabled domestic firms to increase their competitiveness 
with multinational firms, whose inventions they adapted to suit the home 
market.
The second part of the chapter dealt with identifying some determinants of 
domestic innovation in Philippine industry. An econometric analysis of the 
decisions of Philippine firms to invest in their own technology production and 
to purchase foreign technology (through licensing agreements) showed they 
jointly determined by certain characteristics of Philippine industries, factor 
prices and the supply of purchasable foreign technology.
The result that foreign patenting is significantly and positively associated 
with adaptive innovation in the chemical and drug, and engineering industries, 
but is inversely associated with domestic patenting in light industries, suggests 
that the uniform policy of providing protection for all products and process 
inventions in all industries may not be beneficial for developing countries in
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terms of stimulating domestic inventions. The estimated elasticities imply that 
in contrast to the technology-intensive industries, domestic innovation in light 
industries tends to be inhibited by foreign patenting. The negative effect may 
be due to the presence of more product inventions in these industries. In this 
case patenting works in the interest of foreign firms because firms obtain 
patents in the Philippines to block local residents from imitating and copying 
their technology. One policy implication is for developing countries to tailor 
patent protection offered to foreign inventions based on economic 
characteristics and significance of the underlying invention on the domestic 
economy. For example, the practice of limiting patent protection to process 
inventions may be considered in this case. However, this may not be possible 
under the new TRIPs agreement. The challenge then for governments of 
developing countries, like the Philippines, is to find alternative policy 
instruments to enhance domestic innovations in these industries.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The opening of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) signalled a definite shift 
toward stricter intellectual property protection at a global level. From the 
point of view of developing countries, the TRIPs agreement under the 
administration of the WTO would require significant changes in their 
respective IPR regimes and practices.
Such a shift in policy would have two opposing effects on the welfare of 
developing countries. A negative effect is expected as a result of rents being 
transferred from the developing countries (the technology users) to the 
industrial countries (who are generally regarded as knowledge producers). 
However, there are areas that the former could explore from which some 
benefits could be derived. These areas include trade, foreign direct investment 
and increased access to new technologies. The main task then of developing 
countries is to transform a regime of stronger patent protection into an 
instrument responsive to their technological development needs to ensure that 
the benefits would outweigh the costs.
In the case of the Philippines, however, the country's current technological 
capability may undermine the benefits that could be derived from 
strengthening intellectual property protection. Evidence suggests that the 
country's production, investment and innovation capability are lagging behind 
its other Asian neighbours. Moreover, the country's past record shows that it 
failed to maximise benefits derived from technology transfer agreements.
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A policy of increased patent protection is basically designed to encourage 
innovative activity with potential commercial use and application. From this it 
is clear that it is a policy designed to affect the supply of available 
technologies needed for a country’s development. Its effectiveness however, 
is enhanced in a competitive environment where there is demand for such 
innovations. The Philippine experience shows that while policies for 
technological acquisition are generally in place, policies addressing the 
demand side failed to foster a competitive environment that is conducive to 
innovation. Trade and industrial policies predominantly remained bias against 
exports and together with macroeconomic policies have distorted 
technological choice and have undermined the efficient allocation of resources 
among firms. With all these setbacks in the Philippine economy, the expected 
benefits derived in a regime of stronger intellectual property protection is 
diminished. An immediate policy concern for the government is to re-direct 
its policy orientation towards the creation of a more competitive environment. 
The transition period prescribed in the TRIPs agreement before its full 
implementation in five years could be used by the government to correct or 
lessen all the distortions created by its past policies to ensure that while some 
losses are inevitable from such a policy regime, the benefits from it are 
maximised.
Will the benefit of patent protection outweigh the cost of patent protection 
in the Philippines? While the study did not attempt to quantify the cost of 
strengthening patent protection in the Philippines, the findings of the 
empirical chapters of the thesis suggest that on balance, the Philippines has a 
lot to gain from better access to advanced technologies which a regime of 
stronger patent protection could bring. The associated costs from stronger 
patent protection like an increase in the administrative and enforcement costs,
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increase in payments for foreign technology and the displacement of pirates 
would be less than the benefits if the Philippines would be able to take 
advantage of innovations fostered by higher R&D investments at the local and 
international level and greater technology and foreign direct investment flows.1 
It is important to note that the patent office also generate significant revenues 
including foreign exchange through fees; thus, the burden of higher 
administrative cost may be reduced if such a shift in policy would result to 
more applications. Moreover, given the increasing rate of technological 
change worldwide, increased access to new technology can open up new 
opportunities and possibilities that would be beneficial for the development of 
the Philippines. Furthermore, as the country adopts a more liberal trade policy 
and reduce barriers to foreign competition, better access to new technology is 
necessary to improve productivity of its industries and effectively benefit from 
the more efficient reallocation of resources brought about by the integration of 
the world economy.
The model developed in chapter 4 suggests that strengthening patent 
protection in a developing country like the Philippines would have some costs 
and benefits attached to it. The main cost is that technology (embodied in a
'Another perceived cost to developing countries that has recently raise concern is on the 
patenting of animals, plants and genes. The developing countries are home to a vast majority 
of plants and animal species that could be turned into new drugs and crops. Under the current 
system, developing countries fear the possibility that some unscrupulous firms in the industrial 
countries may use patent laws and deny them of the commercial use of indigenous materials. 
To address this issue some developing countries like Cost Rica have laws exempting genes 
from patenting. Others are introducing laws requiring all those applying for intellectual 
property protection of a plant variety to declare the source and prove that they have the 
consent of the native users as well as make arrangements to share the eventual rewards of 
commercialization. Brazil is one country that is currently pushing to have this written into 
TRIPs; however the United States is strongly opposed to such change. The fuss over 
biopiracy shows that developing countries are not opposed to a proper patent regime, they 
merely want to set up a patent system that would take care of their needs. If the current system 
does not work then new models would probably be needed to cover this type of products 
(The Economist 2001).
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product or process) would be acquired at higher prices relative to a system of 
weak patent protection where there is free riding. It is important to recognise 
however, that while free riding may be beneficial in some cases in the short 
run, it may have some negative implications in the country’s long run 
development. For a limited range of industries, firms may be able to 
incorporate new products or process that may have been available through a 
weak system of intellectual patent protection but there is simply a great deal of 
technology that can not be filched much less developed without the willing 
cooperation of innovators. Sherwood (1993) argues that any benefit derived 
from free riding are more than offset by the damage it could do to a country’s 
technological infrastructure as a result of a weak intellectual property system. 
There are opportunities that may be foregone as a result o f a weak patent 
protection which for a country like the Philippines need for its development. 
These opportunities include the encouragement of domestic research, the 
training of local personnel, better access to more advanced technologies and 
the attraction of foreign direct investments and joint venture programs.
The empirical part of the thesis examines two aspects of Philippine 
manufacturing that may be affected by patenting: technical efficiency and 
domestic innovation. In chapter 6 it was found that from the point of view of 
Philippine industry, a positive correlation exists between technical efficiency 
and patenting. This suggests that the availability of industry-specific 
innovations (both internal and external) leads to higher productivity growth in 
Philippine manufacturing. Thus, a patent policy designed to gain access to 
new technologies is beneficial to the Philippines.
The impact of patenting on domestic innovation was examined in Chapter 
7. While patenting does not appear to stimulate domestic innovation in light 
industries, Philippine non-traditional industries like engineering and chemical
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and drug industries significantly benefit from an increased supply of available 
technology which a patent policy can bring. This positive impact of patenting 
on domestic innovation is also consistent with some of the findings in 
developing countries like Mexico and Columbia who recently reformed their 
patent laws (Sherwood 1993). After reforming its patent laws in 1991, 
Mexico’s patent office received a large number of patent applications filed by 
domestic nationals. Columbia on the other hand, adopted copyright software 
protection in 1989 which led to an increase in the registration of application 
software packages from domestic residents. Many of these software 
applications help run local manufacturing firms.
Aside from the above benefits, chapter 3 also shows that there are other 
areas that could be explored from which benefits from patent protection could 
be derived. These areas include trade and foreign direct investment. An 
analysis of trade in intellectual-property and technology intensive goods 
shows that despite the dominance of the industrial countries in such trade, 
exports of these products coming from the fast growing economies of Asia are 
catching up. In the case of the Philippines, fostering these new industries is 
critically dependent on access to advanced technologies which for most part 
can not be pilfered. For high-technology products, foreign companies need to 
be attracted to local plants and share their expertise to local producers. But 
such sharing would rarely occur in a regime of weak protection. Thus, the 
Philippines would benefit more by advancing intellectual property protection 
rather than putting it off.
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